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EXAMINING THE POST SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 PRACTICES OF  
ACCREDITED AND NONACCREDITED LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN  
THE ASPECTS OF TRAINING, LEGAL AND SERVICE DELIVERY

EUGENE G. SAVAGE

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Ross College of Education, Health and  
Human Services of Lynn University  
In partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy

November 21, 2003

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THE ASPECT OF TRAINING, LEGAL AND SERVICE DELIVERY

Savage, Eugene G., Ph.D.

Lynn University, 2003

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This work is dedicated to my mother, Martha Smith, dearly departed, yet always remembered. She taught me the lessons of life and the value of an education, tempered by common sense. Although not with me now in the physical sense, her spirit will remain present in my life forever.

## Abstract

Homeland security measures and the preparation of local law enforcement are reviewed, in light of September 11, 2001, to determine their effect on the Constitutional rights of citizens, the delivery of law enforcement services, e.g., call response and the training methodologies, and the fiscal impact to fulfill the new policing mandates. The study reviews aggressive measures, normally vested with federal law enforcement agencies, to determine if local police are also utilizing similar methods for the sake of national security and if such measures are undermining ethical and legal practices previously exercised by local police. This research also examines the distinction between accredited and nonaccredited law enforcement agencies as it relates to post September 11<sup>th</sup> practices. The findings were gained through interviews at 7 local police agencies of 8 law enforcement executives, who provided rich narrative perspectives showing that their agencies: (a) still abided by Constitutional principles by not engaging in bias-based policing; (b) the impact on calls for services was limited to a few weeks following 9/11, 6 months later were back to normal, and are currently at pre-9/11 levels; (c) training practices have changed; and (d) little or no funding was received by the agencies

from the federal government for training or equipment and the fiscal impact was either absorbed by the agency or equipment was not obtained.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title Page .....	i
Copyright Page .....	ii
Acknowledgements .....	iii
Abstract .....	iv
Table of Contents .....	vi
List of Tables .....	xi

### Chapter I

Introduction .....	1
Purpose of Study .....	5
Statement of Problem .....	8
Conceptual Underpinning/ the U.S. Constitution .....	9
Researcher Bias .....	11
Importance of Study .....	13
Limitations, Assumptions and Design Control .....	19
Definitions of Terms .....	20
Summary .....	25

### Chapter II

Review of the Literature .....	28
Introduction .....	28
Previous Academic Research .....	29
The U.S. Constitution and Civil Rights .....	36
Accreditation .....	40

Racial Profiling .....	44
Terrorism .....	50
Terrorism Training and Funding for Police .....	56
Summary .....	62

### Chapter III

Research Design and Methodology .....	63
Introduction .....	63
Research Approach .....	65
Survey Instrument .....	66
Population .....	70
Sample Size .....	74
Interview Method .....	75
Trustworthiness .....	79
Summary .....	81

### Chapter IV

Results .....	82
Introduction .....	82
Respondents .....	83
Agency Size .....	85
Accreditation .....	85
Policy against Racial Profiling/ Bias-Based Policing .....	86
Vigilance .....	86

Significant Population of Muslim or Arabic Citizens .....	88
Pre-9/11 Department Policies .....	88
Post-9/11 Department Policies .....	89
Pre & post-9/11 Terrorism/WMD Training Requirements .....	89
Increase in WMD Calls for Service .....	90
Similar Number of Calls Today .....	90
Funding From Federal or State Governments .....	90
Additional Statements .....	91
Settings and Participants .....	92
Interview .....	93
Accreditation .....	93
Bias-Based Policing Practice .....	94
Terrorism Policies .....	94
Training and Funding .....	94
Calls for Service .....	95
Personal Views and Opinions .....	95
Within Case Analysis .....	95
PD1 .....	95
PD2 .....	109
PD3 .....	129
PD4 .....	138
PD5 .....	150

PD6 .....	159
PD7 .....	172
Cross-Case Analysis .....	182
Accreditation .....	183
Bias-Based Policing Practices .....	186
Terrorism Policies .....	189
Training and Funding .....	193
Calls for Service .....	200
Personal Views and Opinions .....	203
Summary .....	220

## Chapter V

Findings, Conclusions and Implications .....	223
Introduction .....	223
Summary of the Study .....	224
Conclusions .....	228
Implications .....	235
Future Research .....	241
Final Summary .....	244

References .....	247
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## Appendices

Appendix A: U.S. Constitution .....	261
Appendix B: Law Enforcement Oath of Office .....	263
Appendix C: Law Enforcement Code of Ethics .....	264



Appendix D: Introduction Letter for September 11 <sup>th</sup> Survey .....	266
Appendix E: September 11 <sup>th</sup> Survey.....	267
Appendix F: Survey Recipients .....	269
Appendix G: Survey Respondents .....	271
Appendix H: Personal Interview Questions .....	272
Appendix I: Letter to Informant .....	274
Appendix J: Informed Consent .....	275
Appendix K: Informed Consent to Audio Record .....	276
Appendix L: Mission Statement of PD1 .....	277
Appendix M: Mission Statement of PD2 .....	278
Appendix N: Mission Statement of PD4 .....	279
Appendix O: Mission Statement, Vision, Values and Motto of PD5 .....	280

## LIST OF TABLES

### Table

4.1 September 11, 2001 Law Enforcement Survey Responses .....	84
4.2 PD1 Racial/Gender Demographics .....	97
4.3 PD2 Racial/Gender Demographics .....	111
4.4 PD3 Racial/Gender Demographics .....	130
4.5 PD4 Racial/Gender Demographics .....	140
4.6 PD5 Racial/Gender Demographics .....	151
4.7 PD6 Racial/Gender Demographics .....	161
4.8 PD7 Racial/Gender Demographics .....	175
4.9 Agency Accreditation Status and Their Reasoning .....	184
4.10 Bias-Based Policing Practices .....	188
4.11 Terrorism Policies .....	192
4.12 Agency Training and Funding .....	195
4.13 Agency Purchase of WMD/Terrorism Equipment and Funding .....	197
4.14 WMD/Terrorism Type Calls for Service .....	201
4.15 Prominent Themes Depicting Participants' Attitude Pre/Post-9/11 .....	205
4.16 Prominent Themes Depicting Important Lessons of 9/11 .....	208
4.17 Prominent Themes Depicting Views on the Impact of 9/11 .....	210
4.18 Secondary Theme 2: Arrogance and Apathy of the U.S. ....	215

4.19	Secondary Theme 4: Law Enforcement had Ineffective Communications System .....	216
4.20	Secondary Theme 5: Smaller Communities and Their Law Enforcement Agencies are Overlooked .....	218
4.21	Secondary Theme 7: Changes in Law Enforcement are Permanent .....	219

# EXAMINING THE POST SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 PRACTICES OF ACCREDITED AND NONACCREDITED LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN THE ASPECTS OF TRAINING, LEGAL AND SERVICE DELIVERY

## CHAPTER I

### *Introduction*

**"Are you guys ready? Let's roll" (Breslau, 2001, p.**

**54)!** Todd Beamer, passenger on United Airlines

Flight 93, September 11, 2001.

Much the same as it undoubtedly did for Todd Beamer, September 11, 2001 started as a regular workday for this researcher with a routine Police Department staff meeting underway, discussing local crime events of the past 24 hours. That meeting was abruptly interrupted a few minutes before 9:00 a.m. with an announcement by a police department employee that a plane had just crashed into one of the twin towers in New York City. As the conference room TV was switched on and command staff members affixed their eyes to live broadcasts, the second tower was hit at 9:03 a.m., witnessed on live TV by the researcher and his command staff, and the millions of people world-wide. The magnitude of these events unfolded as reports began to filter in about other planes possibly hijacked. Taken together, the events of that infamous day left no doubt

that this was the dawn of a new day and a new era of terrorism for the U.S. and its law enforcement community. As such, a majority of local level law enforcement agencies took up the now famous utterance of Todd Beamer, "Let's Roll!"

The literature suggests that never before in American history have modern law enforcement institutions been taxed with the awesome responsibility of protecting its service population from terrorism, that is more indicative of the Middle East or other foreign countries (Delattre, 2002; Moore, 2002; Drug Enforcement Report, 2003; Dale, 2003). Police are now faced with the difficult task of how to best address terrorism, and law enforcement experts are locked in debate on what is the appropriate response. Widely recognized expert on police and security, George Kelling, chairman of the Police Institute at Rutgers and author of the theoretical text, *Broken Windows*, poses this query to *American Police Beat*, "The question is, what impact is 9/11 going to have on our community policing and how do we best protect our communities? I take the position that terrorism is one more urban problem and police are going to have to deal with it" (Nichols, 2003, p. 40). If the latter is indeed true and the evidence suggests so (Beary, 2002; Delattre, 2002; Gibeault, 2002), the writer moves

Kelling's statement further in this research to determine how the police are dealing with "it" (domestic terrorism), or indulging on Beamer's refrain, how did the police "roll."

Historically, the roles of American police, in the modern sense of patrols, are to prevent and detect crime and maintain general order. These are carryovers from colonial times, where or when there were constables, sheriffs and nightwatchmen (Miller, 2000). Beginning in the 1950s, there were several paradigm shifts in the approaches to policing, when emphasis swept the gamut from professionalism, efficiency and crime control, to the 1990s with community relations, community policing and a social services model (Goldstein, 1979; Miller, 2000; Delattre, 2002).

However, an increase in violent crime became a major concern for American police in the 1990s and led by the New York City Police Department, law enforcement agencies implemented a new process, Compstat. Compstat was based on accurate and timely intelligence, rapid deployment, effective tactics and relentless follow-up and assessment (Vito, 2000). This process stressed accountability and where implemented, has effectively reduced the violent

crime that police agencies dealt with before September 11, 2001 (Ibid).

Nevertheless, despite the success of aggressive policing due to initiatives such as Compstat, other issues emerged. Racial profiling was one issue that began to balloon into a nationally recognized problem, even becoming the issue of presidential debates and elections (Lords, 2000). Thus the police were pressured to change their approach through mandated policies, etc., against racial profiling or bias-based policing.

Now the picture has changed, ironically, beginning in the City of New York, where the first dose of a new type of domestic terrorism was felt in 1993 at the World Trade Center (Brannan, 2003). From the onset, law enforcement and the fire service were the first responders and felt the full force of the terrorism blow at the World Trade Center and that response has proven to be of paramount importance. "Local first responders are the only assets capable of meeting the critical interval to intervention time necessary to minimize the impact of a terrorist attack" (Maniscalco, Denney, Holtermann and Kaniewski, 2002, p. 3). That picture has translated into policing methodology changes for the majority of law enforcement agencies in the U.S.

This study will take a qualitative look at current practices of law enforcement to determine how business is being conducted after 9/11 and the findings will be discussed. The policy implications regarding bias-based policing, merits of accreditation and Constitutional adherence will be discussed. The practice implications regarding training, call response and the procurement of funding will also be discussed. Any future research implications will be presented.

### ***Purpose of study***

The purpose of this research is to provide a descriptive account of how law enforcement agencies have reacted to September 11, 2001 through the perspectives of the participants. The researcher has synthesized and interpreted the data collected and presented it in a written format to benefit academia in the pursuit of knowledge about law enforcement's response to American domestic terrorism.

Domestic security became increasingly important for law enforcement at all levels of government after the terrorist events of September 11, 2001 (Delattre, 2002; Gilbeault, 2002; Lichtblau, 2002). From a global perspective, the aftermath of September 11 underlined how differently we have changed our thinking about state



sovereignty during the last century (Singer, 2002). From a national perspective, that fateful date drastically changed the way daily operations are carried out, especially in the early period following the disasters (Delattre, 2002; New Profilees, 2002; Raterman, 2002).

Although there are numerous areas that directly impacted the service delivery of local law enforcement agencies, e.g., time of day, type of community, and level of staffing (Goldstein, 1979), those of significance in this study focus on the legal and ethical practices of law enforcement, changes in terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) training, and response to certain service calls. The focus of this dissertation is to qualitatively capture law enforcement's response immediately following the disaster, in the ensuing months after the calamity and the current practices.

The catastrophic events of terrorism also set in motion unprecedented action by the U.S. that affected not only law enforcement, but also virtually all segments of society. John Gibeault (2002) sums up the sense of urgency and the impact on law firms, business communities and law enforcement:

Time was when businesses could consider catastrophic terrorism about as likely as a rogue asteroid strike

or a good old-fashioned plague of locusts or frogs. No longer. As businesses come to grips with terrorism as a real and long-term menace, they must consider massive assaults foreseeable. Within weeks of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, [Bracewell & Patterson] the Houston-based firm launched a practice group to address public and corporate security, as well as counter-terrorism, perhaps the first of its kind,... Some state and local precautions range from dead serious to downright silly. Others appeared to do no more than add a redundant layer to federal laws and regulations already on the books. For example, Chicago has adopted a city ordinance forcing high-rise building owners to develop evacuation plans. Police there are also considering dusting off an old ordinance that requires fingerprinting and photographs from reporters applying for press cards to allow them to cross police lines. (p. 3)

September 11<sup>th</sup> served as the catalyst for the creation of a new mindset, sort of a punctuation mark, and the point of rapid acceleration for priority shifts already begun by other forces. The emphasis switched from one of containing damage already caused to one of preventing disaster.

## ***Statement of the problem***

This study seeks to understand the experience of local law enforcement agencies amidst the impact of domestic terrorism in the U.S. and to investigate their perception of that impact. That experience can be best answered by asking the following research questions:

1. What changes did the September 11, 2001 domestic terrorism events and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have on accredited and nonaccredited law enforcement agencies, directly following the terrorism attack, 6 months after and currently in the following areas:
  - A. Funding
  - B. Vigilance
  - C. Training
  - D. Bias-based policing
  - E. Call response
2. What was the distinction, if any, between the practices of accredited and nonaccredited law enforcement agencies post 9/11?

Qualitative methods are utilized because the focus of the study is exploratory and phenomenological (Patton, 1990). I surveyed 62 local South Florida law enforcement agencies in St. Lucie, Martin, Palm Beach, Broward and

Miami-Dade counties, and one in County 6 (N = 63). I selected 7 agencies with the most salient themes for in-depth open-ended personal interviews. This dissertation will discuss the salient points and implications of the research.

### ***Conceptual Underpinning - The U.S. Constitution***

The U. S. Constitution (see Appendix A) is the underlying principle document that establishes the conceptual foundation for the governance of the U.S. The Constitution is designed to protect the civil rights of Americans. From it flows the doctrine that governs what law enforcement agencies can legally do to the populace. Specifically, this is found in the Bill of Rights in Amendments IV, V and VI (U.S. Constitution, 1787). The Fourth Amendment is of paramount importance in this research, as it outlines the following civil rights:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized. (U.S. Const. amend. IV)

The ethical decisions of the police must abide by these rights. Former U.S. Attorney General, Janet Reno, in a foreword to Principles for Promoting Police Integrity (January 2001), poignantly points out that law enforcement must use ethical principles and practices to promote the integrity of civil rights established by the U.S. Constitution.

The basic oath of office or oath of honor for a law enforcement officer implies that he/she must uphold the U.S. Constitution (see Appendix B). Carol W. Lewis (1991) describes the significance of the oath in public service:

These oaths spell out the foundation of duty in public service. By taking the job, office, or position, the public servant promises legal compliance. The federal ethic code (P.A. 96-303, unanimously passed by Congress and signed into law by the president on July 3, 1980) spells out a simple standard: "Uphold the Constitution, laws, and regulations of the United States and of all government therein and never be a party to their evasion." (p. 35)

Lewis goes on to explain that public service, which includes law enforcement, is both rooted and bound by the Constitution's provision and these are the citizen's basis for trust.

James S. Bowman (1991) points out that the ethos for how public servants must conduct themselves is grounded in the U.S. Constitution. The federalists and the antifederalists determined regime values in the early days of the U.S. Bowman finds that these values are "those manifest in the Constitution of the United States and include but are not limited to personal liberty, property, and equality. According to Rohr, they represent 'the values of the American people' (1976, p. 399)" (p. 14).

Nevertheless, Bowman cautions in the same writing that most of today's constitutional problems with such a narrow interpretation as an administered oath to uphold the Constitution cannot be resolved. Bowman writes, "that oath can provide little ethical guidance to the practitioner or assurance to the public that high standards of ethical conduct will be met" (p. 98). Yet the Constitution remains the most significant force behind the rights of citizens of the U.S. and is intertwined in the language of law enforcement (IACP, 2003).

### ***Researcher bias***

The researcher has a personal interest in the proposal, because it relates to a field of study where the writer has served as a practitioner over 33 years. I am currently the chief of police for a municipal law

enforcement agency in South Florida (City X) with 115 authorized sworn positions, and has been in the position since 1997. Prior to that, the writer spent 26½ years with another larger municipal police agency (currently 280 sworn position), retiring at the rank of assistant chief of police.

This researcher has dealt firsthand with the impact of September 11, 2001 on police operations at his current law enforcement agency. City X has faced a budget shortfall for the past two years, which resulted in 13 of the 115 sworn positions remaining unfunded. Thus, staffing shortages and an above average attrition rate exacerbate an already difficult problem of dealing with the aftermath of September 11, 2001. Despite the latter, I have dedicated staff to participate in one of the regional law enforcement terrorism task forces, handle terrorism planning, training, call response and equipment acquisition.

Funding associated with terrorism and WMD has been sparse, but the researcher was able to purchase some protective suits, designed to shield against certain chemical weapons using money from the Law Enforcement Trust Fund (LETF). Other suits were purchased with the assistance of grant money received by a larger Central Florida law enforcement agency that was the lead agency in

the region's terrorism task force. I have found it difficult to obtain other assistance or reimbursement for expenditures related to September 11, 2001 or subsequent domestic terrorism.

Finally, a critical bias was the inclusion of the researcher's spouse as a participant. My spouse is an African American female, one of a handful of female chiefs of police in the U.S. (Horne, 1999). Another study shows that women comprise a small percentage, "less than 11.2% of all sworn law enforcement personnel in the U.S."

(Harrington, 2001, ¶ 3). Women comprise an even smaller percentage (7.3%) in the top command positions within large police agencies (Women fight, 2002).

Harrington found that African American women account for less than one percent (0.3%) of law enforcement personnel in the top command.

This researcher's spouse was the only female police chief in the population selected for the survey, and subsequently was the only one to respond. She was selected for the personal interview to give a female's perspective at the top executive level in a law enforcement agency.

### ***Importance of Study***

This research is important for four primary reasons. First, it is important for the researcher and law



enforcement administrators to develop knowledge in post-disaster management and to review the preparations for domestic terrorism by law enforcement agencies. The latter became quite clear as law enforcement agencies and government bodies struggled to come to grips with terrorism (Assessing Florida's, 2001; Beary, 2002; Mckinney, 2002). Secondly, it demonstrates why law enforcement agencies must have the capability to handle catastrophic events by developing programs, strategies and obtaining the necessary resources to meet a new demand, while not diminishing the primary law enforcement function (Delattre, 2002). Third, in light of racial profiling issues, it provides guidelines for law enforcement executives to keep them out of the trap of stereotyping individuals based on their beliefs, practices or ethnicity (Delattre, 2002; Mckinney, 2002; Moore, 2002; New Profilees, 2002). Lastly, it is important to academia because there is a paucity of academic research on local law enforcement and the ability to handle domestic or international terrorism in the U.S.

The evidence suggests that law enforcement agencies substantially increased their vigilance, awareness and response to WMD calls, and suspicious persons/activity immediately following September 11, 2001 (Delattre, 2002; Moore, 2002). Domestic Terrorism/WMD training also

drastically increased and federal and state mandates were imposed on police agencies with little or no new funding (Beary, 2002; Buisch, 2002; Boyter, 2003; Police Standards, 2001; PATRIOT Act, 2001). Budget proposals by law enforcement agencies have expanded to meet the demand of mandated homeland security training, because the promised federal funding has not materialized (Modzelewski, 2003). Many operational aspects and certain practices of local law enforcement may never return to pre-September 11, 2001 because of the changing face of current events, e.g., guerilla war in Iraq, its rising unrest and piecemeal rebuilding, and further terrorist activities.

Prior to September 11, 2001, model policies were developed by major police organizations, i.e., the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), to ensure that law enforcement in the U.S. follows a code of ethics (see Appendix C). The overwhelming abundance of police agencies follow and comply with these canons of ethics, which recently incorporated anti-bias based policing policies (Delattre, 2002). Delattre finds that no ethical exceptions should be made, and as such, law enforcement agencies should comply with these principles, even when it may seem inconvenient.

Adding strength to this compliance issue was the earlier establishment of law enforcement accreditation in the late 1970s. Accreditation programs were consistent with the change in the philosophical model of policing from traditional policing to community-based policing (Goldstein, 1979). The Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) maintains American law enforcement accreditation and the following provides a brief overview of its development and function:

In 1979, the Commission was created through the combined efforts of four major law enforcement organizations: the International Association of Chiefs of Police, National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives, National Sheriffs' Association, and the Police Executive Research Forum. These organizations continue to serve in an advisory capacity to the Commission and are responsible for appointing members to the Commission.

The Commission was formed for two reasons: to develop a set of law enforcement standards; and to establish and administer an accreditation process through which law enforcement agencies could demonstrate voluntarily that they meet professionally-recognized criteria for excellence in management and

service delivery. (CALEA Online, 2003, Accreditation program, ¶ 1)

CALEA is a voluntary program, but it provides standards developed by law enforcement practitioners, covering a wide range of topics, including police ethics. Accreditation has international recognition and primary benefits which include controlled liability insurance costs, administrative improvements, greater accountability from supervisors and increased governmental and community support (CALEA Online, 2003).

The importance of accreditation is implied by the rapid growth of smaller accreditation authorities (Sharp, 2000). Sharp found that a dozen states have their own accreditation agencies because local law enforcement must reflect local conditions, priorities and needs. The latter is indicative of state accreditation agencies, such as the Commission for Florida Law Enforcement Accreditation (CFA), which was established by Florida law, § 943.125 in 1993 (Sharp; CFA, 2003). CFA is similar in scope and function to CALEA, but the 250 professional standards are designed specifically for Florida law enforcement agencies, to ensure the public that quality services are being delivered in accordance with recognized accepted standards (Sharp; CFA).

Another fledgling accrediting organization is the National Law Enforcement Credentialing Board (NLECB), which establishes professional standards of excellence for law enforcement officers who have demonstrated a commitment to higher education and public service (Hill, 2000). The difference between how CALEA evaluates law enforcement agencies and how NLECB evaluates is that the subjects of these evaluations in NLECB are individual law enforcement officers (Hill, 1999). However, only law enforcement agencies that are accredited through CALEA or CFA are the subjects of this research.

It is equally important to examine and consider a fundamental ethical issue, here described by Peter Singer from a global perspective (2002):

To what extent should political leaders see their role narrowly, in terms of promoting the interests of their citizens, and to what extent should they be concerned with the welfare of people everywhere? There is a strong ethical case for saying that it is wrong for leaders to give absolute priority to the interests of their own citizens. (p. B8)

Singer believes that, as a nation, the U.S. must extend the reach of our criminal law to "the most remote mountain valleys of the farthest-flung countries" (p. B8) to have

the means to bring terrorists to justice. Although Singer looked at the ethical issue from a global viewpoint and cites the need for a sound global system of criminal justice, the writer will look at the effects of post-9/11 practices on ethical policies from a national standpoint.

### ***Limitations, assumptions, and design controls***

It became apparent that a major limitation of this research was the sensitivity of its topic. This sensitivity blossomed early when one previous study had been censored and was not available for review, although it was listed in the dissertation abstracts as being available via UMI Dissertation Services and Digital Dissertations/Dissertation Express. That sensitivity was again suspect in the failure of many law enforcement agencies to respond to the initial survey and the reluctance to discuss the issue, even to a fellow colleague. My initial assumption was that peers would have little reluctance to discuss the issue, after all, "I was one of them." However, it was difficult to get willing participants from those who responded to the survey.

Another limitation was this type of research with a relatively small sample would be difficult to generalize to a larger population (Patton, 1990). Therefore, I sought to extrapolate the data and complete a cross-case analysis of

the participants to determine if there was congruity among participants. Design control was in the form of purposeful sampling by selecting "information-rich cases for in-depth study" (Patton, 1990, p. 182).

### **Definitions of Terms**

The following terms are repeatedly used throughout this research and to clarify their meaning and application in this text, their definitions are provided.

**Bias-based policing/racial profiling** - The sole consideration by a law enforcement officer in any fashion and to any degree of the race, national, or ethnic origin of a person in deciding upon the scope or substance of any investigation, enforcement action or motor vehicle stop.

**Calls for service** - Incidents (i.e, reports of burglaries, disturbances, thefts, robberies, etc.) that law enforcement officers respond to either through self-initiated activity or citizen requests for police service.

**Command staff** - The executive head of a law enforcement organization and his/her leading administrators. The executive head carries the title of sheriff, chief or director, depending on the type of agency. Other command staff members may have a

variety of titles, i.e., assistant chief, major, captain, commanders, etc.

**Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement**

**Agencies (CALEA)** - A national law enforcement accreditation body that derives its authority from four major law enforcement membership associations, comprising 80% of all of the law enforcement profession in the U.S. Its purpose is to improve delivery of law enforcement service by offering a body of standards, developed by law enforcement practitioners (CALEA Online, 2003).

**Commission for Florida Law Enforcement Accreditation**

**(CFA)** - A commission created by Florida Statute 943.125 to develop a voluntary law enforcement accreditation program, comprised of more than 250 professional standards designed specifically for Florida law enforcement agencies.

**General purpose police departments** - A municipal level governmental department tasked with maintaining order, enforcing the law, and preventing and detecting crime. In a larger metropolitan area, the department may have a countywide responsibility.

**International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP)** -

The IACP is the world's largest and oldest nonprofit



membership organization of police executives comprised of over 19,000 members in over 92 countries. Among the goals of the IACP, two that are important to this study are; 1) to bring about recruitment and training in the police profession of qualified persons; and 2) to encourage adherence of all police officers to high professional standards of performance and conduct.

**Law enforcement accreditation** - Status bestowed or credited to a law enforcement agency when it has met compliance with applicable standards established by a state or national law enforcement commission.

**Law Enforcement Trust Fund (LETF)** - A fund that is established by federal and state statutes, wherein proceeds seized from criminals (by law enforcement agencies) that were used in the commission of a crime are deposited. Such proceeds may be used to purchase items for law enforcement use, youth or community sponsored programs or other purposes.

**National Organization of Black Law Enforcement**

**Executives (NOBLE)** - NOBLE is a multi-purpose nonprofit organization of primarily Black police executives established in 1976. The objectives of NOBLE that relate closely to this study are recommending and executing policies, processes and

procedures that recognize and pursue goals common to all segments of the community and law enforcement, with a focus on ensuring strict accountability and uncompromising integrity.

**Nonsworn** - Civilian personnel working at a law enforcement agency in a support capacity who are not certified, or commissioned by a governing body to carry out law enforcement functions and have no arrest powers.

**Police Executive Research Forum (PERF)** - PERF is a national membership organization of progressive police executives from the largest city, county and state law enforcement agencies, dedicated to improving policing and advancing professionalism through research and involvement in public policy debate.

**Public safety department** - A law enforcement department tasked with maintaining order, enforcing the law, and preventing and detecting crime, whose members are additionally cross-trained in fire fighting.

**Service delivery** - The method or means in which calls for service are handled. There are numerous circumstances that impact how calls for service are

delivered, e.g., type of call and availability of police units.

**Sheriff's Office** - A county law enforcement organization tasked with maintaining order, enforcing the law, and preventing and detecting crime, normally headed by an elected official (in the state of Florida the sheriff is a constitutional officer). The sheriff's office must also house prisoners, handle civil duties, e.g., warrants, subpoena and civil papers, and provide security for the county court system.

**Soft target** - Any infrastructure or facility that has a vulnerability to terrorism due to its accessibility.

**Sworn** - Personnel that are certified or commissioned by a governing body to carry out law enforcement functions and having arrest powers.

**Terrorism** - The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to coerce or intimidate a government or society, to further religious, political or military ideologies. Terrorism can be domestic or international. "Domestic terrorism involves groups or individuals who are based and operate entirely within the United States and Puerto Rico without foreign direction and whose acts are directed at elements of

the U.S. Government or population" (Managing Weapon, 2003, p. 1-14). "International terrorism is foreign based and/or directed by countries or groups outside the U.S." (Ibid, p. 1-18). However, for the purposes of this study, the terms will be interchangeable.

**Weapon of mass destruction (WMD)** - Any explosive, incendiary, poison gas, bomb, military ordnance, or weapons containing or designed to release disease organisms, chemical or explosives. An example would be anthrax, which was sent via the mail to expose individuals to its effect.

**9/11** - The colloquial designation for September 11, 2001.

### ***Summary***

This chapter gave a brief chronology of the historical antecedents of law enforcement leading up to September 11, 2001. That trend went from a professional model of policing in the 1950s to community policing in the 1980s and 1990s and then focused on crime control through computer statistics, with an emphasis on police accountability. It also pointed out why and how the role of the police has drastically changed from the latter to roles in domestic security and terrorism response,

following the terrorist event and how federal organizations responded.

The intent of the study and the main research questions are presented. The importance of the U.S. Constitution as a foundation for the research was reviewed and Amendments IV, V and VI are shown to be the study's conceptual underpinning. Legislative initiatives such as the PATRIOT Act, Homeland Security and Florida legislations were discussed and opinions about their need and legality given.

I also revealed significant personal biases, one of which disclosed a professional involvement with 9/11 in the field of law enforcement. The purpose of providing an accurate descriptive account of law enforcement's response was explained. Three important areas for this research were determined to be: (a) developing knowledge in post-disaster management; (b) determining resource and program development; and (c) diminishing bias-based policing practices. The development, impact and importance of accreditation to law enforcement were also reviewed.

Finally, I disclosed some limitations regarding the sensitivity of the issue of terrorism and law enforcement's response, assumptions made based on my professional status,

and reviewed frequently used terms that are germane to this study, but may be unfamiliar to academic readers.

The remainder of this study will follow a standard dissertation format. Chapter 2 will provide a review of the literature through academic research and other studies or viewpoints, presenting their findings, approaches and revealing any gaps. Chapter 3 will describe the methodologies used and how the participants were selected for personal interviews. Chapter 4 will provide a descriptive assessment of the results in the words of the participants, and an analysis and interpretation of the findings by the researcher. A discussion and explanation of the results will be given. Chapter 5 will summarize, evaluate and interpret the results, as they relate to the original research questions. The predominant findings will be listed and any limitations experienced, and direction for future research will also be discussed.

## CHAPTER II

### Review of the Literature

#### *Introduction*

**"To the fanatic, everything is black or white, curse or blessing, friend or foe—and nothing in between. He is immune to doubt and hesitation. He perceives tolerance as weakness" (Wiesel, 2002, p. 5).** Elie Wiesel, Nobel laureate and World War II Auschwitz and Buchenwald concentration camp survivor commenting on the individuals who flew planes into buildings on September 11, 2001.

This chapter reviews academic dissertations and other studies/viewpoints relevant to this research. It also ventures outside the academic setting to examine acceptable and credible studies, views and thoughts of others regarding police practices and related issues (e.g., ethics, racial profiling, training and funding), pre/post-September 11, 2001. Many of the latter studies are derived from private independent think tanks that are underwritten by the federal government, universities and law enforcement agencies and foundations. The review focuses on the direction and scope of this research and its significance.

The chapter describes what others have to say about the application of the U.S. Constitution to police

operations from several viewpoints. The importance and impact of accreditation to law enforcement is examined. Methodologies and findings of some Academic studies are reviewed and briefly explained. I highlight any gaps found in the reviewed studies that might be applicable to this research.

### ***Previous Academic Research***

A computer search was made via OCLC FirstSearch to check prior dissertations similar to the writer's research proposal from the 1980s to date. There were fewer than a dozen dissertation abstracts on the subject of law enforcement and terrorism, but only four bore similarities to the writer's proposal. Interestingly, all of the studies were prior to September 11, 2001, but focused on the preparedness of government and law enforcement to deal with terrorism. However, I discovered a similar study in-progress serendipitously after receiving a survey in the mail from Florida International University.

The earliest research was by Thomas H. Mitchell, Carleton University, Canada (1986) and it "examined the incidences of politically-motivated insurgent terrorism in North America from 1968 to 1983 and the resultant policy and organizational response of the US and Canadian governments" (¶ 1). Mitchell reviewed "publicly-available"



data collections on the subject of politically motivated terrorism and obtained quantitative data that proved there had been, at that time, a moderate incidence of domestic and transnational terrorism in the U.S. and Canada. Mitchell found a number of significant problems and deficiencies with both governments' response, among them as it relates to local law enforcement, were a lack of coordination of government and law enforcement resources, crisis management planning and police-media relations. The latter (dependent variables) was inhibited by several independent variables (factors), "including the clandestine nature of terrorist activity, the international linkages of some terrorist groups, and the necessity of the coordination of a vast array of governmental and law enforcement resources" (§ 4).

Another early study from City University of New York (Barnathan, 1987) sought to determine the interrelationship between law enforcement and the media in handling terrorist events. Barnathan used a content analysis of the terrorist reporting of a major television network news program and then contrasted with the information disseminated by the Public Information Division of the New York City Police Department. Key personnel in both agencies were interviewed extensively about their methods of gathering,

assembling for distribution and evaluating news and crime data relating to terrorism.

The findings in Barnathan's study suggested that law enforcement and media do not accurately transmit information about terrorist events and they shape and manage information in a number of ways characteristic of their respective institutions. Although the setting in this study was New York City, it was several years ahead of the first World Trade Center terrorism event in 1991.

John B. Furay, University of La Verne, California (1999) conducted a study analyzing "task forcing" used by federal, state and local law enforcement agencies as they cooperate and interact with each other in response to domestic terrorism. Furay, using quantitative and qualitative data collection and assessment, found that it was better for all three levels of law enforcement to centralize their efforts to effectively address domestic terrorism.

I attempted to obtain a copy of the research via the Lynn University library system and also from the Wilson Library at the University of La Verne, La Verne, California. Unfortunately, I was unsuccessful and received a notice from the University of La Verne which said:

Due to apparent sensitive national security issues discussed within the dissertation, we were not allowed to have a copy nor is UMI able to sell copies of that dissertation—your only chance would be to try to contact the author of the dissertation to get a copy, and we are unaware of how to contact him. Sorry!

(Wilson Library Reference Desk, personal communication, July 24, 2003)

The communication served as a poignant reminder of how things have changed since September 11, 2001.

Lastly and very closely related to the writer's proposal, Jason A. Cote' (2000), of Central Missouri State University, completed a quantitative study assessing the level of terrorism preparedness of local police and sheriff's departments in the state of Missouri and determined those department's attitudes about terrorism. Cote' sent surveys to every police department in Missouri with a population of 30,000 people or more and every sheriff's department with a population of 50,000 people or more, resulting in 18 city agencies and 16 county agencies being surveyed ( $N = 34$ ). Cote' had a 56% response rate, receiving surveys from 10 city agencies and 9 county agencies ( $n = 19$ ).

Two of the conclusions were that there were (a) no general consensus on what type of training was most important in combating terrorism, and (b) no agreement on where to obtain funding for development of counter terrorism training and procedures.

I was able to obtain a copy of Cote's study through UMI Dissertation Services. Cote' (2000) noted that there was no set procedure as to who is directly responsible for handling the problem of WMD and he found an earlier study by Jonathan White (1991) that spoke of the dispute between civilian police and the military as to who was responsible for WMD. Civilian law enforcement felt it was a military problem, wherein the military felt just the opposite.

Interestingly, Cote' (2000) talked about congressional bills that were being considered at that time to expand wiretap authority and security at airports. The latter have all passed. Cote also discussed the opposition to counter terrorism legislation:

Some groups, however, claim that Congress is rushing into things in the heat of the moment, so it will not appear soft on terrorism. ...the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) ...claims that Congress is attempting to federalize too many crimes, and that it is additionally expanding the already far reaching

federal powers. The ACLU claims that in an attempt to combat international terrorism, Congress developed an extremely broad definition which overly targeted domestic terrorism. It created the danger that certain individuals will be selectively prosecuted as domestic terrorists based on their political views (Strossen, 1997). (pp. 34-35)

The undermining of civil liberties was a recurrent theme in Cote's work and he referenced the ACLU frequently, "The ACLU points out the abuses of federal law enforcement powers during the sieges in 1992 at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, and in 1993 near Waco, Texas. ...and the future potential abuses of law enforcement power under new counter terrorism legislation" (p. 35).

Cote' asked a series of 27 questions to respondents that were subdivided into three sections. Section 1 discussed past, present and future terrorism preparation, the latter being similar to questions in this PI's research. Section 2 asked for opinions about the present and future state of terrorism in the U.S., and the obstacles impeding better terrorism preparation. Section 3 required respondents to rank several areas pertinent to counter terrorism, including sources of additional funding.

Cote' (2000) in his conclusion found what was still true at the dawn of September 11, 2001:

...most agencies surveyed either thought terrorism was a problem in the United States now or would be in the near future but they did not seem to think that terrorism was or would be a problem in their specific area. Even though most of the agencies did think terrorism was a problem in the United States [sic] most were reluctant to implement department wide training for anything other than the traditional terrorist threat or did not implement training at all.

(p. 67)

However, the latter part of Cote's findings regarding training has been changed drastically by the events of 9/11.

An important finding of Cote's study and significant for this study is that less than half of the respondents reported receiving additional funding, with the federal government being the least contributor. Twelve law enforcement agencies identified a lack of available funding as the biggest obstacle to their agency developing more thorough counter terrorist training procedures and policies. Cote' recommended that his study should be

duplicated in other states to assess various state's levels of terrorism preparation.

There is a current study in progress by Michael W. Collier, Ph.D. and Matthew Rollie, MPH of Florida International University (2003) to understand the preparedness of Florida's public safety agencies regarding counter-terrorism efforts. The research is designed to identify general trends in Florida terrorism preparedness. Although it appears to be a quantitative study, the survey instrument asked 27 specific questions that are similar to Cote's research and my research, regarding training, call preparedness and funding. Some of the similar questions asked by Collier and Rollie are the following:

1. How well prepared is your agency in the area of terrorism response training? (p. 2)
2. Are there any other resources or assistance your agency needs in order to improve its training level? (p. 2)
3. How is your agency funded? (p. 5)

### ***The U.S. Constitution and civil rights***

As pointed out in chapter 1, the U.S. Constitution is the principle document from which all civil rights are bestowed upon American society. Numerous studies point out the freedom and liberties that Americans enjoy are far

above those in many modern-day societies (Lewis, 1991; Bandow, 1995; ACLU, 2003). There are those who feel that these civil liberties should be protected regardless of the consequences of terrorism (Bandow, 1995; Shank, 2001; Raterman, 2002; ACLU, 2003). Nevertheless, there are those who would argue that the very nature of the United States, e.g., a geographically large democracy with open borders, the difficulty in monitoring illegal immigrants, coupled with the rights and necessity of individual access to government facilities, etc., makes it woefully susceptible to terrorism. Prior to September 11, Wright, Ostrow and Cimon (1995) published a viewpoint of America's vulnerability to terrorism and quoted a former FBI agent's caution on giving the police broad discretionary powers, "Democracies are by far the most vulnerable to terrorism, because freedoms are used by terrorists to victimize us. Police don't have the right and shouldn't have for sweeps and searches" (p. A1).

Subsequently, Wright's (et al.) viewpoint of vulnerability in 1995, following the Oklahoma City bombing, was consistent with the viewpoint of politicians of both major parties who began posturing for new counter-terrorism legislation. Such sweeping proposals threaten civil liberties according to Doug Bandow (1995):



These bills would vest the federal government with vast new powers to wiretap, investigate, deport, use the military, and rely on secret evidence. If people don't already have reason to fear government, they certainly will if these measures become law.

(¶ 3)

Bandow (1995) believes that Congress should answer four questions before acting precipitously:

Is terrorism so serious a threat that it requires an immediate, draconian response? Has government policy contributed to violence, like the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City? Do federal agencies require more power to combat terrorism? Does the law enforcement interest outweigh the rights and liberties of citizens that would be sacrificed? (¶ 5 - 13)

Categorically, in 1995 according to Bandow, the answers are that: (a) Terrorism is not serious enough to cause Congress to act without due deliberation; (b) government has already abused its power and thus contributed to the level of violence; (c) the government has enough authority; and (d) law enforcement interests must not outweigh citizens' rights, because this circumvents our system of government. Amazingly, the answers in 1995 are still applicable today,

but the federal government made vast changes in federal law with the passing of the PATRIOT Act of 2001.

Representative Cynthia McKinney, representing Georgia's Fourth Congressional District, offers her own assessment of the danger of allowing government and law enforcement to go too far. Appearing before Congress, July 25, 2002, she recalled the civil rights events of 1967 and a memo from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to 22 field offices to conduct illegal surveillance on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.: "The purpose of this new counterintelligence endeavor is to expose, disrupt, misdirect, or otherwise neutralize black activist leaders and organizations" (p. 3). McKinney further warned, "Congress and the Administration must be increasingly vigilant towards the protection of and adherence to our constitutional rights and privileges. For, if we win the war on terrorism, but create a police state in the process, what have we won" (p. 4)?

However, as the evidence suggests, local law enforcement will be increasingly called upon to engage in overt and covert activity against suspected terrorists and it might place the locals at odds with the U.S. Constitution, their own code of ethics and other policies against bias-based policing. At a recent confidential

meeting of law enforcement officials (federal, state and local levels), the sentiment expressed was to "take them out and worry about" consequences later (Anonymous, personal communication, February 13, 2003).

Despite such sentiments, the review underscores the need for law enforcement to adhere to the principles and guidelines established and protected by the U.S. Constitution.

### ***Accreditation***

I reviewed several studies on law enforcement accreditation and these authors agreed that accreditation was the results of combined efforts of several police organizations to establish law enforcement as a profession (Falzarano, 1999; Sharp, 2000; Bittick, 2003). Falzarano examined one police department's experience with national accreditation and the findings were that the department was able to develop policies and procedures to implement operation standards. Accreditation for this department resulted in a significant reduction in their insurance premiums and improvement in operations, investigations and service to the community.

Falzarano notes that accreditation represented the first step in establishing policing as a profession. Policing is increasingly complex, as officers routinely

deal with life and death situations and activities impacting the health, safety and welfare of citizens. Yet the public has difficulty recognizing law enforcement as a profession, according to Falzarano. However, the very nature of policing requires "specialized knowledge and often long and intense academic preparation" (Falzarano, ¶ 2).

Studies on law enforcement accreditation note that there are numerous benefits. Falzarano (1999), Hill (1999), Sharp (2000) and Bittick (2003) cite the following benefits of accreditation:

1. Controlled liability insurance costs
2. Fewer lawsuits and citizen complaints
3. Stricter accountability within the agency
4. Support from government officials
5. Increased community advocacy
6. Recognition for a department's ability to meet established standards

Hill describes the benefit of national accreditation as a device for measuring professionalism, which most progressive law enforcement executives consider as one of the single most important developments in the history of policing. Sharp's study found that the strongest virtues of accreditation are found in how it establishes

accountability and how it impacts an agency's overall performance. Bittick touts accreditation as a major accountability factor because it provides an already skeptical public with confidence that the agency is in compliance with legislation and court mandates.

However, despite all the hype about accreditation, others regard it as more of a public relations strategy as revealed in the following comments:

Police agency accreditation endures because it provides a veneer of professional assurance while accepting a wide range in the substance of formal policies, most of which have little consequences for the day-to-day practices of police. ...Its greatest significance is in the symbolic realm, not the everyday experience (Mastrofski, 1998, p. 205).

Cordner and Williams (1998) said that accreditation has an emphasis on changes in the process rather than changes in the outcome.

One of the authors who tout the benefits of accreditation also admits its weaknesses, or why it is not wholeheartedly accepted. Sharp (2000) found that some agencies that have tried accreditation discovered that its benefits were not worth the effort or the cost. He notes that other agency heads believe that accreditation has

nothing to offer and is expensive, time consuming and require additional personnel that could be used for other purposes. According to Sharp, the director of CALEA admitted that approximately 10% of accredited agencies do not seek reaccreditation.

Sharp (2000) conducted a poll of randomly selected law enforcement agencies and found the following five major arguments against accreditation:

1. Too expensive
2. Too time consuming
3. Dubious benefits
4. Hard to justify to community government
5. Department administration does not believe in accreditation

Geoffrey P. Alpert and John M. MacDonald (2001), in another study, conducted an analysis of the organizational characteristics of police agencies and used law enforcement accreditation as one of five independent variables. The dependent variable in their study was the rate of force reported by law enforcement agencies. Their national study looked at agency characteristics and their relationship to police use of force. Alpert and MacDonald believe that law enforcement accreditation was an important variable because accreditation is premised on the notion that department-

level policies and procedures can affect police behavior. Forty-seven percent (n = 270) of the 571 agencies responding divulged their data on force and the surprising results found that CALEA or state accredited agencies were not associated significantly with the variation in use of force.

However, all of the writers previously mentioned are in agreement that accreditation does provide significant civil liability reductions and cost-savings in insurance. When civil and criminal liability incidents arise, accredited agencies are afforded with a more defensible legal position if litigation should occur (Hill, 1999). The Intergovernmental Risk Management Agency (IRMA) proved this point after conducting a study of liability litigation and the resulting savings. IRMA found that the number of claims per 100 officers is reduced by 17% for CALEA-accredited agencies, when doing a comparison of CALEA vs. non-CALEA-accredited agencies (Sharp, 2000).

### ***Racial profiling***

Coming on the heels of serious racial profiling issues that modified and established guidelines when police officers conduct traffic stops of African Americans, American police now face similar issues with individuals of Arabic descent or with Islamic beliefs.

Max T. Raterman (2002) made the following comments about racial profiling and post 9/11 America:

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have given the national debate on profiling new life while at the same time recasting the debate in a new light. American law enforcement has had to react to the very real threat of terrorism on American soil as well, prompting great and meaningful debates over whether or not profiling is a useful and necessary technique. Is it somehow now a good idea to profile? In a practical sense, is profiling a useful concept? Other law enforcement subjects such as counter-terrorism training, search and seizure, immigration enforcement, and monitoring of the Internet are controversial, but the issue of profiling is the proverbial "800-pound gorilla" in the room. Do we acknowledge him and deal with him, or work around him? Profiling remains a divisive and problematic issue for the law enforcement community, as well as for the public and elected officials. (p. 1)

Raterman indicates that the first order of business for law enforcement is to develop coherent and effective approaches to objectionable profiling by law enforcement.



However, there are specific laws in most states that prohibit racial profiling. Florida enacted legislation on June 19, 2001, which prohibited racial profiling and directed all "sheriffs and municipal law enforcement agencies to incorporate antiracial or other antidiscriminatory profiling policies into their policies and practices" (§ 943.1758, Sec. 1, Curriculum revision for diverse populations, 2001). The deadline for Florida law enforcement agencies to incorporate the policy was January 1, 2002.

The caveat for prompting such swift legislative action by many states is the federal government's resolve to impose the anti-profiling measure on states by their own Bill (H.R. 1907) which amended title 23, United States Code, "to require States to adopt and enforce standards that prohibit the use of racial profiling in the enforcement of State laws regulating the use of Federal-aid highways" (Racial Profiling Prohibition Act of 2001, § 1). The caveat is the withholding of federal funding/aid to maintain current or build new federal highways for those states that failed to comply with the prohibition.

Many police agencies have created measures against stopping citizens solely on the basis of race, either specifically as a policy against racial profiling, bias-

based policing or referenced in their code of ethics (Curriculum Revision for Diverse Population Act, 2001; Delattre, 2002; Racial Profiling Prohibition Act, 2001; Raterman, 2002). Some agencies have policies against racial profiling that were enacted after the events of 9/11, but were not a result of the terrorists' acts. Most policies have been in the works as a result of racial profiling cases throughout the U.S. in the mid to late 1990s (Delattre, 2002). As indicated earlier, many states have mandated the revision of policies to include anti-bias based policies.

One of the most notorious cases of racial profiling involved the New Jersey State Police, with allegations stemming from a shooting incident following a traffic stop of minority males (*New Jersey v. Hogan & Kenna*, 1998). In the spring of 1998, two New Jersey State troopers stopped a van on the New Jersey Turnpike, largely because the four passengers were African American and non-white males. When the vehicle accidentally rolled back, troopers opened fire, wounding three of the men. The resulting court case prompted policy revisions and data collection by state troopers when making traffic stops ("Media Awareness," 2002). A New Jersey State traffic stop study, released in March 2002 and "which concluded that black drivers were

more likely to speed than whites, created a debate about the merits of collecting traffic data" (p. 6).

Dr. Larry T. Hoover (2002) of the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) cites the ethical issue of racial profiling as an obstacle to state and local terrorism intelligence effectiveness. Dr. Hoover says:

Many states have enacted anti-profiling legislation, prohibiting the use of race, ethnicity, or national origin as a criteria for focused police attention, even as little attention as a traffic stop. Given the clear and present threats of the events of September 11<sup>th</sup>, the trend has clearly been to downplay the profiling issue in its current intelligence gathering effort. A substantial majority of Americans support the effort, and recognize it would be absurd to ignore national origin in the current terrorism control effort. However, when such focused attention is engaged in by local law enforcement agencies that must also provide a range of services to members of the Muslim community, it acquires a different character.

(p. 8)

Dr. Hoover says that police agencies cannot afford to act differently toward Muslims or they will take the "hit" (p. 8) in relations with Muslim communities.

But a report prepared by Sikh Mediawatch (2002) said that many Muslims and other similar community members feel they have been targeted by law enforcement and are becoming the new "profilees" (p. 23). The impact is further described in the following comments from the report:

The Sikh community in the United States, about 500,000 strong, has been deeply shaken up by the events of 9/11. Since the events of 9/11, Sikh Americans have scrambled to improve their relations with local and national law enforcement agencies. In part, this has simply been out of a need for protection: as has been widely reported, many Sikhs and Arabs/Muslims have been attacked and harassed by some bigoted Americans who associate all Middle Eastern-looking minority groups with terrorism. But the engagement with law enforcement authorities also centers around a very pressing issue, that of racial profiling. (p. 24)

Other areas, such as hate crimes against Sikhs, did experience a drop after September 11, but this may be due in part to Sikhs being extremely careful not to expose themselves to potential attacks. However, the report ("New Profilees," 2002), notes that despite the declining violence, racial profiling by police has increased:

In the period immediately following the attacks, many Sikhs (as well as Arabs and Muslims) found themselves scrutinized by police officers even while engaging in normal activities—shopping, eating in restaurants, traveling, etc. Some have even been detained or arrested for reasons that seem to be manufactured. And, a trend that is actually increasing rather than declining is harassment at airport security. (p. 24)

Yet the early days following September 11, 2001 saw repeated action by federal authorities to go against law enforcement anti-racial profiling policies. The Immigration and Naturalization Services immediately passed an order increasing the time an immigrant could be held without being charged, and the White House supported this further by asking Congress for authority to indefinitely detain foreign nationals identified by the attorney general as terrorist threats. Congress scaled the proposal back to seven days, with the enactment of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism, HR 2975, Sec. 203 (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001.

### ***Terrorism***

The reasons behind terrorism are varied and as diverse as the type of people who commit terrorist acts (World

Conflict, 2002). Religious and/or political views may motivate terrorism or military beliefs, but too often the targets are unarmed and/or unsuspecting civilians (Ibid). Suicide bombers are not new to the terrorism venue and in recent history were used in Lebanon and Israel.

The term international terrorism was coined almost 4 decades ago, as leftist guerilla movements clashed with rightist regimes in Latin America, and then it spread around the world—most notably to the Middle East (Wright, Ostrow and Cimon, 1995). However, according to Philip C. Wilcox, Jr., State Department coordinator for counterterrorism, even before September 11, 2001, "Terrorists have expanded their global reach and today all continents are vulnerable" (Wright et al. p. 4). Yet Wright et al. noted that after the Oklahoma City bombing of a federal building, terrorism specialists in this country argued that the Oklahoma City bombing is unlikely to be a catalyst for sweeping change.

However, immediately after September 11, 2001, federal antiterrorism legislation was quick to pass and on October 26, 2001, President Bush signed into law the USA PATRIOT Act. The PATRIOT Act gives federal law enforcement a wide range of tools against terrorism covering electronic surveillance (Sec. 101), search warrants (Sec. 108),

detention (Sec. 203) and property confiscation (Sec. 304, 401, 402, 403 & 404). The Act extends to associates and family members of suspected terrorists (Sec. 217 & 306). The Act also allows for increasing cooperation and information sharing by federal authorities with local law enforcement agencies (Sec. 204).

Gregory Shank (2001) describes the reaction of many police departments to requests made from federal authorities:

Attorney General John Ashcroft ordered interviews of some 5,000 Middle Eastern men between the ages of 18 and 33 who entered the U.S. on nonimmigration visas since January 1, 2000. Interestingly, police departments in Oregon and California, fearful of harming their relationships with minority groups, refused to cooperate. (p. 7)

This research will inevitably determine if the same may hold true for police departments in South Florida.

Although guidelines established by the Justice Department prohibit federal law enforcement officers from using race or ethnicity in routine traffic stops, they allow officers to consider these factors in preventing threats to national security ("Racial Profiling," 2003).

The FBI tracks the activities of persons who are suspected of having connections with terrorism in the U.S. and this may be seen as unethical, especially when focused on a certain group, as reported by the New York Times. On October 6, 2002, reporters Philip Shenon and David Johnston pointed out the following skewed concentrated efforts of the FBI against Muslim men:

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is trying to make an open book of the lives of hundreds of mostly young, mostly Muslim men in the United States in the belief that Al Qaeda-trained terrorists remain in this country, awaiting instructions to attack. Senior law enforcement officials say the surveillance campaign is being carried out by every major F.B.I. office in the country and involves 24-hour monitoring of the suspects' telephone calls, e-mail messages and Internet use, as well as scrutiny of their credit-card charges, their travel and their visits to neighborhood gathering places, including mosques. (p. 1)

The trend above is indicative of the wide dragnet of the FBI, as it is using the law enforcement resources of colleges and universities to scrutinize Middle Eastern students. The following excerpt from an article in the Palm Beach Post highlights this trend:



Since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the FBI has strengthened or established working relationships with hundreds of campus police departments, in part to gain better access to insular communities of Middle Eastern students, government officials said. On at least a dozen campuses, the FBI has included collegiate police officers as members of local Joint Terrorism Task Forces, the regional entities that oversee counter-terrorism investigations nationwide. (Eggen, 2003, p. 18A)

Florida has also developed its local joint terrorism task force and divided it into regional entities, but while broadening its scope to be more effective in fighting terrorism, it has been careful to develop protocols that will not infringe on the rights of citizens and non-citizens as well. In assessing Florida's Antiterrorism capabilities, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and the State Division of Emergency Management (2001) stress the need to, "Enhance retrieving, storing and sharing of vital intelligence and investigative information" (p. 5) with federal terrorism task forces. The plan calls for the creation of "Work-Study Group(s) to address new, modified or enhanced legislation/administrative rules to allow law

enforcement to effectively investigate and negatively impact those committing terrorist acts" (p. 6).

As American society becomes more susceptible to domestic terrorism, legislation will continue to impact local law enforcement. Indicative of the trend is the newly created Department of Homeland Security, which was signed into law by President Bush on November 25, 2002, and is hailed as "the largest government reorganization in half a century" (Horne, 2003, p. 10). The department will coordinate counterterrorism and emergency programs with state and local governments and the private sector.

Delattre (2002) puts the ethics dilemma in perspective in the following:

Before 9/11, the very best police earned the public's trust by respecting the liberty and civil rights of the people they serve. Good police departments scrupulously trained their personnel in the conduct of legitimate and morally sound profiling. They taught explicitly what racial and ethnic profiling is and prohibited it. Terrorism must not be allowed to divert us from these criteria of excellence in policing. This is of particular moment now, because portions of the public that abhorred racial

profiling before 9/11 now say they favor it as part of the terrorism prevention.

...We need as a people to face hard questions: Which hazards of terrorism must we learn to live with? What civic responsibility do we have in the light of 9/11? Since we cannot prevent the execution of every terrorist plot, but we are determined to go on with our lives, what form of vigilance most befit us? What are the realistic expectations and reasonable hopes with respect to terrorist attack? (p. 4)

### ***Terrorism Training and funding for Police***

Law enforcement agencies, in Florida, have been careful to address the "heightened alert & increased vigilance" issues by developing new policies and protocols, while leaving their policies or ethical practices against racial profiling intact. Training of personnel in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is the major emphasis of Florida's terrorism response and that of the local law enforcement agencies (Lober, 2002; Moore, 2002; Police Standards & Training, 2001). Edwin J. Delattre (2002) expressed the importance of training and the ethical integrity of the police after September 11, 2001:

September 11 did not change human nature, any more than it changed the need for both virtue and

accountability in policing and every other walk of life where the public trust is at stake. Furthermore, because all know-how can be used both ethically and unethically, the better the training police receive, the more extensively the public interest depends on their having good character and their being accountable within their departments. (p. 1)

Training and ethical values are critical to officers' behavior in the field. Richard Lober (2002) suggests that police chiefs should: "Identify the department's current values within the ranks; put core values into daily operation; incorporate core values into all training; and select field training officers and supervisors carefully for strong values" (p. 8).

The federal government has redirected its funding for state and local law enforcement to programs that are directly related to terrorism. Joey R. Weedon (2002) described the new focus:

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have had a dramatic impact on federal priorities, redirecting them toward efforts to strengthen the government's ability to protect Americans against terrorism. To accomplish this, the Bush administration has proposed shifting federal

dollars away from programs that are considered duplicative, unproven or ineffective concerning terrorism preparedness. In light of this, several of the nation's federal crime programs...have become candidates for restructuring, consolidation or elimination. The law enforcement community needs to be proactive in protecting against terrorism and federal funding for these efforts must be proactive (to prevent future terrorist acts) and reactive (to help minimize the damage in the event of future terrorist acts). (p. 18)

Other studies and works (Buisch, 2002; Delattre, 2002; Krull, 2002; Mundy, 2002) also point out the drastic shift of the country and the sense of urgency and hurry to change the federal regulations and mandates to protect the country against terrorism. The primary entities impacted are the many law enforcement agencies throughout the U.S.

WMD are clearly a primary target of law enforcement agencies, emphasized by the immediate mandates imposed by training commissions and various other governmental oversight agencies charged with determining standards and training for Law Enforcement Agencies. In Florida, Governor Jeb Bush and the Director of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) created Florida

Regional Domestic Security Task Force Teams, which divided the State of Florida into six regions. Within 3 days after the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks, under the order of Governor Bush, the FDLE and the Department of Community Affairs' Division of Emergency Management, assembled over 1000 professional subject matter experts from across the State of Florida for the purpose of assessing Florida's preparedness. In part, as a result, within 10 days, these experts (representing health, law enforcement, fire and emergency response, education, agriculture, transportation, environment, and businesses) produced 26 recommendations to improve Florida's ability to prepare, mitigate, respond, and recover in the event of an attack. Immediate training mandates (FDLE, 2001) have been imposed that provide that all law enforcement agencies must train their personnel in WMD to come into compliance within a 60-day time frame. Sheriff Kevin Beary describes how Law Enforcement Agencies in Central Florida have met the mandates:

We met all regional goals by 11/15. There is the possibility that [omitted for security reasons] could be used as the SE Regional Training site for WMD. UWV will be asking for help in bringing anthrax testing out of the lab and into the field. (Personal communication, January 25, 2002)

Beary is head of the terrorist regional task force in Central Florida, based in Orlando and comprised of several counties.

Perhaps a most compelling example of the need for WMD training (other than the hijacked planes of September 11<sup>th</sup>) was the anthrax mail incidents. Originally begun on October 12, 2001 at the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) Brentwood Mail Processing and Distribution Center (PDC) in Washington, D.C. on October 16, 2001, response activities involved local, state and federal authorities (Curtis, Stoddard, Kim and Devasundaram, 2002). The response demonstrated that police organizations were woefully unfamiliar with *Bacillus anthracis* (anthrax) spores, but training was immediately heightened in this WMD area.

Eric Lichtblau, of The New York Times (2002), described the police response to the October 2001 anthrax terror as inefficient in this excerpt, "When an unknown killer began mailing anthrax to East Coast targets last October, the government's slow and disjointed response set off recriminations from the White House and finger-pointing among investigators" (§ 3). As a result of the Montgomery County sniper incidents and other sniper killings in the Washington, D.C. area, there is a new era of coordination and communication among law enforcement agencies. The

latter can be attributed to major policy shifts and changes following September 11, 2001.

Training is an expensive venture for law enforcement agencies, and in a time when budget cutbacks are felt all over, WMD and terrorism add another fiscal hurdle for local agencies. Although the federal government is making funding available, many law enforcement agencies have yet to receive federal funds for training. The latter has frustrated law enforcement heads, who are passing the cost on to their local governments during the budget preparation process:

Sheriff Ken Mascara [St. Lucie County Sheriff's Office] on Thursday asked the county for \$39.48 million for the 2003-04 fiscal year, including an estimated 10% raise for his employees and money to cover the rising cost of homeland security.

The budget is 8.5% higher than the spending plan the County Commission approved for 2002-03.

More than 4% of the increase would pay for homeland security:

..."This year, there continues to be mandated training that they [federal government] keep promising us they are going to reimburse, but we haven't seen a dime yet," Mascara said. (Modzelewski, 2003, p. C2)



## ***Summary***

The literature review reveals that academic research on this subject matter is limited. Several similar studies have been undertaken prior to September 11, 2001 and the salient themes show that agencies faced a lack of coordination and planning between agencies, experienced inaccuracy in transmitted information about terrorist events, no consensus on training needs and no funding identified funding source. Other related secondary research and literary perspectives on the issues were reviewed and the majority found that training and procuring funding for training are of paramount importance to law enforcement agencies.

Ethics, civil rights and police conduct in handling heightened domestic security are significant sources of discussion and consternation with pros and cons. One school of thought on ethics and civil rights issues is that law enforcement should not change practices that are constitutionally founded, for the sake of national security. Another school of thought suggests that national security must be maintained, even at the expense of a few civil rights. However, all sources agree that domestic terrorism in the U.S. is here indefinitely, but there is no agreement on how law enforcement should respond to it.

## CHAPTER III

### Research Design and Methodology

#### *Introduction*

"I just heard the building rock. It knocked me on the floor. It sounded like a big roar, then the building started swaying, that's what really scared me" (Crenson, 2001, p. A3). Peter Dicerbo, Trade Center worker.

This chapter will focus on the design of the study, participant selection and information collection. To recap the focus of this study, I revisit the problem under investigation, which is to determine the direction law enforcement agencies took, after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The terrorist disasters of September 11, 2001, which involved the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon and an open field in Pennsylvania, were the catalyst for drastic change in the U.S. I pose the following questions, discussed in chapter 1, with regards to terrorism's impact on law enforcement in the U.S.

1. What changes did the September 11, 2001 domestic terrorism events and WMD have on accredited and nonaccredited law enforcement agencies, directly following, 6 months later and currently in the areas of funding, vigilance, training, bias-based policing and call response?

2. What was the distinction, if any, between the practices of accredited and nonaccredited law enforcement agencies post 9/11?

The literature review supports the primary question posed, because similar academic studies prior to September 11, 2001 revealed weaknesses in finding funding sources and a need for training. Post September 11, 2001 studies show that there are definite changes in the way law enforcement agencies respond to terrorism related events.

The significance of the impact of 9/11 is found in the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting Program, which notes a 2% increase in the nation's Crime Index from the 2000 figure. However, the FBI indicates (2002, p. 17), "the figures reflecting the offenses from the events of September 11 are not included in the trend data because they are statistical outliers that will affect current and future crime trends." Thus, to determine the extent of the impact of 9/11, for the purpose of this research, I sent a letter of introduction (see Appendix D) and used a survey instrument (see Appendix E), to collect relevant data from law enforcement agencies. I then selected 7 chief executives from the survey respondents for in depth personal interviews.

## **Research approach**

The researcher drew analytical data from a survey sent to 63 local South-Florida law enforcement agencies providing municipal and county services (see Appendix F). The survey asked 13 primary questions of each agency head and the data collected were used to explain and gain insight and understanding of their past and current practices. The researcher acted as instrument or primary synthesizing and interpretive agent, which are characteristic of qualitative research (Guba & Lincoln, 1981; Patton, 1990). The methodology used is a naturalistic inquiry or a study of real-world situations that unfold naturally, without the manipulation of the researcher (Patton, 1990).

Twenty-nine law enforcement agencies responded to the survey instrument, representing a 46% response rate (see Appendix G). I selected from the respondents a purposeful sampling of 7 law enforcement agencies, based on their responses, with a special focus on service population demographics, type of policing agency (accredited or nonaccredited), size and location. "The logic and power of purposeful sampling lies in selecting *information-rich* cases for study in depth" (Patton, 1990, p. 169). The 2000 U.S. Census was used to assess the population demographics

of these areas, specifically looking for minority populations. Additionally, law enforcement agencies reporting a significant Middle-Eastern or Arabic service population received preference for the personal interviews of informants.

Based on the methodological strategies used in a naturalistic inquiry, data was collected using several techniques, including surveys, formal interviews, follow-up interviews and document analysis (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). The study was completed through checks of law enforcement information system records, which record the calls for service. The researcher looked for patterns showing increases in calls, such as in WMD calls for service (primarily suspected anthrax calls) in the months following September 11, 2001.

### ***Survey instrument***

The survey (see Appendix E) was the initial data collection method and used to capture brief information about anti bias-based policies in place and the department's actions towards fighting terrorism, as it relates to before and after 9/11. Important aspects of the survey instrument gleaned information about the following areas of interest:

1. Department size

2. Accreditation status
3. Bias-based policing or racial profiling policies in place pre/post 9/11
4. Requirements to change how persons of Arabic or Islamic are treated or handled post 9/11
5. Significant Arabic or Islamic population
6. Training program modifications for terrorism and WMD
7. Department policies regarding WMD pre/post 9/11
8. Impact of WMD calls and other post 9/11 calls for service
9. Changes in handling persons of Arabic or Islamic descent
10. Available funding

The method of data collection covers all the key elements described in the research questions and were the origin of the questionnaire design. The questions are structured to provide a reflection on past practices and a look at the present situation so that I can determine the direction the agency took after September 11, 2001.

In arriving at the survey instrument, considerable information guiding the questions were gained by attended notable conferences in the policing circle. First, immediately following 9/11, this researcher attended the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP)

International Conference in Toronto, Ontario (Canada) in October 2001. Sentiments were high regarding terrorism and the attendance rate was lower than previous years. However, there were more than 7,500 delegates from law enforcement agencies throughout the world. These attendees also indicated that serious immediate changes regarding WMD and terrorist activity had reshaped policy and the policing methodologies used by their various agencies. The latter was indicative of the heightened sense of urgency inherent with law enforcement agencies immediately following the disaster. Police chiefs and other high level police officials from all over the world discussed terrorism and preparation by local police departments. At the top of the list were terrorism response and training changes, followed by resource, equipment and funding needs. Bias-based policing was rarely discussed in the context of the new wave of terrorism. Subsequently, this information supports the thrust and focus of the survey instrument.

I spent considerable time in June and July 2002 at two other major police conferences, in preparation for this study. These conferences were the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE) National Conference and the Florida Police Chiefs Association (FPCA) Summer Conference. Interacting with police chiefs

nationally, I was able to glean considerable information about how police departments had reacted initially to September 11<sup>th</sup> and how they were currently operating. The subject matter was essentially the same as the 2001 IACP conference, but there was additional emphasis on bias-based policing and how to remain clear of the practice. Although through informal interviews with numerous police officials and through the attendance of workshops, the information received was consistent with the query design of the survey instrument (see Appendix E)

Finally, in arriving at the instrumentation used, I have, "...some familiarity with the phenomenon and the setting under study" and "strong conceptual interests" (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 38).

I obtained official permission from Lynn University IRB to begin the study on June 19, 2003. All surveys were sent to the executive officer of each law enforcement agency during the last week of June 2003, with a three-week turnaround date of July 15, 2003. Due to an initial slow response, with only a handful of surveys returned by July 15<sup>th</sup>, the deadline for returning the survey was extended to July 31, 2003.



## **Population**

In determining the focus population, I reviewed the types of law enforcement agencies found in the U.S. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin (2002), there are 17,784 full-time law enforcement agencies in the U.S. "The total included 12,666 general purpose local police departments and 3,070 sheriffs' offices..." (Reaves & Hickman, p.1). The report shows that general purpose local police departments were the largest employer with 565,915 full-time employees as of June 2000. Reaves and Hickman (2002) also found a high concentration of general purpose local law enforcement agencies and sheriff's offices in South Florida. There were 58 South Florida general purpose police agencies, 4 sheriff's offices and 1 public safety department identified through the statistical information compiled by Reaves and Hickman.

All of the law enforcement agencies were in the counties of St. Lucie, Martin, Palm Beach, Broward and Miami-Dade, with the exception of one general purpose law enforcement agency located in St. Lucie County (see Appendix F). The chief of the agency in St. Lucie County asked to be included in the survey.

Secondly, South Florida along the east Atlantic coast has a fast-growing, multicultural, high concentration of people, according to the U.S. Census (2000). The U.S. Census verified that South Florida has the Port St Lucie-Fort Pierce, Florida Metropolitan Statistical area (Martin and St. Lucie counties), and the Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach, Florida Metropolitan Statistical Area (Broward, Miami-Dade and Palm Beach counties). The U.S. Census defines race as "self-identification by people according to the race or races with which they most closely identify... Furthermore, the race categories include both racial and national-origin groups" (Redistricting Data, 2000, see Appendix B-2).

The 2000 U.S. Census uses six categories of racial classification: American Indian and Alaska Native, Asian, Black or African American, Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander, Some Other Race and White. Adding to the confusion, the U.S. Census allows for Hispanics to be of any race and permit individuals to report more than one race. As such, population categories could be in combination with one or more races listed and may add to more than the total population and the percentages may add to more than 100%, because individuals may report more than one race. The 2000 U.S. Census, Definition of Subject

Characteristics says that persons of Arabic or "Near-Easterner" (see Appendix B-3) may be identified in the White race category. However for the sake of clarity and for the purposes of this research, I will only use two of the U.S. Census racial classification, White and Black or African American. A third racial classification of Hispanic or Latino will be used in this research, whereas the 2000 U.S. Census describes this as "origin" (see Appendix B-2).

A third consideration use by the researcher was based on events prior to 9/11. There was an abundance of activity specifically in the South Florida region by at least 14 of the 19 terrorists herein described:

Two years after the deadliest attack on American soil, one question has never been answered: What were at least 14 of 19 terrorists doing in South Florida – at least 12 of them in Palm Beach County – for perhaps a year or more before killing some 3000 people on Sept. 11, 2001?

...The black hole of information – or at least official information – exists despite the fact that many of the terrorists' movements were widely reported. Among them: ringleader Mohamed Atta... (Kleinberg, 2003, p. 1B)

Finally, figures from the U.S. Census (2000), which measures ethnicity beyond official race classification, show that 1.25 million Americans are of Arab descent. However, Arab American watch groups, such as Allied Media Corporation, dispute this figure vehemently. Allied Media (2003) says, "...the 2000 Census...captures about one-third of the total population that traces its roots to the Arabic-speaking world. "Private research by the Arab American Institute (AAI) and Zogby International indicate a population that exceeds 3 million" (Census Figures, 2000, ¶ 2). AAI believes there are about 4 million Arab Americans in the U.S. (Allied Media, 2003). Florida is identified as one of 17 states in the U.S. with the largest Arab American population (Allied Media, 2003). Specifically, according to Allied Media, South Florida has 4 cities (North Miami Beach, Hallandale, Fort Lauderdale and Coral Springs) with the largest concentration of Arab Americans.

Additionally, there are 7 million American Muslims and 1,209 mosques in the U.S. (Allied Media, 2003). Fifty-seven of the mosques are in Florida and a large percentage of the Muslim population (Allied Media). African Americans account for 30% of Muslims and Arab Americans account for 25% of all Muslim in the U.S. (Allied Media).

Therefore, South Florida is an area conducive for a study that will look at the general direction of law enforcement post 9/11 due to four collective conditions: (a) an abundance of all types of law enforcement agencies; (b) a high concentration of diverse people; (c) the presence of a majority of the terrorists known to be in this region in the months preceding 9/11; and (d) the presence of a large Arab American population.

### ***Sample size***

As outlined earlier, from the survey responses obtained (see Appendix G), I did a purposeful sampling, by specifically selecting 7 departments for in-depth, open-ended interviews to collect data consisting of "direct quotations from people about their experiences, opinions, feelings, and knowledge" (Patton, 1990, p. 10). The selection criteria for these open-ended personal interviews follow the purpose of the research, as suggested by Ambert, Adler, Adler and Detzner (1995). First, the writer looked for a mix of agencies and included accredited and non-accredited agencies. Secondly, population demographics played an important role in determining who was interviewed, especially if an agency identifies a significant Arabic or Muslim community in their service area. Lastly, I looked for different types of law

enforcement agencies, large, medium and small to obtain a cross section of police executives. Certainly, respondents with vastly differing or opposing viewpoints received priority for inclusion in those who were personally interviewed.

Although sample size in qualitative research is generally small, Patton says, "it depends...on what you want to know, the purpose of the inquiry, what's at stake, what will be useful, what will have credibility, and what can be done with available time and resources" (1990, p. 184). Since the purpose of this research is not to generalize to a larger population, but to essentially provide a description, a sample size of 7 police departments was more than sufficient. Patton supports the latter, "The validity, meaningfulness, and insights generated from qualitative inquiry have more to do with the information-richness of the cases selected and the observational/analytical capabilities of the researcher than with the sample size" (p. 185).

### ***Interview method***

The original research proposal called for the selection of at least 6 law enforcement agency heads for personal interviews. However, a seventh was added, because only one female police chief was included in the 63 surveys

that were originally sent out, and she was one of the 29 executives to return the survey. Although the issue of researcher bias was discussed in chapter 1, as it relates to this female police chief, a female Chief adds to the "information-richness" of the research described by Patton (1990, p. 181). An eighth participant was added to the group at PD2 where 2 executives were interviewed.

Pre-interviews of potential informants at the selected agencies were used to determine the best interviewee, based on their receptivity. There were three candidates who did not have time in their schedules to permit an interview and subsequently declined. Two potential participants thought the issues were too sensitive and declined to be interviewed, but felt the study would benefit law enforcement. One potential candidate for an interview could not find time within his schedule to allow the researcher an audience and he was excluded, after three unsuccessful attempts by the researcher to seek an interview. Ironically, his department was undergoing its own trial by fire after members of the African American community were incensed by what was suspected as a suspicious hanging of a Black man, later ruled a suicide by an inquest (Brenner, 2003).

The questions for the interviews are outlined in Appendix H. These questions are designed to describe experiences/behaviors, obtain opinions/values, and describe feelings and knowledge (Patton, 1990). Information supplied by the respondents was analyzed, which is the initial step in qualitative analysis (Maxwell, 1996, p. 78), and patterns, comparisons, trends and paradoxes were identified.

The questions asked are primarily dichotomous questions that require "the person making a decision about what an important experience is and whether or not an important experience has occurred" (Patton, 1990, p. 304). Some of the information supplied by the participants was verified within each department's activity database and through FDLE training records. However, the writer also employed participant feedback (member checking) and used low inference descriptors, i.e., direct quotations of respondents, to ensure interpretive validity (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Johnson, 1997).

The primary personal interviews were of the top executives in six of the seven departments. However, due to a scheduling conflict in one agency, the chief executive delegated the task to his assistant director. The assistant director brought his terrorism task force



commander into the personal interview and both answered my questions.

During the interviews, I took notes for reflexivity when transcribing and analyzing the data. As recommended by Maxwell (1996), I read all of the interview transcripts, field notes and supporting documents that were obtained from the participants. I did follow-up telephone interviews of each participant and allowed them to review their individual and collective transcriptions for accuracy.

All data and information collected will be retained by the researcher and used for the purpose of this research, without disclosing sources. Specifically, names of persons interviewed and the identity of law enforcement agencies will remain confidential and other identifiers are used to describe the person interviewed and the location.

Anonymity was maintained in the following manner: (1) Participants were given sequential confidential initials; (2) cities of the participants were given a letter of the alphabet; (3) counties were identified by a number; and (4) law enforcement agencies were identified by the acronym PD followed by a number.

Between July 25, 2003 and August 21, 2003, I visited each of the seven law enforcement agencies and met with the

chief executive, or in the one case, an assistant director and his bureau chief. I did a pre-site tour of the police facility and the surrounding area, noting external and internal security measures, type of facility and other architectural features. The letter of introduction to the interviewee (see Appendix I), informed consent (see Appendix J), and informed consent to audio record (see Appendix K) were reviewed and the appropriate signatures were obtained for the record, according to the University's Institutional Review Board (IRB) guidelines. The recorded interviews took an average of 40 minutes.

### ***Trustworthiness***

The researcher used Guba's (1981) model to assess the trustworthiness of the research. Guba's model is based on the identification of four aspects of trustworthiness: (a) truth value, (b) applicability, (c) consistency, and (d) neutrality (Krefting, 1991). The researcher used the following strategies, identified by Guba and described by Krefting, to increase the trustworthiness of the research:

1. Credibility
2. Transferability
3. Dependability
4. Confirmability

As noted by Krefting, truth value is obtained from the responses of the interviewees to the interview questions. Lincoln and Guba (1985) used the term credibility to describe truth value. To strengthen credibility, the findings were shared and checked with other interviewees (member checking) to see if they had an immediate recognition of the description. Other credibility strategies that were used are reflexivity, field notes, triangulation of data methods and sources, document analysis, peer examination, interview technique, establishing authority of researcher and structural coherence (Krefting, 1991).

Lincoln and Guba (1985) noted that it was not the researcher's job to provide an index of transferability, but to provide a database. Therefore, in order for transferability judgments to be made by others, the researcher has provided an adequate database, describing the informants, the research context and setting. A rich narrative description of the setting includes size of agency, type of police facility, service population description, and demographics and is, "...sufficiently detailed to permit the reader to visualize that setting" (Patton, 1990, p. 219).

I did within case studies of each individual law enforcement agency and extrapolated the data obtained in a cross-case study. The within case studies were to "evaluate individual client outcomes" (Patton, 1990, p. 99). The cross-case analysis was done to, "[group] together answers from different people to common questions or [analyze] different perspectives on central issues" (Patton, 1990, p. 376).

### ***Summary***

The design of the research begins with a survey instrument to collect data about 9/11 developed from previous studies and research, and information gleaned when I attended major police conferences. South Florida was selected for the target population, based on reviews of 2002 U.S. Department of Justice statistics on law enforcement agencies, the 2000 U.S. Census data and the disclosure that a majority of the terrorists were in the area prior to 9/11. I found a specific and purposeful sample for in-depth personal interviews from the survey respondents. The researcher, using strategies that will maintain the trustworthiness of the study, synthesized and interpreted the data that were collected from the interviews.

## CHAPTER IV

### Results

**"We will find these people, and they will suffer the consequences" (Deans, 2001, p. 18A).** President George Bush, September 11, 2003

### ***Introduction***

The purpose of this study is to provide a rich narrative descriptive account of how local law enforcement agencies responded to the terrorist events of 9/11. The problems addressed are defined by accredited and nonaccredited law enforcement agencies and how the U.S. Constitution and civil rights, call response, terrorism/WMD training, and funding impacted each type. To gain the requisite information, a survey instrument consisting of 13 questions about the subject areas was sent to each agency-head of 63 South Florida law enforcement agencies, in the counties of Indian River, St. Lucie, Martin, Palm Beach, Broward and Miami-Dade. Twenty-nine law enforcement organizations responded to the survey instrument (46% response rate) and seven agency-heads were selected for personal interviews.

This chapter will review the survey responses and provide a descriptive account of the interview setting, detailing the type of service community, police facility

and organizational culture. Using a within-case study approach, a rich narrative description of each person interviewed will be given in the words of the participant. The information gathered in the personal interviews will be compared and contrasted with the information gleaned during the literature review and through cross-case analysis of each participant with the other. An explanation and discussion of the results will be given, as it relates to the primary research questions. Lastly, the researcher's interpretation will be provided.

### ***Respondents***

I received 29 surveys, of which three were sheriff's offices, one a large county general purpose police agency, one a public safety department and the remaining 24 were general purpose municipal agencies. Table 4.1 provides additional information about the respondents as it relates to the survey questions and responses, and discussed in the following subtopics. The specific questions asked in the survey are outlined in Appendix E. The employees of the surveyed agencies were either sworn; e.g., employees certified to carry out law enforcement duties; or nonsworn, e.g., civilian employees who are noncertified and do not carry out law enforcement duties.

**Table 4.1**

**September 11, 2001 Law Enforcement Survey Responses**

Q1	SIZE OF AGENCY								
Sworn	1 TO 25	26-50	51-100	101-200	201-300	301-500	501+	NR	Total
	3	6	4	10	1	3	2		29
Nonsworn	1 to 25	26-50	51-100	101-200	201-300	301+	NR		
	10	4	7	3	1	1	3		29
Q2	Accredited	Natl	State	Natl&State	in-prog	Ntl	in-prog	St	No NR
		1	11	6	2	2	7	0	29
Q3	Policy	yes	no	in-progress					
		27	1	1					29
Q4	If yes...	yes	no	NR					
		0	25	4					29
Q4a	List groups	NR	listed						
		29	0						29
Q5	Vigilance	yes	no	NR					
		5	24	0					29
Q5a	By whom	not id	id	NR					
		1	4	24					29
Q5b	Comply	yes	no	NR					
		5	0	24					29
Q5c	Concerns	yes	no	NR					
		5	5	19					29
Q6	Arabic pop	yes	no	NR					
		10	18	1					29
Q7	Dept policy	yes	No	NR					
		10	19						29
Q8	Policy chg	yes	No	NR					
		24	3	2					29
Q9	WMD train	yes	No	NR					
		9	20	0					29
Q9a	After 9/11	yes	No	NR					
		26	1	2					29
Q9b	Continue	yes	No	NR					
		25	0	4					29
Q10	WMD calls	yes	no	NR					
		23	5	1					29
Q11	Calls today	yes	no	NR	N/A				
		1	26	0	2				29
Q12	Funding	yes	no	NR	pending				
		17	11	0	1				29
Q13	Comments	yes	no						
		15	14						29

### **Agency size**

The largest agency to respond to the survey was a metropolitan police organization to be identified as PD2, and the smallest was a small affluent town to be identified as PD8. PD2 is located in County 1 and has 3,178 sworn officers and 2,053 nonsworn (civilian) personnel. PD2 is located in one of the major metropolitan statistical areas (Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach, Florida Metropolitan Statistical Area, U.S. Census, 2000), whereas PD8 is in eastern County 3, but in the same metropolitan statistical area as PD2. PD8 has 10 sworn personnel and 5 nonsworn personnel. The only public safety department to respond was PD4, which was comprised of 16 sworn and 4 nonsworn positions. Thirteen of the agencies responding to the survey had 100 sworn officers or less, 10 agencies were between 101 to 200 sworn officers, four were between 201 and 500 sworn, and two had over 500 sworn. Twenty-one of the agencies had 100 or less nonsworn personnel, four were between 101 and 300 nonsworn and only one had over 300 nonsworn. Two agencies did not provide sworn numbers and three did not provide nonsworn numbers.

### **Accreditation**

Of the 29 respondents, the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) accredited one; the



Commission for Florida Law Enforcement Accreditation (CFA) accredited 11; CALEA and CFA dual-accredited six; and seven were not accredited. Two agencies reported that they were in the process of obtaining CALEA national accreditation and two were in the process of obtaining CFA state accreditation.

### ***Policy against racial profiling/bias based policing***

Twenty-seven agencies reported policies against racial profiling or bias based policing. One agency reported no policy and one agency indicated that a policy was in progress. Twenty-five of the agencies indicated that their policies did not address specific minority groups and four gave no response to question 4 of the survey.

### ***Vigilance***

Five agencies reported that they had been asked to increase their vigilance toward certain groups (see Appendix E, Question 5) such as Muslim, persons of Arabic descent or with Islamic beliefs. One of the agencies that responded yes, did not identify the entity asking them to increase their vigilance (Question 5a), however, the remaining four agencies did identify sources. One agency said, "Various anti-terrorism organizations." Another agency said, "Federal and state intel agencies." A third agency identified the "U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security /

F.B.I." Most astonishing was the fourth agency's response, which provided a different twist by identifying the source as the "Muslim Islamic Center." In the latter incident, the center had received death threats from other communities as a form of retaliation for 9/11. The 5 agencies that responded with "yes" to the increased vigilance question indicated compliance with the request (Question 5b).

The third subset of the question (see Appendix E, 5c), asked if there were ethical or legal concerns about bias-based policing? Five agencies indicated there were ethical or legal concerns; five indicated no concerns, and 19 had no response or put N.A. The 5 agencies that said they were asked to increase vigilance, replied to question 5c in the following manner:

1. Two said Yes without any comments
2. One put n/a
3. "No-it is the right thing to do."
4. "Not if policies are followed."

Others responding to question 5c listed the following comments of interest:

1. "It is wrong and illegal."
2. "Yes, and a policy was implemented on 12/31/01 based on incidents in other agencies."

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**PAGES**

**88 TO 96**

**Table 4.2*****PD1 Racial/Gender Demographics***

Race/Sex	WM	WF	HM	HF	BM	BF	OM	OF	Total
Sworn	116	26	17	1	8	1	5	0	174
%	66%	15%	10%	.5%	4.5%	.5%	2.8%	0%	
Nonsworn	42	81	2	4	2	9	0	1	141
%	30%	57%	1.4%	2.8%	1.4%	6.3%	0%	1%	
Total	158	107	19	5	10	10	5	1	315 <sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup>N = 315

The mission statement of the department speaks volumes about how it interacts with the community, with value on integrity by adhering to the highest level of ethics and honesty (see Appendix L). Interestingly, the chief's opening message in the 2003 annual report had this to say about the emerging threat of terrorism:

Terrorism, which has been so prevalent in many other areas of the world, has taken center stage in the United States and has compelled local law enforcement to its mission and responsibilities of public safety and crime prevention. Terrorism mitigation is at the forefront of your police department's agenda. (p. 2)

PD1 is located in the central city business district, but the area does not have the hustle and bustle associated

with an urban site and absent is traffic noise, cement and mortar. Instead there is an abundance of greenery, trees and shrubbery, which gives it a less institutional appearance. City hall is located across from PD1 and other city governmental facilities are on either side of PD1.

PD1 is housed in a two-story facility, designed to blend in with the Mediterranean architectural theme of City A. The police facility is clean with well-manicured lawns and a security gated rear access for police vehicles and employees. There are concrete barricades in the front of the facility, designed and painted to match the trim of the building, and configured to prevent vehicles from penetrating the front lobby.

The lobby of the facility was spacious and open, but standard security measures were in place. A volunteer, who sat at a desk in the lobby, and a duty officer, who sat behind bulletproof glass at the front desk, screened all visitors. Security cameras were visible and interior doors were locked and could only be accessed electronically by the duty officer. All visitors were issued a visitor's pass and were required to leave a driver's license at the front desk before being allowed admission. The physical building security and procedures were indicative of what

has changed since 9/11, although certain security measure were standard for a police facility pre-9/11.

I was issued a visitor's pass, but did not have to leave my driver's license or other identification at the front desk. I was escorted to the second floor where the chief's office was located, as was the command staff and other administrative offices. The office had contemporary furnishings, was moderately spacious, and equipped with a private shower and toilet, and a private conference room (where the interview took place).

Chief AA has a Master of Science Degree in Management from St. Thomas University in Miami, Florida and a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Psychology from Florida International University. Chief AA is a graduate of the FBI National Academy and began his career in law enforcement in 1978. He worked for two law enforcement agencies before being appointed to chief of police for City A in 1998. Chief AA has been recognized nationally for promoting equality for women in law enforcement.

I visited PD1 on July 25, 2003 and Chief AA was the first participant to be interviewed. Chief AA was dressed casually, as was his staff, indicative of a regular Friday dress-down day. Chief AA and I exchanged pleasantries and Chief AA expressed appreciation that he was selected for an

interview, the latter indicative of his enthusiasm demonstrated throughout the interview.

Chief AA of PD1 was proud that his agency was dual-accredited through both CALEA and CFA and explained its importance:

It provides a nice foundation for which an agency or CEO can build the house of professionalism. A lot of people want to say that accreditation is professionalism; my contention is that accreditation is the foundation for professionalism. The CEO builds the rest of the house on top of that strong foundation and that's why we are accredited and will continue to be accredited. (Interview transcript; July 25, 2003)

The correlation of accreditation with professionalism was clearly echoed in Chief AA's comments, as well as emphasized in previous works (Falzarano, 1999; Sharp, 2000; Bittick, 2003).

Chief AA said that annual training for police department personnel served as a reinforcement against bias-based policing practices. He explained how the department's policy prohibiting such action was initiated through the Florida Police Chiefs Association (FPCA) and adopted by the County 3 Association of Chiefs of Police. There were internal mechanisms to prevent it and

remediation for those suspected of engaging in bias-based policing. However, he emphasized that the organization's philosophy vehemently spoke against racial profiling saying, "It won't be tolerated" (Interview transcript; July 25, 2003).

Chief AA said that bias-based policing was handled much the same prior to 9/11 for the PD1, when it started to get some political movement behind it. There was no difference prior to or after 9/11 in the way bias-based policing violations were handled. Chief AA commented:

We have really not seen an up-shoot or increase in complaints with regards to bias-based profiling, and we have a Muslim community in [City A] and within the surrounding area. We had a hate crime related to post 9/11 against a Muslim individual. However, we have not received any other complaints related to bias-based profiling since 9/11. (Interview transcript; July 25, 2003)

Chief AA of PD1 said that pre-9/11 policies were not good, even though PD1 had a pervasive and extensive unusual occurrence policy that focused on civil disturbances, manmade disasters and hurricanes. Chief AA found that after 9/11, it was clear that policies did not address WMD and the anthrax incident shortly after 9/11 revealed their



inadequacies. However, shortly after 9/11, policies were clearly developed addressing WMD, terrorism and terrorism mitigation. Chief AA expressed that cooperation with federal agencies became a standard policy on all terrorism related issues and he personally recognized the importance of a policy change:

...It was a naïveté on our part that terrorism only occurred elsewhere, and perhaps the Oklahoma bombing was a blip on the radar screen of an isolated incident. Obviously, that's all changed and we clearly recognize that the threat to this country both domestically and internationally are real and pervasive, and will be around for a long time and so this is a policy or philosophy, if you will, of allocating personnel, the resources and time to this topic, of paramount—and has to be done, and it's going to be an intricate part of the organization.

(Interview transcript; July 25, 2003)

Chief AA went explained that in the new policies the national color alert was added and followed, often requiring bringing in additional personnel. Chief AA's seriousness about terrorism is outlined again in these comments:

Our religious facilities are also taken care of and I'll leave it at that because this is probably going to be a public document somewhere along the line. ... That has driven us—cost us a lot of money and a lot of time. ...We have taken a hard look at our own infrastructure and our own weaknesses and we have developed a city-wide security team, of which the police department spearheads, to take a look at all of the infrastructure within the city to check out our vulnerability and then to take steps to mitigate that vulnerability. (Interview transcript; July 25, 2003)

Chief AA emphasized that before 9/11, suspicious packages, etc., were taken lightly, but now nothing is taken lightly.

Policy changes also address inter-departmental cooperation. For example, PD1 has worked closely with the fire department (FD1) because of the anthrax incident and established a protocol wherein PD1 and FD1 respond together. PD1 and FD1 are cross-trained in evidence and in bio-hazardous material so that multiple police units are not tied up, when both components respond to a particular site.

Chief AA of PD1 acknowledged that there were significant changes made in training, which included topical areas, combined fire and police training, and more

personnel being sent to specialized school on WMD and bio-hazardous material. Chief AA estimated that the total cost of training since 9/11 was approximately one-half million dollars, expended primarily for terrorism mitigation, WMD, and intelligence gathering and dissemination. Chief AA relied on some appropriations in the regular 2002/2003 fiscal year's budget specifically to address the training cost, but he also tapped into the department's law enforcement trust funds. Chief AA stated that he will be purchasing \$300,000 worth of EOD [emergency ordinance and demolition] equipment and has purchased protective suits for officers. The city also purchased barricades that were placed around the police facility. Apparently terrorism is a critical concern of the City A government as explained by Chief AA, "We hired three additional officers. The city council authorized the hire...because we have created our own terrorism mitigation unit. These individuals work closely with the law enforcement community, both national and statewide" (Interview transcript; July 25, 2003). Chief AA specified that the duties of the three new officers are solely for the fight against terrorism.

Chief AA of PD1 was perhaps in a unique situation because of his experience with an anthrax case that involved his department. "[Robert] Stevens, 63, died Oct.

5, 2001, after being exposed to anthrax while working as a photo editor at American Media Inc. headquarters in [City A]" (Cooper, September 25, 2003, p. 1B). Chief AA recaps his agency's response:

The calls for service—did not increase significantly. Although we were on alpha-bravo, 12-hour shift and we canceled days off and we canceled vacations, training and everything for about 2 weeks after 9/11. Then what happened, the anthrax incident occurred in October of 2001 and we went back to alpha-bravo [12-hour patrol shifts] for a while. Our calls for service increased exponentially after the anthrax incident, not necessarily after 9/11. After the anthrax incident, for at least a month and a half to two months, our calls for service skyrocketed for suspicious packages, suspicious substances, suspicious persons and we were very very busy responding to all of those. (Interview transcript; July 25, 2003)

The anthrax incident at the media center was the only bona fide call following the plethora of calls afterward.

Chief AA finds that the current calls for service are back to normal, "pretty much status quo" (Interview transcript; July 25, 2003). However, during heightened alert states, he places additional officers on the street.

Chief AA of PD1 had early worries about his city, well before 9/11. He described City A as a "high-end community" with "name brand people" (Interview transcript; July 25, 2003) and he was concerned that City A would be the site of domestic terrorism at one of the exclusive resorts as early as 1998 when he was appointed chief of police for PD1. Chief AA's attitude about terrorism prior to 9/11 indicated awareness that his community could be targeted, but differently and he explains his action in preparing for such an event:

Subsequently, I made every effort to throw legitimate dollars and resources to our SWAT team and to expand our SWAT team. With the mind set that it was going to be domestic terrorism and [PD1] needed to prepare ourselves and hopefully mitigate domestic terrorism of some type. Well low and behold October 2001, we're the subject of a terrorist event [anthrax case at the American Media Inc. headquarter], still unknown if it is domestic or international... I was surprised of this event that happened in [City A]. I suspected more hostage-taking, a building being blown up, maybe, or somebody being kidnapped, nothing of this magnitude. (Interview transcript; July 25, 2003)

In an especially profound personally expression, Chief AA further describes his attitude and lesson learned since 9/11, and how his own department's experience with anthrax changed him, and the apathy of the U.S. about terrorism:

I am a believer that anything can happen anywhere, anyplace and [City A], like any other city, USA cannot sit on its laurels and said it can't happen to us, because it can very easily happen to us at anytime and anyplace, and I'm talking not [City A], us, in any community, anywhere and anyplace in the United States.

...The naïveté and arrogance of this country that we could not be subjected to something like this, stupefies me, both personally and in a global scale.

Secondarily, how vulnerable we actually are, a free open society, and as a result of that freedom and that openness, our greatest strength is our greatest weakness, and those individuals that are hell bent on creating anarchy in the United States are utilizing our greatest strength, because that is our greatest weakness.

Thirdly, although we have seen over the course of history zealots who have killed themselves, the realities are that now more than ever, is that philosophy of killing oneself for a particular cause

more pervasive than ever. That in fact 9/11 has caused us to realize that if you can think it in an evil term, you can make it happen. It is easier to destroy and do evil than it is to build and do good. That in and of itself is an eye opener. ...Those lessons learned are going to be our ability to protect ourselves and never underestimate the will or desire of an individual or a zealot that is hell bent on creating a cause.

Lastly, and this is personally from me, what we are seeing today--the Osama bin Ladens, the Sadam Husseins and all of these individuals throughout the world that claim religious acumen for doing what they're doing in attacking the United States are nothing more than what Adolf Hitler was, Mussolini, Stalin; it's all about control and power and hate.

Those are the lessons I have or the things that I've become acutely aware of. The other thing is the resolve to prevent this from spreading further throughout the United States and I play just a small part, just as you do in protecting the citizens of our country. But that small part when you attach it to another small part ultimately becomes a huge, huge

power base of being able to mitigate and or stop this.

(Interview transcript; July 25, 2003)

**PD2.**

PD2 serves County 1, the center of the region's Metropolitan Statistical Area (U.S. Census, 2000). County 1 has a very diverse population with a large Hispanic population and a significant number of people from the Caribbean. The latest U.S. Census (2000) estimate County 1's population to be 2,332,599, comprised of 1,570,558 (67.3%) White, 1,291,737 (55.3%) Hispanic or Latino and 457,214 (19.6%) Black.

County 1 is a sprawling metropolis that includes two world-renowned cities: City G and City H, several other noteworthy affluent communities, and lesser-known municipalities, e.g., City I and City J. PD2 provides police services to all of the unincorporated areas and to some of the municipalities. County 1 has a major international airport (City G International Airport) and a seaport (Port of City G) that service several cruise lines and also international shipping. The seaport and the airport are policed by PD2 (Assistant Director AB, personal communication, July 30, 2003). There are numerous major highways, freeways, interstate systems, the Florida Turnpike and a metropolitan rail mass commuter system



throughout parts of the southeastern metropolitan area of County 1.

County 1 is home to more than a dozen private and state colleges and universities, several of whom are nationally known and recognized. County 1 is the headquarters of multinational corporations and banking institutions. However, with its progressive development and multiculturalism come significant crime problems (FBI Crime Index, 2002) and other growth headaches.

PD2 is located on a major corridor, west of City G. PD2 is housed in a three story, contemporary facility that is spread over several blocks and adequately landscaped. There are concrete barricades placed strategically to prohibit vehicle forced-entry into sensitive interior building areas. The facility has electronic surveillance equipment externally and internally, and scanning devices to detect weapons, etc., for the public making entry into the facility. Personnel are stationed in the lobby to check identification and packages of all who enter, before being allowed passed the common area and into the main interior. Electronic locks are in use on doors prohibiting access to inner offices.

PD2 is nationally accredited through CALEA and has an authorized strength of 3,072 sworn officers and 1,875

civilians and is the largest police department in the southeastern United States (PD2 2000-2001 Annual Report). PD2 has a service area of 2,139 square miles of unincorporated county area. The director of the department is a Hispanic male and the three assistant directors are an African American male, a White female and a White male. The subsequent command staff consists of eight other members that include: two White males, one White female, two Black males and three Hispanic males ([PD2] workforce, 2003, p. 2). Table 4.3 captures PD2's overall racial and gender demographics at the time of this research.

**Table 4.3**

***PD2 Racial/Gender Demographics***

Race/Sex	WM	WF	BM	BF	HM	HF	OM	OF	Total
Sworn	842	242	343	239	1,162	226	23	5	3,082
%	27.3%	7.8%	11.1%	7.7%	37.7%	7.3%	0.7%	.1	
Nonsworn	155	289	156	530	309	533	14	23	2,009
%	7.7%	14.3%	7.7%	26.3%	15.3%	26.5%	0.7%	1.1%	
Total	997	531	499	769	1,471	759	37	28	5,091 <sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup>N = 5,091

PD2's mission statement describes its commitment to their service community and its desire to provide fair and impartial service (see Appendix M).

I was wearing civilian clothes, but had a police badge affixed to my breast coat pocket. The duty officer in the lobby observed the badge and allowed this researcher entry without going through the customary screening process. An escort came from Assistant Director AB's office and escorted the researcher to the third floor where the office was located. The office was arrayed with institutional furnishing and standard office equipment and appeared to be in the midst of several other administrative offices. The interview took place in the office of Assistant Director AB on July 30, 2003 and PD2 was the second agency that I visited. Assistant Director AB and Chief BA were the second and third police executives to be interviewed, and the only pair that was at one department.

Assistant Director AB has 27 years of police service with PD2, rising through the ranks to his current position. He has a Bachelor's Degree in Criminal Justice, prior military service with the U.S. Army and is a graduate of the FBI National Academy. Assistant Director AB is tasked with overseeing police services and is one of three assistant chiefs overseeing all operational components of the PD2. Chief BA has 22 years of police service with PD2 and he has a Master's Degree in Public Management and a Bachelor's Degree in Public Administration from St. Thomas

University in Miami. He is commander of the Uniform Services Division of PD2, which includes the airport, police operations, special patrol and community affairs.

Assistant Director AB explained that his agency (PD2) had been accredited through CALEA for 10 years and its importance to the agency was vested in the criteria established, which provided direction for enforcement, administration and a number of aspects of policing. Additional comments by Assistant Director AB indicated that accreditation provided a parameter to avoid bias-based policing practices.

PD2 Assistant Director AB revealed that management philosophy was the most important means to control racial profiling and he provided some profound comments:

...First, through the management philosophy right down to the mission statement [see Appendix M] of providing equal unbiased law enforcement that involves integrity, respect, fairness and service to everyone.

...Second, additionally we avoid it through the parameters of accreditation, and thirdly, we prevent it by being a diverse department with representation from all aspects of the community. With that, I think we have it [at] levels of the department and the verification factor is the fact that the director

himself is a minority—who is a Hispanic male and at the assistant director level, we have myself—who is a Black male, we have White male and White female. So that is our complete picture of diversity. It is first priority for everyone to provide police servicing without consideration to race and with a special attentiveness to avoid any kind of discriminatory practices within our policing, whether they be a sworn personnel or civilian. (Interview transcript; July 30, 2003)

Assistant Director AB noted that complaints are handled via department guidelines and directives and through the Professional Compliance Bureau, which is set up to investigate bias-based profiling complaints. September 11, 2001 did not change how the department handled complaints, but Assistant Director AB did point out the following:

...Occasionally we got complaints regarding undue focus [inaudible] but from the community on the aspects of community that were potentially mistaken for people that would be from the regions of the world that were associated with the bombings. In other words, the occasional complaint that citizens are responding to our community or they are responding to

our mosque and we would like for the police to watch that kind of conduct. We did respond to that when we had a request to put watch order on a mosque or a particular store in the community that was owned by individuals who may have been mistakenly associated with 9/11 type of--I guess you would call them--Middle Eastern citizens; people that would be mistakenly--be considered Middle Eastern citizens of race and ethnic makeup. We did pay particular attention to making sure that they were not discriminated against, and we did respond to every call that hinted to that kind of correlation or that kind of reason for us responding.

(Interview transcript; July 30, 2003)

I asked for clarification on Assistant Director AB's response and he added that PD2 received numerous calls from the Arabic or Middle Eastern community, who were concerned about retaliation against their mosques and businesses. Chief BA, who said that similar sentiments came from the Jewish community, followed Assistant Director AB's remarks with these comments:

...After 9/11, we went above and beyond and developed contact with all the temples, rabbis, all the presidents of the temples and assured them that

they would [be] in [a] safe environment just as the Arab community would be.

The perception was that the incident that occurred in the country were [sic] perpetrated by Arabs and they had a fear, whether it was legitimate or not, that maybe some of the terrorism activity could possibly continue in this local community. (Interview transcript, July 30, 2003)

Pre-9/11 terrorism policies, according to Assistant Director AB of PD2, were limited toward the occasional domestic terrorism incidents that the country had experienced, identifying the Oklahoma City bombing and Waco, Texas cult standoff. PD2 made significant policy changes after the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993. Chief BA pointed out that PD2 made changes in policy regarding certain infrastructure, e.g., water-plant, waterway, airport and the seaport and security was also enhanced at these locations.

Assistant Director AB said aspects of Federal Homeland Security, the Regional Homeland Security Task Force and [County 1] Homeland Security Office were all included in revised policy and PD2 worked collaboratively with those agencies. One particular change that increased security measures has caused is:

The immediate mandates issued by [County 1] Homeland Security Office [and] the Federal Homeland Security Office required us to devote additional resources to homeland security, but it came without fiscal support. It impacted operations to the degree that we would provide in terms, for example, patrol service was diverted to other security type operations for homeland security, thus making people a little less available on the street. ...We try to always--do this at our expense, with the promise that we would be reimbursed from the federal government. Of course as you know the reimbursement has not come. ...I will give you one example, and this is not a criticism, but the immediate implementation of a security detail for several government facilities and the major one being the county government building, [where] an entire squad [was] assigned to security operations within that facility. That's a significant drain on manpower, without a specific funding application for doing that. (Assistant Director AB, interview transcript; July 30, 2003)

I found that current training for PD2 is specialized toward homeland security issues and Assistant Director AB describes what changed:



...training has become more specific to homeland security types of concerns. Training has been more focused and for example the emphasis is placed on connecting training with the type of equipment that would be associated with [terrorism]. ...Additionally, our Special Response Teams and special operations training has become more focused towards responding to a terrorist type training, as opposed to the usual training for hostage negotiations and things of that nature. Our aviation training is becoming more focused on aerial surveillances and that type of operation is to move forward to that type training. So training is being adjusted or planned towards terrorism type responses and at the same time the other types of standard qualifications such as firearms and things of that nature and certifications requirement trainings have not been abandoned, they have been maintained...(Interview transcript; July 30, 2003)

Chief BA added that the civilian (nonsworn) personnel are trained in terms of terrorism-related issues that are essential for building security. On the receptivity of the training by civilians, he commented:

I heard tremendous feedback and very much appreciation because it makes them also feel part of the organization and it's something they need to know. They are in facilities, as lot of these people that potentially could be a target so they need to be educated as to what to look for. (Interview transcript; July 30, 2003)

Assistant Director AB said to lessen the impact of the cost of training, PD2 refocused the training emphasis to terrorist-related events and discontinued training that was "not so important" (Interview transcript; July 30, 2003). However, Assistant Director AB did acknowledge a funding problem:

The second impact is perhaps a normal fiscal year we would, over the full year, expend the allocated resources. In this case, we end up expending the resources within the first six months of the year or a majority of the resources except for the things that are scheduled and mandatory. Our rushed response to train and get prepared for it had a fiscal impact to the degree that our expenditures sort of ran out before they normally would. (Interview transcript; July 30, 2003)

I asked a follow-up question, "When the funds ran out, what happened?" Chief BA answered, "When the funds ran out, we did things based on no funding, but we did them anyway, which resulted in somewhat of a deficit somewhere around \$3 million over now. Deficit is the bottom line" (Interview transcript; July 30, 2003). Chief BA said that PD2 had a slight deficit the first fiscal year after 9/11, but it became an increasing problem into the next fiscal year. Carryover expenses were added back into the budget at the beginning of the fiscal year and used to handle some of that deficit. But it will not cover the shortfall in the current fiscal year.

Chief BA said that several specialized units have asked for specific equipment to deal with terrorism. To that Assistant Director AB added:

...We have a division called Special Strategic Investigations Division that's now a secret criminal intelligence bureau, which has changed to specialize in terrorism. ...the majority of the requests for additional funding for equipment has come from, as [Chief BA] mentioned, Special Operations, Special Response Team, Underwater Recovery, the Divers, and Critical Incident Management Unit, also equipment such as computers, monitoring and detection equipment,

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**PAGE 121**

Funding that was received from the federal government was described by Chief BA as promising but sparse thus far:

...[County 1] itself got a very small portion of [federal government's] funding. It was something in the area of \$50,000 or \$100,000 of that \$2 million. The second allocation has just been made and again it is among the regions and it's assigned more focally to the region of [City G], surrounding [County 1] and that allocation will be \$8 million...we should get a fair share of that \$8 million. So that's been the only federal money that's come back so far. There has been much discussion about money that is available for purchasing things, such as protective gear, out of a fund that the federal government sees as everyone needs this; no doubt, so everyone will get this. We have not received that funding yet, but we know the grant is out there and it is available. We've applied in conjunction with the county's Homeland Security Office, but have not received it yet. But my understanding is that help is on the way. All the other funding opportunities are pie in the sky; we don't have them yet and have not been assured we would get them. (Interview transcript; July 30, 2003)

The overall outcome of PD2's funding woes was handled through funding adjustments to their regular budgeted funds.

PD2 Assistant Director AB described the call increases at his department in the following manner:

I would say that they increased significantly, specifically with regard to white powder type calls. We kept track of them for a while and I think we were getting in the area of 100 plus a day of white powder related calls. Ultimately, it turned into something that we coordinated between police and fire in terms of how we would respond to those. Of course, other less frequent calls had to do with Middle Eastern "Arabic" citizens who appeared to be suspicious, that type calls and again that ties into our response being professional and not being discriminatory and making sure that these were handled in a very impartial way.

(Interview transcript; July 30, 2003)

Chief BA described the calls as frenzied, with residents reporting suspicious mail because there was no return address or they did not recognize the address. Added to Assistant Director AB's comments, Chief BA said:

The anthrax issue was a great concern for a while, but [different agencies] actually had to convene and

develop a protocol as to how we were actually going handle these calls. There was tie-in with the police, fire and health departments, and crime lab, on how we transport this powder, because you had to treat each one like it was potentially anthrax. That actually increased our calls for service quite a lot; we were getting an enormous amount of calls. As [anthrax] died out of the limelight on the news then [the calls] faded. Also in the districts, there was an increase of suspicious package [type] calls; especially at the airport there was an increase. Whereas, when someone just a left a briefcase at the airport, now it was looked at like well maybe there is an explosive device in that briefcase. Absolutely, it's [9/11] made everyone aware. (Interview transcript; July 30, 2003)

However, despite the significant increase in anthrax type calls or suspicious incidents, according to Assistant Director AB and Chief BA, none were proven to be valid. Assistant Director AB noted that media reports prompted a lot of the erroneous calls. Nevertheless, both interviewees agreed that the anthrax type and suspicious packages calls have decreased, returning to post 9/11 levels.

PD2 Assistant Director AB thought domestic and international terrorism were a reality for the U.S. before 9/11 describing it akin to an old movie that he had seen once:

...There was a movie I saw maybe 15 years that came pretty close to 9/11 and it indicated that there would something like this. The movie itself to me was a wake up call and I said this could happen in this country and it happened. So in my mind international or foreign terrorism was a reality. Of course, we had never had a real bona fide case other than the 1993 thing [first World Trade Center bombing] in New York. So we had a sense we were above this kind of real harm on a large scale. Of course, the Oklahoma City bombing was the other reality check that this would likely come from within this country, so I knew that it was a reality and potentially could happen. But you just don't really want to face that until it has happened. ...So you kind of have a sense of managing and dealing with what you have to deal with, which is everyday police work, until something like this happens. It becomes more important to refocus and prepare for this. The shame about [it] is that you can't really prepare to a level or degree that you



could prevent it. I don't care what you do; potentially it can happen. (Interview transcript; July 30, 2003)

PD2 Chief BA added the following comments, "...The frame of mind was that essentially terrorism still occurred in foreign lands, the Middle East and even England, and Paris, and that was the mindset" (Interview transcript; August 30, 2003).

The attitude by members of the command staff at PD2 shows that since 9/11 terrorism is becoming a major focus of law enforcement. Assistant Director AB said,

You have to do the policing; you cannot forget about potential terrorism. You cannot forget about being prepared and being aware and omnipresent at the same time. So I know that abroad, for example Israel, they view terrorism as a thing that is going to happen. They look at terrorism like we look at murder. (Interview transcript; August 30, 2003)

Chief BA thought that terrorism was "an annoyance [and] something that is going to happen again" (Interview transcript; August 30, 2003), so law enforcement must prepare for it. Assistant Director AB said:

...Obviously, [federal] government is not going to give law enforcement that degree of funding or

resources that we consider necessary, because they are not going to view it as necessary as we view it. So beyond that, we must have multi-faceted focus on both doing the regular policing, during times of peace; we don't want to panic people. We want people to think they are secure and at the same time we have to be prepared for a response if and when it comes again.

(Interview transcript; August 30, 2003)

Chief BA said that 9/11 brought the police closer to the community because of terrorism concerns, "We have developed relationships with 12 temples in [the Jewish community] that we had absolutely not had before. I think it has just made us more aware" (Interview transcript; August 30, 2003).

Assistant Director AB identified an obvious lesson learned from 9/11,

...Never take anything for granted and you can start with the term like security and expand that or reduce that down to include thoughts or ideologies about people. What qualifies as secure? What qualifies as reasonable? All of that now can be redefined.

(Interview transcript; August 30, 2003)

Chief BA, in describing the lessons of 9/11, said:

...It has made us so aware of vulnerability factor and we look at security situations differently than we did before. Although I think we had a very good security program working at the port, but I think since [9/11] we have added a complete dimension out there than we may have never done if it wasn't for 9/11. (Interview transcript; August 30, 2003)

Assistant Director AB's and Chief BA's closing statements captured how people were now more aware of the importance of law enforcement and how better working relationship were now established between various levels of law enforcement. Assistant Director AB commented:

I think there was less than enough appreciation of what police, fire, and law enforcement and public safety individuals did, and the sacrifice of the many lives of police and fire fighters on that day changed the world's view about law enforcement and the significance of what they do. (Interview transcript; August 30, 2003)

Chief BA said, "I honestly and sincerely feel that the relationships between federal agencies, county agencies, inter-agency cooperation has increased" (Interview transcript; August 30, 2003).

**PD3.**

PD3 is the law enforcement agency for City B, County 2, which is part of the Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach, Florida Metropolitan Statistical Area (U.S. Census, 2000). City B's total population is 57,588 with 33,840 (58.8%) Black or African American, 19,482 (33.8%) White and 3,995 (6.9%) Hispanic or Latino (U.S. Census, 2000). There is a strong presence of people from the Caribbean and the influence is shown in some major city projects, e.g., 25,000-seat cricket stadium (Chief BC, personal communication, August 7, 2003). City B is located near I-95 and the Florida Turnpike.

PD3 has an authorized strength of 98 sworn officers and 25 civilian support staff and services a community of 7.4 square miles (Chief BC, personal communication, August 7, 2003). The command staff consists of the chief, two majors, one captain and one lieutenant. The command staff is composed of one Black male and the remainder White males. However, Chief BC said that the department has a 51% minority composition of approximately 33% African American, 9% Hispanic and the remainder Asians and females. Chief BC later provided me with a Diversity in the Workplace report (2003) that indicated 46.4% of the sworn workplace consisted of minority police officers (Black and

White females, Latino males, Black males and Asian males) and 92% of the civilian (nonsworn) workplace consisted of minority personnel (Black and White females, and Black males). Thus the overall minority makeup of the police department represented actually 56.4% of the workplace. Table 4 provides the racial and gender demographics of PD3 at the time of this research. Similarly, City B has a 57% minority composition, defined as primarily Jamaican, Haitian and other Caribbean groups (Chief BC, personal communication, August 7, 2003).

**Table 4.4**

***PD3 Racial/Gender Demographics***

Race/Sex	WM	WF	BM	BF	HM	HF	OM	OF	Total
Sworn	51	5	22	8	8	0	1	0	95
%	53.6%	5.3%	23.2%	8.4%	8.4%	0%	1.1%	0%	
Nonsworn	2	4	3	16	0	0	0	0	25
%	8%	16%	12%	64%	0%	0%	0%	0%	
Total	53	9	25	24	8	0	1	0	120 <sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup>N = 120

PD3 was not accredited and did not have an annual report, but was in the process of applying for CFA accreditation, and completing its first annual report. PD3's mission statement reflected the diversity of the

city, "To promote a sense of community pride and mutual respect by enhancing the quality of life in the culturally diverse [City B], through professional police service in partnership with the community" ([City B], 2003, p. 4).

PD3 is located on a major east-west thoroughfare in City B and is housed in a one-story temporary facility until a new facility is built. Trailers are in the parking lot and used to house some of the support function of PD3. The premises are well manicured with a host of foliage and tree covering, but there was no visible presence of barricades of any type to obstruct vehicle entry into the building interior. The parking area was open and accessible to public and police department vehicles, but marked to indicate the appropriate parking for official police vehicles and those of the public.

The lobby was easily accessible and a duty officer was stationed in the lobby behind a windowed partition. The interior of the facility beyond the lobby could only be accessed after the duty officer released an electronic lock. There was considerable pedestrian traffic in and out of the facility, mostly employees and the Caribbean culture was evident by the accents of the individuals. However, there appeared to be no surveillance cameras visible either internally or externally.

I did not show identification to the duty officer, but announced that I was scheduled to meet Chief BC. Chief BC came to the lobby and took the researcher to a conference room located in the central part of the facility, where the interview took place. The building was clean and orderly, but it was easily discernible that it was not intended for use as a police facility due to its basic layout. Chief BC was the fourth police executive interviewed, August 7, 2003 and his agency was the third that I visited.

Chief BC has only 2½ years of experience with PD3, however, he spent 27 years at PD1, leaving that agency at the rank of deputy chief of police. Chief BC has a Master's Degree in Criminal Justice from Nova Southeastern University and a Bachelor's Degree in Criminal Justice from Florida Atlantic University. He has attended several police executive development schools throughout the U.S.

Chief BC of PD3 said that his department was not accredited and when he arrived 2½ years ago:

This department did not even know what accreditation even meant and we are in the process of rewriting every policy to fit accreditation. ...I am a state assessor for accreditation, so I know what it takes to get accredited, and the first step is that I felt would be to rewrite all the policies. We are about

three to four policies away from completing that and I intend to apply for state accreditation. (Interview transcript; August 7, 2003)

Chief BC of PD3 said that City C's diversity and the police department's diversity assist in preventing bias based policing and a policy is being developed to address it as well. Chief BC had little knowledge about how bias based policing complaints were handled prior to 9/11, but noted that currently his department takes any citizen complaint "in person, in writing, over the telephone, anonymous of any incident, including racial profiling" (Interview transcript; August 7, 2003).

Chief BC of PD3 did not have any policies addressing domestic terrorism pre-9/11, but have addressed it with the implementation of new policies. Extra patrol in certain areas is part of that change whenever the country's color alert changes and several reasons are described by Chief BC:

For instance, we have two temples in our city, we have a rabbinical school here, we have a section in our northwest where people are made up of the Israeli culture and they are always asking for some type of extra patrol. They are highly concerned about security these days and what is going on and we have



built into our daily patrol to do extra patrols in these locations. We also have documented some areas that we think are critical. For instance, we have a gas line that runs from South Florida all the way to Texas that exposes our city, which most people don't know about and we have to keep an eye on. A situation that is strange to me is that there is [a] propane tank vendor/business that is right next to the middle school that is right along side the Florida Turnpike. So if something happens, not only would there be a problem with the school, we would have to take care of transportation also. (Interview transcript; August 7, 2003)

Chief BC explained that the large Jewish population of the NW city was 40% and the two temples were also Jewish.

Chief BC of PD3 trained in conjunction with another law enforcement agency to reduced cost. Both agencies put all of their personnel through WMD training and incident command system training. The biggest expenditure for PD3 was the overtime cost, which according to Chief BC, was absorbed in the budget through salary accounts with unspent funds due to vacancies. Chief BC used money from the Federal Law Enforcement Block Grant, which is a grant received by many law enforcement agencies, not specifically

for terrorism. Chief BC also received \$12,000 from the Federal Equipment Grant, which is specifically for the purpose of procuring equipment to combat terrorism, i.e., protective suits. The two federal grants and funds from the law enforcement trust funds were used to purchase protective clothing and gas masks for personnel.

PD3 also had the assistance of the fire department to offset the cost of equipment and training:

I also want to say that our fire department was also very helpful in providing some equipment and some of the training also. ...They are the first responders to those types of incidents that occurred and they put on the training for us, as far as what to do when we get there. Because we had that nasty situation where officers got too close and then they had to be the one to say, "Give me all your clothing and everything else." They confiscated two police cars, and two officers for basically a 24-hour time period because they did not know what to do. (Chief BC, Interview transcript; July 7, 2003)

Chief BC of PD3 reported the following about calls for service:

There was a major increase. Everyone was so concerned about suspicious people, about seeing any kind of

white powder. As a matter of fact, we were the first agency in County 2, I believe, that made an arrest on an anthrax hoax. Some kid had put white powder in an envelope and sent it to his girlfriend and we ended up arresting him for that hoax. The calls averaged about eight additional calls a day because of that. The fire department was the first responder and we had to back them up. (Interview transcript; August 7, 2003)

Chief BC said none of their calls were authentic and currently, all is back to normal except, "...When they raise the Homeland Security rate status that's when I start receiving calls again from the temples, from the rabbinical school saying would you give us extra patrol" (Interview transcript; August 7, 2003)?

Chief BC of PD3 spoke of his complacency when asked about his attitude before 9/11 and said, "...It probably would not happen over here. You watch it on TV, on the other side of the world and so it's been going on for many years, but couldn't happen over here" (Interview transcript; August 7, 2003).

Chief BC expressed a totally new attitude currently, similar to what others have said:

I didn't realize how vulnerable the United States was and how still vulnerable we are. My attitude today is

that I have a feeling that something is still going to happen, but it's a matter of time and all the chatter we hear about threats and [terrorists] have a means to do it. Unfortunately, I think it's going to happen. (Interview transcript; August 7, 2003)

The important lessons learned by Chief BC focused on communications with other law enforcement agencies and being unprepared to deal with terrorism. Chief BC explained how 9/11 caused law enforcement to hone and fine-tune these critical issues:

...We now work together a lot better with the FBI here, with surrounding agencies, with fire departments to the point now we have joined [in a federal radio system] grant with all municipal departments in County 2. That's a sign right there that shows we need better communications and we're doing that by trying to get that 700 MHz radio system. (Interview transcript; August 7, 2003)

Chief BC concluded by remarking, "I think that the changes we made are good changes, but the changes are going to have to continue. This has changed the way we do business forever" (Interview transcript; August 7, 2003).

**PD4.**

PD4 is the public safety department for Town C, which is an island with two bridge accesses to the mainland (north and south). Town C has 619 residents, but during the summer months most of the residence are in other areas of the U.S., as most of the homes are used during the winter (Director CB, personal communication, August 15, 2003). The U.S. Census 2000 report estimates the current population to be 620, of which 585 (98.8%) are White, 33 (5.3%)Hispanic or Latino and 8 (1.3%) are Black. Town C is a unique community, semi-private, exclusive and located in the midst of golf courses and private docks. One major access highway runs north and south along the 10-mile length of the island and each home is personalized with a private nametag identifying the owner. The homes range in price between five million and twenty million dollars and the population is overwhelming White, rich and famous, and corporate America (Director CB, personal communication, August 15, 2003).

PD4 is located in an older, but quaint, one-story CBS white building that serves as the town hall, fire and police departments, which are merged as one public safety service. The premises of the police facility were immaculately landscaped and manicured, and sit squarely in

the middle of a golf course. One could easily mistake this government center for a rather large home, except for not-so-obvious signage affixed to the facility. There were no barricades or any readily identifiable security measures in place outside of the building and the lobby area was open with the remainder of the interior accessible to seemingly anyone. A duty officer was positioned behind a windowed partition and the access door to the duty station/dispatch center was electronically locked.

PD4 is a state accredited agency through CFA and has 16 sworn, predominately White male, officers and 4 nonsworn positions. The sworn personnel, with the exception of the director, are dual certified as fire fighters and law enforcement officers. The command staff is composed of the director (White male) and five sergeants (White males) that report directly to him (Director CB, personal communication, August 15, 2003). Table 4.5 provides racial and gender demographics of PD4 at the time of this research.

**Table 4.5*****PD4 Racial/Gender Demographics***

Race/Sex	WM	WF	BM	BF	HM	HF	OM	OF	Total
Sworn	14	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	16
%	87.5%	6.25%	0%	0%	6.25%	0	0	0	
Nonsworn	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
%	0	100%	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Total	14	5	0	0	1	0	0	0	20 <sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup>N = 20

PD4 is contracted with the County 4 Fire Rescue for fire and EMS service, but officers respond to fire calls and have fire outfits and equipment in their vehicles for fire situation. PD4 has a service area of 2.5 square miles (Director CB, personal communication, August 15, 2003).

The mission statement of PD4 is outlined in Appendix N.

I did not have to produce identification and was greeted by Director CB, once the duty officer called him. Director CB's office was directly off of the lobby, modestly outfitted and small, and the site of the interview. During the interview, a daily operational test was performed on the town's sole fire engine, which was parked just outside and the noise bled over into the director's office, emphasizing the smallness of the

building. The interview of Director CB took place on August 15, 2003 and his agency was the fourth that I visited and the fifth executive to be interviewed.

Director CB started his career in law enforcement in the Military Police Corps, U.S. Army in 1962. He retired from the military and became a Florida Highway Patrol (FHP) Trooper in 1962. He left the FHP for the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) in 1968, retiring in 1997. He taught in the Criminal Justice Master's Program at Lynn University, until he became Director of Public Safety for PD4 in 1998. Director CB has a Ph.D. in Criminal Justice Education from Union Institute, a Master's Degree in Sociology from the University of Northern Colorado, a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Human Resource Management from Pepperdine University and a Bachelor of Science Degree in Business Administration from the University of Palm Beach.

On his reasoning for accreditation, Director CB found an agency that was woefully lacking in many areas:

We went for accreditation primarily for the professionalism and it certainly upgraded the department in every way, and it was the quickest and easiest way to rectify a lot of old concepts that existed prior to the accreditation. Just by redoing



the manual, we were able to change so many things. I have tried to instill that professionalism in the department, in the members and hopefully it is working. (Interview transcript; August 15, 2003)

Director CB of PD4 said that his department has a general order for handling complaints and the agency is so small that he personally reviews all calls and notes anything remotely suspicious. He could not provide specifics about prior 9/11 practices saying, "Of course, prior to my tenure, I don't know how it was handled because truthfully the policy and procedure manual that we made under my watch was the first change to the duty manual in about 15 years" (Interview transcript; August 15, 2003). Director CB said that nothing changed after 9/11.

PD4 had no policies pre-9/11 and haven't really implemented any new policies. According to Director CB, his department watches the government color coded alert system and notify town government about changes, through memorandum and other written notices. Director CB gives the following picture of his town and rationale for decisions regarding terrorism:

We are fortunate here if I can digress, we've got JI, under a little thumbnail very quickly. It's truly an island, we got a bridge at one end and a bridge at the

other end and just 10 miles in between and it's a quarter-mile wide at its widest point, so its relatively small. We've got 20 people in the police department, four dispatchers and 15 patrolmen and myself, so it's relatively small and it's easy to get the word out so to speak. We have a total of 41 people counting the 20, we've got an additional 21 in public works, finance and administration and the other departments in town. So many times I'm also, besides the Police Chief, the de-facto or chairman of the Safety Committee for the town and any safety issues. I put out memos or letters to other department heads to go to their employees if there is something that affects the safety or security of the town. So it's kind of easy; it's not like in a large department where you have layers and layers of bureaucracy. When you see something that needs to be done you put a memo out and get it done. (Interview transcript; August 15, 2003)

However, Director CB did make some noteworthy security changes regarding the town, something indicative of "Big Brother," but an acceptable method that is being increasingly used by government:

One thing that we have done and are still in the process of upgrading it as much as we can, we have cameras at both ends of the Island. Prior to September 11<sup>th</sup> the cameras took pictures of all cars entering and leaving the island. Since September 11<sup>th</sup> we have placed two additional cameras at each end and now not only do we get the cars but also we get the license tags and it takes a separate kind of camera for that and we can do it at night also. So that gives a little greater security if we had to identify who is on the Island at any given time. (Interview transcript; August 15, 2003)

Director CB described other elaborate vehicle detection equipment that the town has used to monitor traffic throughout the island for the past 25 years. But since 9/11, the system is being tied into a video system that can be monitored at the PD4 headquarters. There is a need for enhanced security, according to Director CB, "because [Town C] is so affluent, the majority of the people who live here are CEOs, corporate CEOs of America. I mean you name the company and that CEO is here and we feel that could be a threat" (Interview transcript; August 15, 2003).

Director CB of PD4 described his handling of mandatory training by the State of Florida in the following vein. He has designating one sergeant to attend, on the average of one per month, one and two-day seminars on terrorism issues and homeland security. Director CB said that he maintains all the information received on terrorism in a simple fashion, herein described:

I have three large notebooks of stuff that have come in on terrorism and whenever it comes in, from whatever source, the FBI or ATF [Department of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms] that stuff is synopsized or distributed to everyone and it's available for everyone to review. For the town, those brochures from the Red Cross on disaster and terrorism have been given to every town employee along with additional information and we put that out early on. We first started by giving it to the town commission and a six-page document that explained what all the colors were and brought them up to date and then shared it with all town employees. It's ongoing training; whatever comes in we review and see if it should go to all town employees or just the police department--should it be put in our terrorism notebook for future reference where people can refer to it? So

that's basically it. (Interview transcript; August 15, 2003)

It costs PD4 between \$1,000 and \$2,000 annually to train each officer and most of the WMD training was done in-house. Director CB has been creative in procuring additional equipment through the fire rescue side of his department for EMT purposes and by buying gas masks via the federal government military supplies system. However, as far as federal assistance, Director CB said, "We have done as much as we can for a small department and we've done it all ourselves, because this federal help I haven't seen it; have you" (Interview transcript; August 15, 2003)?

Despite the creativity of Director CB, his agency still does not have the protective suits that many agencies have. He said that PD4 was to receive six suits from the Federal Equipment Grant, which was promised about a year ago. PD4 needs about \$65,000 more to purchase surveillance cameras and other security needs for terrorism and those funds were cut from the budget request, because a new town hall is being built.

Town C is a seasonal community and during the month of September, most residents are away. This drastically affected the calls for service, when they returned to their community in October 2001. According to Director CB, 9/11

was on the minds of town residents when they returned home and this is when the calls for service increased, not immediately after 9/11:

The calls for service went up 10% due to the media hype. We had people call about strange noises, strange smells or things that normally we would not have gotten calls on, but people were more aware due to the media hype. So our calls probably went up 10% the first six months, but after the season then everyone leaves to go to their other homes.

...But when they got here that was their first questions, how secure are we? And they wanted to feel like they're back in the cocoon. (Interview transcript; August 15, 2003)

Director CB said that none of the calls were valid and he described the current state of his department and town as back to normal, "It's not a consideration. People get complacent and since nothing has happened on the island that is terrorism related, I think that people aren't thinking about it any more" (Interview transcript; August 15, 2003).

In the small Town C, Director CB opined, like others, that he never thought about terrorism in the U.S., instead he believed terrorism was something that happened in

"Israel, Lebanon or somewhere else where they're having problems" (Interview transcript; August 15, 2003).

Nevertheless, Director CB's current attitude demonstrated a vigilance that was not present before 9/11. To emphasize this, he spoke of the major blackout (August 14, 2003) that had just occurred in New York, several other states and parts of Canada, and the response (Hirsh and Klaidman, 2003). Director CB said that joint training with city residents was forthcoming and describing his new attitude, he said, "...It's on your mind every single day. Today my attitude is heightened awareness and especially after we have these training sessions. You know people are reminded why we are doing this. ...So it's on everyone's mind. (Interview transcript; August 15, 2003)

The important lessons learned by Director CB dealt with:

...an awareness that simple things can be dangerous. We're now aware and we took for granted living in this area the [nuclear] power plant in your city. Now we are aware of what wind currents can do and what would happen if that power plant was attacked by someone. Things that you took for granted, now you're aware of possibilities of the power plant or a train passing through or if there was nuclear or radiation hazard,

how it would affect the Island. We knew it was there before but now we are aware of what the possibilities are. (Interview transcript; August 15, 2003)

Director CB said that in recent years law enforcement efforts were becoming more organized, but he was impressed with the increased cooperation between police and fire departments:

...but more important in all my 35 years, I seldom ever dealt with the fire department, but since September 11<sup>th</sup> we have joint meetings. I think that's important because September 11<sup>th</sup> really showed us how all public safety agencies, police and fire, and the truth be known the fire department is more prepared for disasters through their incident command structure, so police are learning from fire and I think it's working. My perspective is a little different because being from a small agency we have to work with everybody. It's not a question of will you work, but you have to because you need the joint commitment. I think that's the biggest thing I have seen. We now have a common goal to defeat terrorism; this is our country, etc., etc. and everyone has kind of like banded together like that. (Interview transcript; August 15, 2003)



## **PD5**

PD5 is the law enforcement agency for City D, which is located the northern part of County 1. It borders the intra-coastal waterway and extends west of I-95 and is surrounded by several other cities, the largest of which is City G to the south. City D has a total population of 59,880, of which 32,867 (54.9%) are Black or African American, 20,842 (34.8%) are White and 13,869 (23.2%) are Hispanic or Latino (U.S. Census, 2000). City D is a city in transition, from a predominately White population to a predominately Caribbean African American, primarily Haitian or Haitian descent. The Haitian culture has influenced many of the businesses and shops in the business area of the city. There is a large satellite campus for a major university within City D.

PD5 is a state accredited agency through CFA and has 130 authorized sworn personnel and 40 authorized nonsworn personnel. According to Chief DE (personal communications, August 19, 2003), the command staff is comprised of the chief of police, who is an African American female (rare in law enforcement), two White-male assistant chiefs and four majors (one Black male, one White female and two White males). Table 4.6 provides the racial demographics of PD5 at the time of this research.

**Table 4.6*****PD5 Racial/Gender Demographics***

Race/Sex	WM	WF	BM	BF	HM	HF	OM	OF	Total
Sworn	45	11	21	5	25	4	3	0	114
%	39.4%	9.6%	18.4%	4.3%	21.9%	3.5%	2.6%	0%	
Nonsworn	2	12	4	13	2	1	0	1	35
%	5.7%	34.2%	11.4%	37%	5.7%	2.8%	0	2.8%	
Total	47	23	25	18	27	5	3	1	149 <sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup>N = 149

PD5 is responsible for 10 square miles of service area (Chief DE, personal communications, August 19, 2003). PD5 has a mission statement, a vision, values and motto (see Appendix O).

PD5 is housed in a faded blue, but rather new four-story building. The police facility is located behind city hall and in the business district of the city, but off the main thoroughfare. Police vehicles are kept in the rear of the facility and a wall around the rear provide some means of security, however, a security gate is missing and nothing prevents unauthorized vehicles from entering the rear parking lot. Nevertheless there are other security measures in place that prevents unauthorized access to the interior of the building, e.g., electronic locks on doors

requiring electronic key cards to gain access, and a 24-hour security camera monitors the exterior. The front courtyard of the facility has large concrete planters constructed in such a manner to prevent vehicular penetration of the building. There was some greenery around the premises; but overall, it projected an institutional appearance. The building's interior was clean and still had an apparent newness about it.

Clerical technicians and sometimes police officers staff the front lobby of the police facility. Access beyond the lobby by the general public requires clearance by duty personnel. Electronic door locks prohibit access beyond the lobby and anyone allowed into the building must receive a security card/pass, and must be accompanied by someone from the section that is being visited. I was not subjected to the screening process when I visited PD5, because I was with Chief DE.

Chief DE had a spacious office on the fourth floor overlooking the city, with a private bath and conference room. The office was modestly furnished and personalized with plaques and artwork. Chief DE has a distinguished law enforcement career of firsts that began in 1974 at the Police Department of City G. She retired from City G's Police Department in 1997 and became the first female

police chief for a police department in Alabama. She left Alabama in 1999 to become the first female police chief in City K, Florida. After leaving City K and a year and a half stint at a major Florida University as a vice president, she became the first female chief of police for PD5. Chief DE has a Ph.D. in Adult Education/Human Resource Management and a Master's in Public Administration Degree from Florida International University; Bachelor's in Criminal Justice Degree from the former St. Thomas Villanova University, Miami, now Biscayne College; and is a graduate of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. She has completed a host of other executive development courses and seminars, and is a member of a plethora of organizations. Chief DE was the sixth police executive to be interviewed and it took place on August 19, 2003.

Chief DE of PD5 stressed the importance of accreditation because, "It...signifies that an agency has complied with several policies and procedures that shows an agency that is striving for excellence in their performance, personnel and in their services to the citizens" (Interview transcript; August 19, 2003).

PD5 Chief DE said that citizen input into policy making contributes to how PD5 prevents bias-based policing:

[The citizens] provided input to the police command staff based on the concerns that had been demonstrated, not by our department. It was a preventative measure; it was trying to be proactive. We were trying to make sure that people of certain ethnic backgrounds were not targeted just based on their race, but on some type of substantive traffic violation or real traffic violation instead—justified cause, it had to be based on probable cause, not based on ones race. (Interview transcript; August 19, 2003)

However, Chief DE said that her city does not have a track record for having those types of practices, either in the past or after she became chief. Nevertheless, any complaints were handled through internal affairs or through a shift supervisor's investigation. Chief DE did identify "a policy in place which basically advised officers on how to conduct any type of traffic stop or any type of stop" (Interview transcript; August 19, 2003). But she pointed out that there was not really a difference between before 9/11 and after 9/11 in the way bias-based policing complaints were handled.

PD5, like most agencies did not have specific policies addressing terrorism, only hazardous chemicals. After 9/11, Chief DE said that a WMD type policy is under

development, but there is a policy requiring all officers to go through WMD training. Chief DE described increased security measures since 9/11 as such:

It made us want to strengthen security at the rear gate, the entrance to the police compound. Actually, city hall had a security guard stationed there full time and that was changed to a police officer after 9/11 until overtime costs increased. Plus we have provided information to the mayor and council members because they were concerned about their welfare if something should happen. So it was more of an educational process to the mayor, council, employees and citizens. (Interview transcript; August 19, 2003)

Chief DE of PD5 said that [sworn personnel and nonsworn crime scene investigators] completed WMD training and in-house experts were developed to provide annual training. According to Chief DE, in conjunction with WMD training, civil disturbance training was provided. All training was through a larger agency (PD2) and free, but the cost to PD5 was the overtime for those attending. Additional equipment for personnel at PD5 was limited as told by Chief DE:

Gas masks, actually we replaced some of the equipment that officers had and some officers that didn't have

them—we got gas masks. We got full body suits, only about eight of them; they were given to us actually. We got some additional equipment for the SWAT team.

(Interview transcript, August 21, 2003)

Chief DE said her biggest funding shortfall was replacing the rear security gate, which had been broken prior to 9/11. A new gate cost approximately \$40-50,000 and Chief DE thought that perhaps with the heightened sense of urgency, the federal government might assist with gate replacement as a means to enhance security of the police facility. Of course, the latter never happened and Chief DE said it was taken out of the city's budget and there are currently no funds allocated to get the security gate replaced.

On receiving any federal funds, Chief DE said, "Absolutely none! They [federal government] say money is available, but we're waiting to receive it" (Interview transcript; August 19, 2003). The latter caused PD5 to fall into "the red on the overtime costs and assigning vehicles at the water plant and the numerous calls for what people thought were suspicious packages just increased the overtime dollars, and an overtime budget that we had already exceeded" (Chief DE, interview transcript; August 19, 2003). Chief DE explained that currently all positions

are frozen and the salary savings in those vacant positions are being used to offset the overtime deficit.

Chief DE of PD5 wasn't chief of police at the time of 9/11, but she said that her information, based on existing staff and records indicated no major call for service increases after 9/11. There was some increase immediately following 9/11 in certain calls, e.g., suspicious packages, which all turned out to be invalid, according to Chief DE. But 6 months afterward, all was back to normal and remains as such currently at PD5.

PD5 Chief DE felt that terrorism would not affect the U.S. She said, "I had never expected anything of that happening in this lifetime" (Interview transcript; August 19, 2003). However, Chief DE' attitude has definitely been changed by the events of 9/11 and she stressed her new attitude in the following excerpts from the interview:

We have to be very much aware that the possibility [of terrorism] is out there. Not knowing the status of Osama bin Laden or not knowing the status of a lot of these terrorists or what's happening in Iraq. Yes, there is a possibility a threat could happen at any point and we are really not that prepared. We still don't know if that power outage (blackout of Northeastern U.S. & Canada, August 14, 2003) was



terror-related; they can't say unequivocally what caused it. Any city can be attacked at any time and I don't think there is a lot that this country can do to prevent it, if the terrorist really want to do harm to us. (Interview transcript; August 19, 2003)

Chief DE said that her most important lesson learned was, "...how ignorant we are" (Interview transcript; August 19, 2003). Chief DE does not believe that the U.S. has the investigative skills or networking in other countries to combat terrorism in its own homeland. She opined:

We are not as sophisticated as I thought the great America was. When the crisis happened, everyone went into a tailspin and people tend to focus on the major companies, the major cities and they forget terrorists are shrewd; they can target a small city and annihilate that small city of 50,000 people just like that. Also, the training that they were trying to provide, they have provided for the larger cities and not the smaller cities. Forgetting to realize that small cities don't have the equipment and you have a whole lot of small cities and they are the ones that will perish in a situation like that. Because the people won't know what to do, the police per se won't know what to do, they won't have the equipment to do

it with and that's where we will have major problems.

(Interview transcript; August 19, 2003)

In closing, Chief DE talked about the lack of effective communications among police agencies:

It was a wake call to show us just how unprepared we were and how much there is to be gained from this. This should be a learning experience and how even today we still have to work on communications. We need to work on some type of, at least statewide, communications frequency that our police agencies can operate on. With all our technological advancements we should be able to go a statewide system, if necessary. (Interview transcript; August 19, 2003)

#### **PD6**

PD6 is the law enforcement agency for City E, County 3 and consist of the mainland and an island accessible by bridge. City E's total population is 29,884, with a 20,264 (67.8%) African American majority, 8,297 (27.8%) White and 1,348 (4.5%) Hispanic or Latino (U.S. Census, 2000). The population on the island is predominately White and there is a public beach and numerous private beaches. Upscale homes, many high-rise condominiums and hotels comprise the primary living facilities on the island. However, the population on the mainland is predominately poor to middle-

class Blacks, living in older homes or subsidized government housing, and a mix of industry, business and a few new home developments. Nevertheless, the city has embarked on a major \$1.25 billion redevelopment project on the mainland "to turn undervalued waterfront property into a boating and shopping paradise" (Piloto, 2003, p. 1B). The city is expanding its western growth with new homes and development.

City E has a seaport that serves primarily as a shipping point for the Caribbean. Two major highway systems are located in City E: (a) U.S. #1-north and south corridor along the eastern mainland, and (b) I-95-north and south corridor along the western mainland.

Currently, PD6 is not an accredited police agency, but is working toward CALEA accreditation. According to a PD6 demographic report (2003, p. 1), the command staff is composed of the chief of police (Black male), two assistant chiefs (one Black male and one White male) and two Black male majors. The department has an authorized strength of 99 sworn and 68 nonsworn personnel. Table 4.7 provides the racial and gender demographics of PD6 at the time of this research.

**Table 4.7*****PD6 Racial/Gender Demographics***

Race/Sex	WM	WF	BM	BF	HM	HF	OM	OF	Total
Sworn	35	4	48	10	2	0	0	0	99
%	35.3%	4%	48.4%	10.1%	2%	0%	0%	0%	
Nonsworn	3	2	12	49	0	2	0	0	68
%	4.4%	2.9%	17.6%	72%	0%	2.9%	0%	0%	
Total	38	6	60	59	2	2	0	0	167 <sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup>N = 167

The mission statement of PD6 simply says, "Service is job one" ([PD6] Annual, 2003, inside cover). PD6 has a service area of 9.19 square miles (U.S. Census, 2000).

PD6 is located in a centralized city complex that consists of city hall, library, utilities and fire department. The police department is located in the rear of the complex and has a chain link fence around the sides and rear of the facility. The premises is landscaped and well maintained, but there were no visible signs of concrete barriers, etc., that would stop a motor vehicle from crashing into the police facility, however, the location of the facility and the need to negotiate a maze of columns and other architectural features appear to serve as sufficient barriers. There are standard security

measures in the main lobby of the police department, e.g., electronically locked doors that will not allow access by the general public, surveillance camera and a duty station, enclosed with bullet-proof glass to protect the police personnel stationed there. Although I did not have to produce photo-identification or wear a visitor's pass, it is the standard procedure at the front desk, which was staffed by one employee.

The police building is somewhat weathered from wear, tear and age. The interior walls, floors, doors and almost the building's entire internal infrastructure show signs of aging. Offices that I viewed en route to the chief's second floor office were all cramped and stuffed with boxes. Chief ED later explained that the building had major problems with roof leaks, etc., and personnel had outgrown the facility. The city was in the process of relocating its police department to another larger existing facility and negotiations with the seller were ongoing.

An assistant escorted the researcher to the chief's office and the interview took place in Chief ED's office. As explained earlier, the chief's office was cramped and boxes were in abundance. I explained the interview process and collected the necessary informed consent forms.

Chief ED started his law enforcement career in 1973 at a major police department in Ohio. He became chief of police for City E in 2002 and at the time of this interview had been in the position for 14 months. Chief ED has a Juris Doctorate Law Degree from the University of Cincinnati and a Bachelor of Science Degree in Criminal Justice/Political Science from the University of Cincinnati. He has attended several executive development institutions and is a member of at least eight professional organizations, including NOBLE and the National Bar Association. Chief ED was the seventh executive that I interviewed and that occurred on August 20, 2003. Similar to Chief AA of PD1, Chief ED made this comment about terrorism in his department's 2002 annual report:

Since September 11, 2001, the entire country has had to change the way in which we conduct business. We can no longer take for granted the freedoms we once enjoyed. "Homeland Security" has now become a full-time concern. This agency is aware of and committed to its responsibility and the role it must play in addressing terrorists' threats. ([PD6] Annual, 2003, p. 1)

Chief ED of PD6 said that although funding for accreditation has been in place for the past 5 years, it

has not received the proper executive attention to complete the task of obtaining accreditation. Since his arrival, that emphasis has shift toward CALEA accreditation with the necessary resources now in place. The importance of accreditation to Chief ED was evident by his allocation of funding, and the assignment of a major, four staff members and a consultant to the difficult task.

Chief ED of PD6 describes training and sound policies regarding traffic enforcement as the way to keep racial profiling in check. He additionally commented, "We have internal checks and balances in terms of identifying and flagging police officers that are involved in situations that may tend to indicate that, for example, traffic stops, enforcement activities, targeted to specific persons in our community" (Interview transcript; August 20, 2003).

Chief ED emphasized that prior to 9/11, although an anti-bias based profiling policy was in place, the administrative philosophy didn't address it, "what we probably didn't do was the adequate administration on complaints. So what we didn't do was analyze the data and then make administrative determinations based on the data" (Interview transcript; August 20, 2003). Chief ED was not the chief of PD6 until February 11, 2002.

The philosophical change after 9/11 was evident in the following comments:

The policy has not changed, what have changed are our review and inspection efforts. So we've stepped up those, but the policy is clear in terms of our prohibition against biased based enforcement efforts. There have not been any adjustments since 9/11. ... So now we are analyzing the data and what is involved in that is closer inspection and training. (Interview transcript; August 20, 2003)

Chief ED went on to describe the introduction of an early warning system to identify problematic officers:

...One of the technologies that we introduced after 9/11 was the ability to do automated computerized personnel management processes to identify officers and track officers who are involved in use of force, amount of traffic citations written at a one particular location, traffic [citations] written to one particular class of persons. So we track those kinds of things and try to analyze the data.

(Interview transcript; August 20, 2003)

PD6's policies on terrorism were similar to so many other agencies prior to 9/11. The basic policies dealt with disasters and disruptions to public service, i.e.,



riots, bomb threats, etc. According to Chief ED, the term WMD did not exist in any policy. In describing new policies, Chief ED said:

In our new policy, what we've done is identify the areas that would be of concern for terrorists in our community, soft targets if you will, and woven throughout the new policy is this term Weapons of Mass Destruction. ...We have...looked at our existing plans and expanded them to include the possibilities of terrorist attacks and various scenarios. We have had table top exercises to deal with, for example, we have enforcement responsibility for the Port of [County 3] and we have had table top exercise[s] with the Port to address a bomb going off in the area, what the response would be; who is responsible for what areas of concern. ...We have expanded on our disaster policies and I think the largest enhancement is the cooperative effort between various law enforcement agencies and the various tabletop exercises. So we are now doing quarterly meetings with various law enforcement agencies around various scenarios that could happen and identifying soft targets. (Interview transcript; August 20, 2003)

Chief ED noted that the day-to-day operations haven't changed much, but staff meetings include an update on the national alert status.

Chief ED of PD6 said that the primary training change has been joint training with other law enforcement agencies on homeland security issues, which additionally saved expenditures. Grant funding was used to purchase protective clothing for officers and the department purchased a bomb dog. In describing the funding shortfalls, Chief ED said:

...The funding shortfall comes in on the personnel end. There is simply not enough dollars to hire the increased number of persons needed to address the identified Homeland Security concerns. For example, [City E] is responsible for the Port of [County 3] that is located in our city and we had to provide two officers there on a full-time basis and that was never considered in the budgeting considerations prior to 9/11; and of course with the increased activity around security of the Port, it became necessary for us to identify how we were going to pay for two more positions now. We were fortunate that the Port was able to secure a grant and we were able to assist

them. So now there are two officers that are assigned there.

We were only able to increase by two and that is just meeting the minimum requirements...imposed by the state. The Florida Department of Law Enforcement who oversees the Port security concerns for, of course, the State of Florida and there are minimum requirements based on the activities in your particular terminal. Our terminal had just recently started accepting cruise ships and with that the security levels escalate and the minimal requirement is two officers manning gates, roving patrols, ...the debarkation of passengers...and assisting customs with inspections and that does not include the inspections [by] the bomb dog every time a cruise ship comes in and that is what bomb dogs and trainers do. I have probably 4-4½ miles of beachfront that we're responsible for and ...one of the inlets is from the ocean to shore and so we have the immigration issues all the time, and there is no way to increase our patrol activities around those concerns. So currently we have one person assigned to a beachfront area and it is just not enough and there are major concerns. Personnel and defraying personnel costs to meet just

the minimum Homeland Security requirements have been difficult for smaller agencies. (Interview transcript; August 20, 2003)

Chief ED did receive a small amount of funding funneled to him via the Regional Terrorism Task Force. However, Chief ED admits that his agency has not been able to handle the fiscal impact of 9/11. He said:

There were a number of mandates that have been imposed or suggested...on local law enforcement without sufficient funds to handle it. We have had increased Homeland Security responsibilities without the ability to increase staff to meet that, so that became an unfunded mandate. (Interview transcript; August 20, 2003)

Although Chief ED of PD6 was not in office at the time of 9/11, he noted that there were a number of issues that increased calls for service after 9/11:

...So our calls for service have increased, but they have not increased in the area of concern for terrorism or those kinds of issues. We have had an increase in the number of immigration issues that I think is important and is attached to our ability to [be] able to keep our shores safe, and we have gotten a great deal of cooperation from immigration officials

here in the area. Also, we've gotten assistance from the Sheriff's department to address those [immigration issues]. The city—also being an inlet city [makes it] an attractive drop off point. ...We had a spike of bio-hazardous types of calls after 9-11, it has been reported to me and even here on the city hall complex related to anthrax scare. So there was a spike there and every package was considered a suspicious package; and so we had increase response to packages that we received, especially here at the city hall complex. That peaked shortly after 9-11 and through the anthrax investigations [U.S. Postal Service facility at Brentwood, New Jersey and the American Media Inc. building in Boca Raton, Florida] and then dropped off. To date, no particular increases and trends have been identified with that and they are not necessarily connected to 9/11 or 9/11 events at current. [There is] no increase in persons identified as Middle Eastern, raising suspicion or being involved in some activity. (Interview transcription; August 20, 2003)

Chief ED said that none of their calls involving suspicious packages, etc., turned out to be valid.

Chief ED of PD6 said that he did not have a lot of concern about terrorism in the U.S. and in his words:

...I don't know that we paid a lot of attention to terrorism, so it was probably not on the radar screen. There were a lot of other local law enforcement concerns...9/11 placed terrorism, WMD on every law enforcement executive's radar screen...we were not adequately armed to deal with those types of concerns and there were a number of soft targets in various municipalities that could be the subject of an attack and it was a not a heck of a whole lot we could do or were prepared to do to prevent that...now at least [we] have a plan in response to the various threat levels that are identified nationally and we know...how to mobilize to best protect those targets. (Interview transcript; August 20, 2003)

Today, Chief ED says of his attitude and how he has responded to 9/11:

Ever vigilant is the attitude. What we tried to do is to raise the risk level for persons who want to do harm in our community—to harden the targets as best we can. Finally, to keep our communities informed and educated about the various things that they can do to help keep the area safe. Of course, read all intelligence that you get. ...we have a Homeland Security Specialist...now in the department, so he

kind of analyzes all of our Homeland Security stuff and responds to all the surveys and attends all the area meetings as it relates to Homeland Security and provides a monthly briefing. (Interview transcript; August 20, 2003)

Chief ED's most important lesson learned in his words was, "Just how vulnerable we are in an open society and how difficult it is to prevent an attack and identify a potential attacker, without adequate intelligence" (Interview transcript; August 20, 2003).

Chief ED believes the greatest impact of 9/11 for him: ...is the increased awareness for local law enforcement...and this whole notion of soft targets and having an impact on a mass number of people is an overwhelming one. It's one we don't think about often and I think we are now. To a certain extent, you feel vulnerable because here is not a heck of a lot you can do to prevent someone from [inaudible] who is hell-bent on causing destruction for example. (Interview transcript; August 20, 2003)

#### **PD7**

PD7 is the law enforcement agency for City F located in the western farmlands of County 3. SB has a total population of 3,859 with 2,583 (66.9%) Black or African

American, 935 (24.2%) White and 755 (19.6) Hispanic or Latino (U.S. Census, 2000). City F is located on east/west U.S. Highway #27 and north/south State Road (SR) #80 that slice through this farming country of primarily sugarcane. City F is situated east of Lake Okeechobee and has a large state correctional facility within its corporate limits. The correctional facility and the sugarcane fields act as the major stimulus to the economy. City F is 1.93 square miles (U.S. Census, 2000). The city residents are poor and it is evident in the dilapidated buildings, older homes and poor infrastructure that is visible as one drives through the city.

PD7 is located in an older white CBS two-story facility that also serves as a multi-purpose complex for the fire department, city hall and other city services. The premises are sparsely landscaped, just off SR 80, and at the end of a residential section. There is front parking for police, fire, other city vehicles and the general public. Additional parking for city vehicles is in the rear. The lobby of the police department is small, has obvious wear and tear, and open to the public, with a civilian behind a small glass enclosed counter assisting the public. Access to the interior is controlled by the person on duty at the front counter via an electronically



locked wooden door, which was recently installed according to Chief FG (personal communication, August 21, 2003). The front door was not locked when I visited the police facility and the receptionist did not ask me for identification. The receptionist notified Chief FG that I was present and he came out to the lobby. No additional security measures were observed internally or externally.

PD7 is not an accredited agency and has 13 authorized sworn positions, seven part-time sworn positions and three nonsworn positions (Chief FG, personal communication, September 23, 2003). The command staff is composed of an African American male chief of police and one White male lieutenant. Table 4.8 provides the racial and gender demographics of PD7 at the time of this research.

Chief FG's small office was just inside the door off the lobby and was modestly furnished. Chief FG has been in law enforcement for 23 years, working at Belle Glade (Florida) Police Department from 1980-1999. He was an investigator for the state attorney's office between 1999 and 2000, before becoming a victim advocate at PD7 in 2000. He became chief of police for PD7 in April 2003. Chief FG has had extensive training in law enforcement and is currently working on a Bachelor's Degree. Chief FG was the eighth and last police executive that I interviewed.

**Table 4.8*****PD7 Racial/Gender Demographics***

Race/Sex	WM	WF	BM	BF	HM	HF	OM	OF	Total
Sworn	5	1	10	0	4	0	0	0	20
%	25%	5%	50%	0%	20%	0%	0%	0%	
Nonsworn	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	3
%	0%	33.3%	0%	33.3%	0%	33.3%	0%	0%	
Total	5	2	10	1	4	1	0	0	23 <sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup>N = 23

Chief FG of PD7 put his reason for not having accreditation "very simple" (Interview transcript; August 21, 2003), due to lack of funding. When asked if there were plans for future accreditation, Chief FG replied, "I don't have any immediate plans, but there is a desire to want to be accredited and if sometime in the future we can secure the funding to make it happen, I certainly plan to pursue it" (Interview transcript; August 21, 2003).

Chief FG of PD7 touted his agency's minority composition as a deterrent to bias-based policing complaints, "My agency is mostly comprised of minority officers and I guess we have all experienced it [racial profiling]. My officers don't want to impress on somebody else what something that's been done to them (Interview

transcript; August 21, 2003). Chief FG said that all but two of his 13 officers are minorities, either Hispanic, African American or female. However, Chief FG acknowledged the existence of a policy that dealt specifically with racial profiling.

Chief FG described how racial profiling was handled before 9/11:

...A formal written complaint was logged and it was turned over to the lieutenant for investigation. He would then interview the complainant and the officer and any other witnesses that were found. If the allegation was sustained, the appropriate disciplinary action was taken. If not, we would probably just give sensitivity training. (Interview transcript; August 21, 2003)

Here he describes what changed after 9/11, "Pretty much the same way, there is not much you can do. I guess there was more education put in place for the officers in regards to diversity training" (Interview transcript; August 21, 2003).

Chief FG said that prior to 9/11, there was no policy in place to handle terrorism or WMD at PD7, but afterwards he said, "The only thing we did was add a few components to our disaster plan and those components were to deal with

the aftermath of any WMD" (Interview transcript; August 21, 2003. He further describes additional changes at his small agency:

...We did not have an ID badge in place, we started to require officers [to wear] their identification badges and our receptionist that mans the front door was instructed that no one enters the building unless they are identified and have a badge on. In your case today, I just told her to let you in. We also installed the buzzer on the door so immediate access wouldn't be available. [PI - prior to that you could just walk in?] Well, the receptionist stopped you and the door was supposed to be locked, but you know how that is and it was not locked all the time. So we put the electronic buzzer in place. We outfitted city employees with IDs also and advised the city manager to put in place policies that [made it] a requirement at all times. (Interview transcript; August 21, 2003)

PD7 was having difficulty receiving training, according to Chief FG, but his officers received some limited training in the proper use of "HAZMAT suits" (Interview transcript; August 21, 2003), that were obtained through a grant. But he related how he adapted a creative measure to provide some inexpensive training for his

agency, "I accessed a [FDLE] website where they had [training information that could be downloaded and it provided] 8 hours [of] training for WMD and terrorism. ... The online training was very minimal in costs. I think something like \$20 per officer" (Interview transcript; August 21, 2003). Although there were funding shortfalls, Chief FG said:

Our increase wasn't very much because those few items that we purchased didn't cost that much. There may be some things that we need but because we don't have the money; we just rely on the Sheriff's office and other agencies if the need arises. (Interview transcript; August 21, 2003)

Chief FG was not the chief of police at the time of 9/11, but he was working for PD7 as the victim advocate. However, in recalling events from 9/11 through the current date, he said:

I wasn't the chief, but I was here. I know there was a slight increase. We had a couple of specific complaints where somebody got some mail [sent via U.S. Postal Service] with a white powder substance in it. There were about three, but they were not anthrax just white powder substance. We don't know if someone was just playing pranks on people or what, but there were

no actual chemical substances. ...That's an increase because we didn't have those kinds of calls before [9/11].

...I don't think we had any calls 6 months after. We did an extensive educational program in the community; we held seminars explaining to them the process.

[Today] I'd say it's back to normal. I can't recall anything that would be associated with terrorism or any kind of WMD, anthrax or any other chemicals that they used. I don't recall having any in the last couple of years. (Interview transcript; August 21, 2003)

Chief FG related an unusual event that occurred in his community prior to 9/11 in describing the most significant impact to his agency. Three of the hijackers were issued traffic tickets by police officers at PD7 before 9/11, while they traveled through the small rural city (Bhatt, Clifton, and Hobbs, 2001). Chief FG recalled:

I think what it did was make our officers more aware of the people they deal with on the streets and being more careful on how they deal with them. Because during that time we found that several of the

hijackers traveled through our community and received tickets from our officers. Yes, even Atta.

We had three of them come through here and that was probably because they were going to Naples to do the flight training. (Interview transcript; August 21, 2003)

I asked a follow-up question after Chief FG disclosed the traffic stops of the terrorists and inquired if the stop had an impact on his department or him. Chief FG answered by saying:

It caused me to be more aware of our surroundings and to think about our infrastructure and the possibility of them doing something in our area; in a small community [where] you have access to a major thoroughfare - 27. It really brought it home to me that that we really need to think about security of our water plant, our sewer plant and things like [that]. (Interview transcript; August 21, 2003)

Chief FG of PD7 was very straightforward about his attitude toward terrorism prior to 9/11 and he exclaimed, "I didn't have an attitude, it was just somebody else's problem" (Interview transcript; August 21, 2003). However, his attitude has changed tremendously:

I'm very aware and I am not frightened to the extent that it causes me not to go about my everyday routine, but I pay a little more attention to when you go in the grocery store and you see if anything is laying around or out of place. Just being a little bit more careful how I conduct myself. If I see someone carrying something and they put it down, I'm very observant now. (Interview transcript; August 21, 2003)

In relating important lessons learned, Chief FG spoke of knowing your surroundings and the importance of following the new airline rules. He closed the interview with a statement about lost federal funding:

I think that one of the biggest impacts on law enforcement is that amount of funding that we had been receiving prior to 9-11 has been severely decreased. I think if anything the federal government needs to look at that because of the WMD and terrorists that are out there. They need to really consider putting funding back in place that the communities lose as a result of loss of tourism, travel and things like that.

We lost money in our [Federal] Law Enforcement Block Grant. That was one of our biggest providers of revenue. ...for us, we probably lost between \$6,000-



\$7,000. We didn't get much in the beginning because of our population. We only have about 4,000 people in the community, but [losing] that little bit hurts.

(Interview transcript; August 21, 2003)

### ***Cross Case analysis***

The collective descriptions of 8 law enforcement executives interviewed focused on the primary themes of this research, dealing with two types of agencies: accredited and nonaccredited; and their training, funding, policies and practices. However, other prominent themes emerged that dealt with interagency cooperation and community involvement. The interviewees spoke of working with other local law enforcement agencies, especially larger agencies, to offset cost and the sharing of information by federal agencies with local law enforcement. Previous work by Furay (1999) supported the benefit of centralizing law enforcement agencies as they interact with each other in response to domestic terrorism. The fire department became a common denominator in the new aspect of interdepartmental cooperation.

The words (data) of the participants were crosschecked, using triangulation to determine if there was "agreement" among sources, hence "corroboration" (Johnson, 1997, p. 161). Cross case analysis is "used to deepen

understanding and explanation" (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Secondly, I want to know the applicability of my study at one department to other similar settings.

During a two-week period, between September 20-October 5, 2003, I reviewed the interview transcripts with each participant to ensure their accuracy. I wanted to determine "if they are saying what you're understanding and saying" (C. Warshaw, personal communication, March 30, 2002). I also allowed the participants to review the transcripts of each other and found that there was agreement among the 8 participants regarding the issues brought forth in this study.

### **Accreditation.**

I did interviews at 3 agencies that were not accredited, one that was dual accredited (state and national), two that were state accredited and one that was national accredited (see Table 4.9). All of the police executives interviewed thought that accreditation, either national or state, had merit primarily because it contributes toward the professionalism and accountability of the law enforcement agency. The latter was consistent with the review of the literature, which touted professionalism and accountability as significant benefits

of accreditation (Faizarano, 1999; Sharp, 2000; Bittick, 2003).

**Table 4.9**

***Agency Accreditation Status and Their Reasoning***

Agency & Participant	Status	Reason	Attitude <sup>a</sup>
PD1/Chief AA	CALEA/CFA	"...foundation—can build house of professionalism..."	+
PD2/Asst. Dir. AB	CALEA	"...provides direction for enforcement..."	+
PD3/Chief BC	Not accredited	"...rewrite every policy to fit accreditation..."	+
PD4/Dir. CB	CFA	"...primarily for professionalism..."	+
PD5/Chief DE	CFA	"...striving for excellence in their performance..."	+
PD6/Chief ED	Not accredited	"...dedicated staff toward accreditation..."	+
PD7/Chief FG	Not accredited	"...lack of funding...but there is a desire..."	+

<sup>a</sup>Attitude toward accreditation: + = positive

Of the 3 agencies that were not accredited, two were in the process of applying for accreditation and one did not have the financial means to pursue it. As discussed in

the literature review, the cost of accreditation was seen as a negative factor and hence a weakness (Sharp, 2000). Nevertheless, there appeared to be no significant difference between accredited or nonaccredited agencies in how they responded to 9/11. The study by Alpert and MacDonald (2001) supported the latter, because their study found no significant differences between accredited and nonaccredited agencies in the use of force. The salient differences, if any, between accredited and nonaccredited agencies were in existing departmental policies (not specifically relating to terrorism or WMD) and available funding.

Accredited agencies had well-established policies, which addressed a wide variety of issues to meet accreditation standards, whereas nonaccredited agencies that were applying for accreditation were revising or developing policies. Chief BC of PD3 and Chief ED of PD6 described how their policies were being "revised" or "developed" to meet the accreditation standards. Chief ED devoted substantial staffing to assist with the accreditation process and this was one of the criticisms of accreditation by Sharp (2000), the requirement of additional personnel. Director CB of PD4, whose department is currently state accredited, explained that his entire

policy manual was redone to comply with accreditation. Falzarano (1999) cited policy development as a major requirement of accreditation to meet operational standards.

The one agency that was not accredited (PD7), or seeking accreditation, did not have updated policies. Additionally, Chief FG of PD7 had neither funding nor staffing to handle accreditation. However, Chief AA of PD1, whose agency was dual accredited, had the financial means to maintain both types of accreditation, but still had to make changes to policies to address WMD and terrorism. The latter was true of the three other accredited agencies, PD2, PD4 and PD5.

***Bias based policing practices.***

All seven of the interviewees said that there were essentially no changes in the way bias based policing incidents were handled or prevented pre-9/11 or post-9/11. Policies and procedures were in place, prior to 9/11 or developed shortly thereafter due to state mandates that were already encroaching law enforcement agencies (§ 943.1758, Sec. 1, Curriculum revision for diverse populations, 2001).

Chief AA of PD1, Assistant Director AB and Chief BA of PD2, and Chief ED of PD6 emphasized their organization's philosophy, mission statement, training and policies, which

vehemently spoke against racial profiling. Director CB of PD4 spoke of the department's policy and his personal scrutiny and review of all calls that are handled by his department to prevent or handle any racial profiling complaints. Assistant Director AB of PD2, Chief BC of PD3 and Chief FG of PD7 spoke of the diversity and minority composition of their police agencies being a significant deterrent to racial profiling complaints. Chief DE spoke of her agency not having a prior record of racial profiling, but had policies in place, which were developed with feedback from citizens.

The methods and practices used by the participants to prevent bias-based policing were consistent with the discussants in the literature review (Delattre, 2002; Hoover, 2002; Raterman, 2002). Bias-based policies were either implemented or improved according to the participants.

**Table 4.10*****Bias-Based Policing Practices***

Agency/ participant <sup>a</sup>	Prevention method <sup>b</sup>	Pre-9/11 complaints <sup>c</sup>	Post-9/11 complaints <sup>d</sup>	Attitude <sup>e</sup>
PD1/Chief AA	"...a variety of mechanism ...but the most important thing is the philosophy of this [agency], "It won't be tolerated."	"...before [9/11] we started to initiate aggressive policy prohibiting it."	"There was really no difference... have not seen an up-shoot...in complaints."	+
PD2/Asst. Dir. AB & Chief BA	(AB) "...thru mgmt. Philosophy, right down to mission statement..."	No change in policy. (AB) "...made sure that [Muslims] were not discriminated against"	(BA) "...developed contact with all temples, rabbis..."	+
PD3/Chief BC	"...our dept is composed of 51% [minority]."	"I had just been on a couple months prior... did not experience here..."	"We...take any type of complaint ...in person, in writing, over the phone..."	+
PD4/Dir. CB	"We have a general order ...I personally review every call." [minority]."	"My reviewing the daily headers...didn't have general order..."	"We just watch for it. We have not had any..."	+
PD5/Chief DE	"[...Citizens] provide input to the police command staff"	"...policy in place" City has no track record of bias-based policing	No different than pre-9/11	+

Agency/ participant <sup>a</sup>	Prevention method <sup>b</sup>	Pre-9/11 complaints <sup>c</sup>	Post-9/11 complaints <sup>d</sup>	Attitude <sup>e</sup>
PD6/Chief ED	Through training & sound policies. "...internal checks & balances-- identifying & flagging officers"	ED/ not the chief, but policy was in place, however, no "adequate administration on complaints."	"...changed-- our review & inspection efforts."	+
PD7/Chief FG	Minority composition of agency serves as deterrent	"...formal written complaint was logged"	"...more education put in place for-- officers."	+

<sup>a</sup>PD2 has 2 participants. <sup>b</sup>Method used to prevent bias-based policing.

<sup>c</sup>How bias-based policing complaints were handled pre-9/11. <sup>d</sup>How bias-based policing complaints were handled post-9/11. <sup>e</sup>+ = Participant's belief in the value of un-bias-based policing was strong.

### ***Terrorism policies.***

All of the interviewees had to revise or develop policies to address terrorism and WMD after 9/11. None of the agencies had policies that covered the major issues dealing with terrorism prior to 9/11, although the participants spoke of previous terrorism events in the U.S. e.g., 1993 World Trade Center bombing, Columbine and the Oklahoma City bombing of the federal courthouse. All of the agencies increased security measures at their police facilities or in their service communities in some manner, from a simplistic approach which required the wearing of



identification cards, to more elaborate methods such as electronic screening of personnel and packages. The following are some of the enhanced security measures used:

1. Requiring employees to wear identification cards
2. Screening all non-employees
3. Basic electronic door lock
4. Concrete barricades
5. Building security cameras
6. Street security cameras
7. X-ray machines in the front lobby

Table 4.11 captures the comments of the participants in describing terrorism policies and other practice changes.

Those agencies with seaports, a major airport, significant governmental facilities and infrastructures, and large waterfronts or beach access (PD1, PD2, and PD6) had to deploy additional staffing to provide security. The presence of significant Arabic and Jewish communities required increased vigilance, primarily to keep potential hate crimes from happening at the temples, mosque and businesses owned by "Middle-Eastern" citizens (PD2 and PD3). Interestingly, members of the former communities made appeals to the law enforcement agencies to increase their vigilance. Consistent with Shark's (2001) observations, the participants did not target Middle

Eastern communities, in cooperation with federal requests to the point of racial profiling. Contrary to concerns brought forth by Sikh Media Watch (2002), the participants did not target Muslims and other similar minority communities as new profilees. Instead, as determined through the interviews, the participants reached out to Middle Eastern communities in their service areas.

**Table 4.11*****Terrorism Policies***

Agency/ Participant <sup>a</sup>	Pre-9/11	Post-9/11	Other policy/practice changes	Action <sup>b</sup>
PD1/ Chief AA	"...did not have a very good WMD policy or terrorism mitigation policy."	"...developed written procedures...to responding to WMD & adding to our unusual occurrence policy..."	"...developed city-wide security team-- to check out [city's] vulnerability... "	+
PD2/Asst. Dir. AB & Chief BA	(AB) "...oriented toward the occasional domestic terrorism within this country..."	(BA) ... at [the airport]...more concerned with security..." (AB) "...belong to a regional homeland security task force..."	(AB) "...county govt. bldg, an entire squad assigned to security operations."	+
PD3/ Chief BC	"We did not have any."	"We are part of the domestic terrorism task force...modeled [our] policies [with] color code alert..."	"We have...Israeli culture...we do extra patrol in these locations."	+
PD4/Dir. CB	"None!"	"...haven't implemented policies per se. I put out memos...if	"We have cameras on both ends of the island."	+

Agency/ Participant <sup>a</sup>	Pre-9/11	Post-9/11	Other policy/practice changes	Action <sup>b</sup>
PD4/Dir. CB (continued)		something affects the safety & security of town."		
PD5/ Chief DE	"None...poli- cies only pertained to hazardous chemicals..."	"...we are in the process of establishing a [WMD] policy..."	"...Strengthen security at the rear gate [of the police dept]"	+
PD6/ Chief ED	"...only policies to deal with disasters & disruption to public service by riots, [etc]..."	"...identify-- soft targets, & woven throughout the new policy is this term WMD."	"...cooperative effort between various law enforcement agencies-- tabletop exercises."	+
PD7/ Chief FD	"None."	"...add a few componenets to our disaster plan--to deal with--WMD."	"...require officers to wear their id badges. ...installed buzzer on [front] door."	+

<sup>a</sup>PD2 has 2 participants. <sup>b</sup>+ = Action of all participants was positive.

### ***Training and funding.***

Training changed in a variety of ways at all agencies as the results of state mandates regarding WMD and terrorism (see Table 4.12). These state mandates and

unfamiliarity of agencies with WMD, as described in the literature review (FDLE, 2001; Beary, 2002; Curtis, Stoddard, Kim and Devasundaram, 2002), directed the course of local law enforcement.

PD1, PD2 and PD3 reported increased joint terrorism-related training with fire departments. PD2, PD3, PD4, PD5 and PD6 trained in conjunction with other law enforcement agencies, or sent their personnel to other agencies for training. Agencies that trained with other agencies reportedly reduced expenditures, but overtime costs remained. PD2 and PD5 reported extensive terrorism-related training extended to their civilian personnel. Two of the agencies (PD4 and PD7) provided training and information on terrorism to various members of their city government and certain communities. Chief FG of PD7 obtained a WMD training disk from an FDLE website and provided that information to his personnel.

**Table 4.12*****Agency Training and Funding***

Agency/ Participant <sup>a</sup>	Training change	Associated cost	Funding source
PD1/ Chief AA	WMD added "...working with fire-police component."	"...\$½ million...just training alone..."	"Somewhat in FY2002/2003...Law Enforcement Trust Fund-siphoned..."
PD2/Asst. Dir. AB & Chief BA	(AB) "...more specific to homeland security-concerns." (BA) "We give civilian support people an overview of...terrorism."	(AB) "...expenditures-ran out." (BA) "...but we did [training] anyway--resulted in-deficit [of] \$3 million..."	(AB) "...some carryover expenses that are added back into [PD2] budget at the end of [fiscal year]."
PD3/ Chief BC	"We got together with [PD15] & put officers thru [WMD] training...Fire dept helpful in providing training."	"Lots of overtime..." No cost given.	"It was absorbed in the budget...I had 8-9 vacancies...where it was taken from..."
PD4/ Dir. CB	"...selected one sergeant for homeland security...attends monthly seminars..."	"...it's probably cost us another \$1,000-2,000 per year."	"...we've done it all ourselves..."
PD5/ Chief DE	"We ensured that everyone completed WMD training & having in-house experts..."	"...the training was free, but...had to pay overtime to some officers..." No cost provided.	Absorbed through the regular budget in "vacant positions."
PD6/ Chief ED	"...training with other law enforcement	Overtime, but amount not	Regular budget

Agency/ Participant <sup>a</sup>	Training change	Associated cost	Funding source
PD6/ Chief ED (continued)	agencies...govt. agencies responsible for homeland security..."	provided.	
PD7/ Chief EF	"...undergone training in [protective suits]...the handling of...anthrax, we haven't had much."	"...the online training was very minimal in costs...\$20 per officer."	Regular budget. "Our increase wasn't very much..."

<sup>a</sup>PD2 has 2 participants.

The cost of extra training ranged from a nominal fee of \$20 per officer (approximately \$300 total) for PD7 to approximately \$3 million for PD2 (see Table 4.12), which resulted in a budget deficit. Five agencies purchased equipment for terrorism and WMD concerns; one was given the equipment and one agency was promised equipment through a federal grant, but had yet to receive it (see Table 4.13).

**Table 4.13**

***Agency Purchase of WMD/Terrorism Equipment and Funding***

Agency/ Participant <sup>a</sup>	Equipment purchased	Cost	Funding source
PD1/ Chief AA	"...protective equipment for police officers & barricades around the police dept."	\$300,000	"The city manager has made [terrorism] a priority..."
PD2/Asst. Dir. AB & Chief BA	(AA) "They [protective suits] have been ordered for all [personnel]."	Total cost undetermined. (BA) "Deficit is the bottom line."	(AA) "...[budget] needs to be increased say 25-30% & we're having a struggle reaching that..."
PD3/ Chief BC	"...protective clothing, the gas masks..."	"...it was \$12,000 that was awarded to us."	"...all that was purchased from federal grants, did not impact my budget directly."
PD4/ Dir. CB	"...I'm waiting for those [protective suits] to come in..."	N/A	"The federal govt. is supposed to furnish [protective suits]."



Agency/ Participant <sup>a</sup>	Equipment purchased	Cost	Funding source
PD5/ Chief DE	"We got full body suits, only about 8 of them..."	Cost not provided	"They [protective suits] were given to us actually."
PD6/ Chief ED	"We used grant money to purchase protective equipment..."	Cost not provided	"We have received some from the federal govt."
PD7/ Chief EF	"The HAZMAT suits were given to us..."	"...through a grant." No cost.	No cost

<sup>a</sup>PD2 has 2 participants

The interviews revealed that there were significant increases in expenditures for both training and equipment, but funding assistance for training and equipment from the federal government was slow in coming and sparse whenever it was received. The lack of funding from federal sources was consistent with information gleaned in the literature review (Cote', 2000; Modzelewski, 2003).

Federal grant funding received by two agencies specifically for the purpose of obtaining equipment for terrorism were from the Federal Equipment Grant (PD3 and PD7) and through a federal grant for homeland security

needs provided by a regional terrorism task force (PD6). The primary item purchased by all of the law enforcement agencies, except PD4, was the protective suits for anthrax. There were other federal grants not specifically for homeland security needs, such as the Federal Law Enforcement Block Grant that were diverted and used to purchase protective suits and other items needed to combat terrorism.

All of the agencies had funding shortfalls and handled them, based on their fiscal capabilities. PD1 obtained additional funding from its city government and its law enforcement trust fund, hiring three new officers for the sole purpose of fighting terrorism. PD2 simply faced a \$3 million deficit and used carryover funds to offset it each fiscal year, but increased its budget as well. PD3 and PD5 used the personnel salary accounts where there were vacancies to absorb the costs. PD4 used regular budgeted funds and sent one officer to another agency to learn the training techniques, and subsequently train the rest of the department. PD6 obtained grant funding through FDLE to add two new officers for port security. PD6's funding for two new officers was a pass through of regional task force funding for Homeland Security needs. Lastly, PD7 relied on

the sheriff's office and other agencies to assist, due to lack of funding and personnel.

***Calls for service.***

Although all of the law enforcement agencies reported increases in WMD or terrorism related calls for service, each had different experiences (see Table 4.14). The calls for service at PD1 did not increase significantly until after the October 2001 anthrax incident at the American Media Inc. building. PD4 was located in a seasonal community and its calls did not increase until after the winter residents returned to Town C in October 2001. Two agencies reported hoax calls (PD3 and PD7), wherein persons used white powder to represent anthrax and forwarded it to victims via U.S. mail. PD1 was involved in the only authentic anthrax call wherein, "11 people were diagnosed with inhalation anthrax and six more with non-lethal cutaneous, or skin anthrax. ...five died" (Lipman, 2003, p. 7A).

Generally, the primary type of calls for service that increased were suspected anthrax or suspicious packages, however, PD1, PD2 and PD3 reported suspicious persons calls involving Middle Eastern and Arabic citizens also increased.

**Table 4.14*****WMD/Terrorism Type Calls For Service***

Agency/ Participant <sup>a</sup>	CFS (ia) <sup>b</sup>	CFS bona fide <sup>c</sup>	CFS (cur.) <sup>d</sup>
PD1/Chief AA	"...CFS did not increase significantly...in Oct. 2001...after the anthrax...CFS increased exponentially for 1-2 months..."	"Let me be quite clear on this; none of those calls turned out to be valid."	"...back to normal...during times of heightened alert, there are a lot of officers on the street."
PD2/Asst. Dir AB & Chief BA	(AB)"...increased significantly, specifically with regards to white powder type calls. A lot had to do with media putting out info..." (BA) "The anthrax issue was a great concern for a while..."	(BA) "With the anthrax, I don't believe there was [sic] any."	(AB) "...they have absolutely decreased as far as the anthrax...on regular basis, not in a panic mode, we still go to suspicious package kind of calls..." (BA) "...That's more than [normal], but it's not out of hand."
PD3/Chief BC	"...a major increase. Everyone [was] so concerned about suspicious people, about seeing any kind of white powder."	"Zero...made an arrest on an anthrax hoax. Some kid put white powder in an envelope & sent it to his girlfriend..."	"...gone back to some normality, but when they raise the homeland security rate...that's when we get increase[s]."
PD4/Dir. CB	"...it didn't cause an increase	"None."	"It's not a consideration...People

Agency/ Participant <sup>a</sup>	CFS (ia) <sup>b</sup>	CFS bona fide <sup>c</sup>	CFS (cur.) <sup>d</sup>
PD4/Dir. CB (continued)	because of lack of people here...but when they got here [in Oct.]...CFS went up 10%...due to media hype"		aren't thinking about it anymore."
PD5/Chief DE	"...I didn't come on until Jan. 2002...from what I was told, there were some calls."	"...they turned out to be not valid."	"Pretty much forgotten. We don't get any calls along those lines."
PD6/Chief ED	"We had a spike of bio-hazardous type calls...even here on the city hall complex related to anthrax scare."	"...we have not had any confirmed calls of that nature. None."	"To date, no particular increases & trends have been identified..."
PD7/Chief FG	"...a slight increase...We had...3-4 calls where somebody got some mail with a white powder substance in it."	"...they were not anthrax, just white powder...don't know if someone [was] just playing pranks on people or what..."	"I'd say it's back to normal. I don't recall anything associated with terrorism...WMD, anthrax..."

Note. This table represents only WMD/terrorism related calls for service, e.g., suspicious substances, packages & persons.

<sup>a</sup>PD2 has 2 participants. <sup>b</sup>CFS (i.a.) = Calls for service immediately after 9/11. <sup>c</sup>CFS (bona fide) = Calls for service that were authentic.

<sup>d</sup>CFS (cur.) = Current level of calls for service.

The participants at PD2 and PD4 attributed the increase in calls for service in part to media focusing on anthrax and terrorism. PD3 reported that calls requesting service (extra patrol) increased from the temples and a rabbinical school. Based on the information provided by participants, less than 6 months after 9/11, the terrorism/WMD type calls for service were no longer occurring and things were back to normal. Generally, such is the status of current WMD/terrorism calls for service. Nevertheless, whenever the Homeland Security color-coded alert is raised, PD1 (Chief AA) increase staff and PD3 (Chief BC) reported that there are increased calls for extra patrols from the Jewish temples and rabbinical school.

***Personal views and opinions.***

The personal views and opinions of the participants were gleaned from questions 18-20 of the interviews. Personal views and opinions were divided into two categories: (a) prominent themes, where there was a majority agreement among the participants; and (b) secondary themes, where there was considerable variation among participants. The seven prominent themes emerging centered on the following areas:

1. Question 18-Complacency/couldn't happen in U.S.
2. Question 19-Increased awareness and vigilance

3. Question 19—Terrorism in the U.S. will happen again
4. Question 20—Awareness/never take things for granted
5. Question 20—Vulnerability of U.S.
6. Question 21—Improved cooperation between law enforcement agencies (federal and local)
7. Question 21—Improved cooperation between police and fire departments

As noted above, three questions (19, 20 and 21) have two prominent themes each. Participants and their associated prominent themes are described in Tables 15, 16 and 17. Table 4.15 reviews the attitude of the participants before and after September 11, 2001. Table 4.16 reviews the important lessons learned by the participants. Table 4.17 provided the participants' overall opinions on the impact of 9/11 on law enforcement.

**Table 4.15**

***Prominent Themes Depicting Participants' Attitude Pre/Post-9/11***

Agency/ Participant <sup>a</sup>	Complacency-couldn't happen in U.S. <sup>b</sup>	Increased awareness and vigilance <sup>c</sup>	Terrorism in U.S. will happen again <sup>d</sup>
PD1/Chief AA	N/A	"...the heightened awareness & perception of our officers being out there..."	"I am a believer that anything can happen, anywhere, anyplace & [City A]...cannot sit on its laurels..."
PD2/Asst. Dir. AB & Chief BA	(AB) "...in my mind, international/foreign terrorism was a reality...never had a real bona fide case, other than NY. So we had a sense we were above this kind of real harm..." (BA) "...the frame of mind was...terrorism still occurred in foreign lands..."	(AB) "Homeland security, both domestic & international...is become now more an equal focus...Never take anything for granted..."	(AB) "...it's going to happen again in [U.S.]
PD3/Chief BC	"You watch it on TV & on the other side of the world...but [it] couldn't happen over here."	N/A	"I have a feeling that something is still going to happen, it's a matter



Agency/ Participant <sup>a</sup>	Complacency-couldn't happen in U.S. <sup>b</sup>	Increased awareness and vigilance <sup>c</sup>	Terrorism in U.S. will happen again <sup>d</sup> of time..."
PD3/Chief BC (continued)			
PD4/Dir. CB	"Never thought about it in the U.S., the only time I thought about terrorism was when we saw something in Israel or Lebanon..."	"...it's on your mind every single day...my attitude is heightened awareness..."	N/A
PD5/Chief DE	"I didn't think it would ever affect us...[not] in this lifetime."	"We have to be very much aware that the possibility is out there."	"Any city can be attacked at any time...[not] a lot this country can do to prevent it..."
PD6/Chief ED	"...I don't know that we paid a lot of attention to terrorism...not a lot of concerns..."	"Ever vigilant is the attitude...try to...harden the targets as best we can."	N/A
PD7/Chief FG	"I didn't have an attitude. It was just somebody else's problem."	"I'm very much aware &...I'm very observant now."	N/A

Note. This table is based on responses to the following interview questions: (18) What was your attitude about terrorism prior to 9/11; and (19) What is your attitude today?

<sup>a</sup>PD2 has 2 participants. <sup>b</sup>Theme 1. <sup>c</sup>Theme 2. <sup>d</sup>Theme 3.

The prominent themes arising from the questions about each participant's attitude were mainly consistent when compared across all of the participants. The literature review was congruent with what each participant was saying. The idea of complacency and that it would not happen in the U.S. (theme 1) was brought forth in work by Wright, Ostrow and Cimon (1995), who saw no sweeping changes in law enforcement as a result of domestic terrorism. Cote's (2000) findings showed an awareness of terrorism, but most agencies believing that it would not happen to them, hence a lack of preparation. Theme 2 was demonstrated in the movement to get local law enforcement prepared for terrorism shortly after 9/11 (FDLE, 2001; Horne, 2003; Lober, 2002; Moore, 2002). Cote's study found that law enforcement agencies thought that terrorism would be a problem in the U.S. in the near future (theme 3), but these agencies took for granted that it would not be in their "specific area" (p. 67). The latter is indicative of theme 4, which is captured in Table 4.16, which provides the words of the participants in describing the important lessons of 9/11. Delattre (2002) and Wright et al. discussed the vulnerability of the U.S. (theme 5) in depth.

**Table 4.16*****Prominent Themes Depicting Important Lessons of 9/11***

Agency/ Participant <sup>a</sup>	Awareness-never take things for granted <sup>b</sup>	Vulnerability of U.S. <sup>c</sup>
PD1/Chief AA	"...never underestimate the will or desire of an individual...hell-bent on creating a cause."	"...how vulnerable we actually are, a free open society...our greatest weakness..."
PD2/Asst. Dir AB & Chief BA	(AB) "...Never take anything for granted...like security...thoughts or ideologies..."	(BA) "...made us so aware of our vulnerability factor & we look at security situations differently..."
PD3/Chief BC	N/A	"...we weren't prepared..."
PD4/Dir. CB	"...an awareness that simple things can be dangerous...we took for granted...the power plant in your city."	"...what would happen if the power plant was attacked by someone...& nuclear radiation hazard..."
PD5/Chief DE	N/A	"We are not as sophisticated as I thought the great America was."
PD6/Chief ED	N/A	"Just how vulnerable we are in an open society & how difficult it is to prevent an attack..."
PD7/Chief FG	"Just pay attention to surroundings..."	N/A

Note. This table is based on the responses to question 20: Are there any important lessons that you have learned as a result of 9/11?

<sup>a</sup>PD2 has 2 participants. <sup>b</sup>Theme 4. <sup>c</sup>Theme 5.

Table 4.17 demonstrates the increased cooperation between federal and local law enforcement agencies, and the

fire departments. Four of the participants noted that cooperation between federal and local law enforcement agencies had increased; five said the same about fire departments. The U.S. PATRIOT Act (2001) has a section to improve the information flow and cooperation (theme 6) between federal law enforcement agencies and local law enforcement. Mitchell's study (1986) and a later report (Lichtblau, 2002) found that coordination, cooperation and communication between law enforcement agencies were woefully deficient and needed significant improvement.

The literature review spoke only succinctly about fire departments, as it relates to an important theme (#7) that emerged. However, fire departments, as an important first responder was evident in the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center. Early in this research, Maniscalco, Denney, Holtermann and Kaniewski (2002) emphasized that the fire service was a critical asset whose response was of paramount importance to minimize the impact of a terrorism attack. Fire was included in assessing Florida's preparedness for terrorism and the fire services is a part of the Central Florida Domestic Security task Force (FDLE, 2001).

**Table 4.17**

***Prominent Themes Depicting Participants' Views on the***

***Impact of 9/11***

Agency/ Participant <sup>a</sup>	Improved cooperation btwn. law enf. Agencies (Federal & local) <sup>b</sup>	Improved cooperation btwn. police & fire depts <sup>c</sup>
PD1/Chief AA	"This agency is more than willing to share its experiences...because of the anthrax...with any agency..."	"The PD has worked closely with the fire dept because of the anthrax incident & established a protocol where [we] respond together."
PD2/Asst. Dir AB & Chief BA	(BA) "I honestly & sincerely feel that the relationships btwn. Federal agencies, county agencies, inter-agency cooperation has increased."	(AB) "We coordinated btwn. Police & fire in terms of how we would respond to...white powder related calls." (BA) "There was tie-in with police, fire & health dept..."
PD3/Chief BC	"Because of this, we now work together a lot better with the FBI...surrounding agencies, with fire depts..."	[Ditto]
PD4/Dir. CB	"You always hear about organized crime, but never about organized law enforcement...law enforcement has really come together..."	"...in all my 35 yrs in law enforcement, I seldom ever dealt with the fire dept, but since [9/11] we have joint meetings...police are learning from fire & I

Agency/ Participant <sup>a</sup>	Improved cooperation btwn. law enf. Agencies (Federal & local) <sup>b</sup>	Improved cooperation btwn. police & fire depts <sup>c</sup>
PD4/Chief CB (continued)		think it's working."

Note. This table is based on responses to question 21: Are there any other statements that you might want to make regarding the impact of 9/11 on law enforcement?

<sup>a</sup>PD2 has 2 participants. <sup>b</sup>Theme 6. <sup>c</sup>Theme 7.

There were secondary themes that emerged as the results of the comments and viewpoints from the participant police executives. Generally, the following 8 secondary themes were shared among 3 or less of the 8 participants:

1. Question 18—Terrorism could happen in the U.S.
2. Question 20—learned about the arrogance, ignorance and apathy of the U.S.
3. Question 20—Brought the police and community together
4. Question 20—Law enforcement had ineffective communication systems
5. Question 20—Smaller communities and their law enforcement agencies are overlooked
6. Question 21—Citizens were more appreciative of law enforcement
7. Question 21—Changes in law enforcement are permanent

8. Question 21—Loss of federal funding made significant impact on small departments

Question 19 (What is your attitude today?) did not appear on the above list because the 8 participants shared the same prominent sentiment. There were 3 participants whose responses were the sole secondary theme, but deserves mentioning because of the consistency of their responses with the literature review. Only 1 participant (PD1/Chief AA) had a strikingly different answer to question 18 (What was your attitude about terrorism prior to 9/11?). His answer displayed a strong conviction that terrorism could indeed happen in the U.S. (theme 1), "When I came on board in Oct. 1998...I had spoken to my staff about [City A] being a high-end community...I was concerned that [City A] would be the site of domestic terrorism..." (Interview transcript; Chief AA, July 25, 2003).

The literature review provided corroboration with Chief AA's concern. It was evident by researchers Mitchell (1986), Barnathan (1987) and Cote' (2000) that terrorism had no boundaries and could happen in the U.S. (theme 1). However, the literature review also found that there was very little concern from the law enforcement community that terrorism, such as seen in the Middle East and other countries, could happen in the U.S. The literature

suggests that Chief AA (at the local level of law enforcement) went against the grain in thinking that terrorism was a reality in the U.S. and preparing for it. Cote' (2000) supports this by finding, "...most [of the agencies] were reluctant to implement department wide training for anything other than the traditional terrorist threat or did not implement training at all" (p. 67). Cote' found that most of the agencies surveyed did not seem to think that terrorism "would be a problem in their specific area" (p. 67).

One participant (PD2/Chief BA) identified an important lesson learned (question #20, theme 3) as bringing the community together, "...it brought us closer to the community...We developed relationships with 12 temples...that we had absolutely not had before" (Interview Transcript; July 30, 2003).

The literature review found that local police in some areas did seek to minimize damage caused by requests from federal law enforcement agencies to increase their surveillance, etc., of Middle Eastern communities (Shank, 2001). Delattre (2002) and Hoover (2002) indicate that bias-based policing would undermine any police community relation efforts, but adhering to constitutionally based



practices would improve relationship with the community, as indicated by theme 3.

Although alluded to in previous comments by other participants, only 1 participant (PD7/Chief FG) noted the impact of decrease federal funding, when asked question 21 regarding the impact of 9/11 on law enforcement (theme 8). Chief FG said, "...the biggest impact on law enforcement is that amount of funding that we had been receiving prior to 9/11 has been severely decreased" (Interview transcript; August 21, 2003).

Federal funding has been taken away from the standard law enforcement programs and redirected to programs that are directly related to terrorism, i.e., homeland security needs (Weedon, 2002). As such, agencies will lose funding in some areas, as indicated by theme 8 and must rely on alternative sources, or do without as in the case of and PD7.

Ignorance and apathy (theme 2) were discussed in Cote's study, wherein local departments felt that terrorism would not reach their "back yards" and it was someone else's problem (see Table 4.18).

**Table 4.18****Secondary Theme 2: Arrogance, Ignorance & Apathy of the U.S.**

Agency/ Participant	Comment	Consistency with literature <sup>a</sup>
PD1/Chief AA	"The naïveté & arrogance of this country that we could not be subjected to [terrorism] stupefied me..."	+
PD5/Chief DE	"Yes, how ignorant we are...being prepared in providing information...our federal govt. is not as efficient..."	+
PD6/Chief ED	"...how difficult it is to prevent an attack & identify a potential attacker without adequate intelligence."	+

Note. This secondary theme was derived from question 20: Are there any important lessons that you have learned as a result of 9/11?

<sup>a</sup>+ = consistent with what was found in the literature review

**Table 4.19*****Secondary Theme 4: Law Enforcement had Ineffective******Communications System***

Agency/ Participant	Comment	Consistency with literature <sup>a</sup>
PD3/Chief BC	"...we need better communications & we're doing that right now by trying to get...a radio system grant."	+
PD5/Chief DE	"We need to work on some type of...statewide, communications frequency that our police agencies can operate on."	+

Note. This secondary theme was derived from question 20: Are there any important lessons that you have learned as the result of 9/11?

<sup>a</sup>+ = consistent with what was found in the literature review.

The literature review provided a snapshot about communication problems between different law enforcement agencies during the Montgomery County sniper incidents (Lichtblau, 2002). Currently, the Central Florida Domestic Security Task Force is seeking federal funds to procure a statewide radio communication system to be shared by law enforcement agencies in the region.

Cote's (2000) research broached theme 5, in that he found the problem with smaller agencies was that they did

not have the resources (personnel and funding) to handle terrorism. Cote' determined that larger agencies were more likely to become involved in terrorism training and preparedness. Table 4.20 describes the sentiments of the participants in this area.

One participant (PD2/Asst. Dir. AB) thought that an important impact of 9/11 was that citizens were more appreciative of law enforcement (theme 6). His comment was, "I think that the exact day changed the world's view of law enforcement, not that we were particularly villainous...but there was less than enough appreciation of...what law enforcement...did..." (Interview transcript; Assistant Director AB, July 30, 2003).

I did not review that aspect in this research. There was no information in the literature review that adequately covered the communities' increased appreciation of the police (theme 6), because the latter was not a focus of this study. However, the outpouring of community sympathy and appreciation for both police and fire services after 9/11 was evident, and adequately covered in the media and Assistant Director AB's sentiment can conceivably be verified.

**Table 4.20*****Secondary Theme 5: Smaller Communities & Their Law******Enforcement Agencies are Overlooked***

Agency/ Participant	Comment	Consistency with literature <sup>a</sup>
PD4/Dir. CB	"We have done as much as we can for a small dept & we've done it all ourselves, because this federal help I haven't seen it."	+
PD5/Chief DE	"[The feds] have provided [training] for the larger cities & not the smaller cities. Forgetting to realize that small cities don't have the equipment & you have a whole lot of small cities..."	+
PD7/Chief FG	"We didn't get much in the beginning because of our population, we only have about 4,000 people..."	+

*Note.* This secondary theme was derived from question 20: Are there any important lessons that you have learned as a result of 9/11?

<sup>a</sup>+ = consistent with what was found in the literature review.

**Table 4.21*****Secondary Theme 7: Changes in Law Enforcement are Permanent***

Agency/ Participant <sup>a</sup>	Comment	Consistency with literature <sup>b</sup>
PD2/Asst. Dir. AB & Chief BA	(AB) "...we can never be comfortable again from this point forward. From now [on] we will certainly be prepared." (BA) "...we have added a completely [new] dimension [at the port]..."	+
PD3/Chief BC	"...the changes are going to have to continue. This [terrorism] has changed the way we do business forever."	+

Note. This secondary theme was derived from question 21: Are there any other statements that you might want to make regarding the impact of 9/11 on law enforcement?

<sup>a</sup>PD2 has 2 participants. <sup>b</sup>+ = consistent with what was found in the literature.

The literature review found that terrorism in the U.S. will have an indefinite impact on law enforcement, but the permanency is yet undetermined (theme 7). After the Oklahoma City bombing, Pre-9/11 writers (Wright, Ostrow and Cimon, 1995) doubted that there would be sweeping changes

in law enforcement due to terrorism. However, measures by the federal government to aid law enforcement in the battle against terrorism, such as certain sections in the USA PATRIOT ACT are significant, but only temporary. But the literature shows that there was a rush to protect the U.S. from terrorism and the sense of urgency significantly impacted U.S. local law enforcement and continues to do so currently (FDLE, 2001; Buisch, 2002; Delattre, 2002; Krull, 2002; Mundy, 2002; Horne, 2003).

### ***Summary***

The participants provided answers to the research questions by describing the changes 9/11 had on law enforcement. Those answers suggest the following:

1. Funding was not easily obtained by law enforcement agencies from federal authorities. When funding was provided to local law enforcement agencies by federal authorities, it was insufficient to cover the complete cost of training or equipment needs. Most agencies absorbed the cost in their budgets or used other funding sources or creative means to offset the cost of training, vigilance and equipment purchases.
2. Vigilance was increased by all law enforcement agencies through enhanced security measures,

additional personnel and special enforcement efforts.

3. Training approaches changed for all agencies, and WMD and terrorism-related training were hastily added to regular police training, becoming part of mandatory training for all Florida law enforcement agencies.
4. Bias-based policing practices did not increase for local law enforcement agencies; in fact all participants expressed sensitivity for Arabic or Middle Eastern citizens and were careful to ensure that bias-based policing did not occur in their areas of responsibility. The participants prevented bias-based policing through the department's philosophy, policies and managerial oversight and violators were disciplined accordingly. None of the agencies reported any bias-based or racial profiling incidents. However, some agencies reported increased concerns from Arabic, Middle Eastern and Jewish communities about the possibility of hate crimes on their temples, mosques and businesses. One agency reported a hate-crime against a Middle Eastern citizen.



5. Terrorism related calls for service primarily involved suspected anthrax, suspicious packages and in some cases, suspicious persons of Arabic or Middle Eastern descent. Such calls for service increased immediately after 9/11 or shortly thereafter (October 2001) in two communities due to other circumstances; decreased 6 months later and police agencies are primarily dealing with the normal calls for service currently.
6. Although there were distinctions in certain policies of accredited and nonaccredited agencies, the researcher did not find any distinction between the practices of accredited and nonaccredited agencies, as it related to 9/11.

This chapter has provided the answers to the research questions in the language of the participants. The participants' own words echo those of previous researchers and authors in the same subject areas and contribute to broadening the knowledge of law enforcement's response to terrorism. The participants' descriptions describe why it is important to not allow bias-based profiling to erode the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens. The next chapter will discuss the findings, conclusions and implications.

## Chapter V

### Findings, Conclusions and Implications

#### Introduction

"On September 10<sup>th</sup> we were dismayed that people did not respect or care about what we did. No one cared that the ladders we used to climb up from the basements of old buildings were dilapidated or rickety. But on September 14<sup>th</sup> we were ashamed to find out that people really cared, because the outpouring of love and affection was overwhelming and tremendous" (L. Knowles, personal communication, September 2, 2003). As told by Knowles at the Women in Policing conference, San Francisco, in describing comments of an anonymous New York City Fire Department firefighter a few days after 9/11.

Chapter 5 will provide a summary of the study, which reviews the two primary research questions, subset questions, and the data collected and analyzed. Secondly, in the conclusions, this chapter will present the researcher's personal evaluation of the results of this work and relevant previous work supporting the findings. Third, recommendations for further research areas are discussed. Fourth, implications of what should be done and how it should be done regarding the impact of 9/11 on law

enforcement practices are outlined. Finally, areas and issues that this research briefly visited or does not cover will be examined for possible future research.

### ***Summary of the study***

This research sought to follow the path that local law enforcement agencies took after the terrorist events of 9/11 and herein described in the following research questions:

1. What changes did the September 11, 2001 domestic terrorism events and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have on accredited and nonaccredited law enforcement agencies, directly following the terrorism attack, 6 months after and currently in the following areas:
  - A. Funding
  - B. Vigilance
  - C. Training
  - D. Bias-based policing
  - E. Call response
2. What was the distinction, if any, between the practices of accredited and nonaccredited law enforcement agencies post 9/11?

Although, similar previous academic research was limited in this subject area, a review of the literature

did find that local police departments were not adequately prepared to deal with terrorism in the U.S. The limitations were in funding and training needed to prepare police personnel for terrorism events. The review also found that local police were facing federal pressure to change certain practices that would lead to bias-based policing against Middle Eastern and Arabic citizens, and the pros and cons were delineated. The literature review also provided part of the basis for developing the survey instrument used for the law enforcement population. The survey instrument was consistent with the data sought in the research questions (see Appendix E).

The research population involved 63 local law enforcement agencies in the South Florida counties of Indian River, St. Lucie, Martin, Palm Beach, Broward and Miami-Dade. Twenty-nine law enforcement agencies responded to the survey instrument, which represented a 46% response rate. From the respondents, I selected and visited 7 agencies and interviewed 8 executives (two at one agency). The data gleaned from these interviews were supportive of six major findings.

First, funding was not easily obtained by law enforcement agencies from federal authorities. When funding was provided to local law enforcement agencies by

federal authorities, it was insufficient to cover the complete cost of training or equipment needs. All 7 agencies absorbed the cost in their budgets or used other funding sources or creative means to offset the cost of training. Two agencies used federal grants to purchase WMD equipments (PD3 and PD7) and one agency was given some equipment (PD5). Two agencies used their own funds to purchase equipment (PD1 and PD2) and one agency simply did without equipment and was awaiting funds promised by the federal authorities (PD4). One agency (PD6) used a combination of their regular budgeted funds and non terrorism related grants to obtain equipment.

Second, vigilance was increased by all law enforcement agencies through enhanced security measures, additional personnel and special enforcement efforts. Such increases included: (1) increased personnel at three agencies (PD1, PD2 and PD6); (2) redirection and reassignment of personnel toward homeland security at one agency (PD2); and (3) enhanced focus on likely soft targets for terrorism by all agencies. Focuses also included Jewish temples, a rabbinical school and Mosques, which were done as a precautionary measure against hate crimes.

Third, training approaches changed for all agencies and were concentrated on WMD and terrorism-related issues.

Less emphasis was placed on the standard police training, as terrorism related training took its place. Civilian or nonsworn personnel were included in the training at two agencies (PD2 and PD5).

Fourth, bias-based policing practices did not increase for local law enforcement agencies; in fact all participants expressed sensitivity for Arabic or Middle Eastern citizens and were careful to ensure that bias-based policing did not occur in their areas of responsibility. The participants prevented bias-based policing through the department's philosophy, policies and managerial oversight and violators were disciplined accordingly. None of the agencies reported any bias-based or racial profiling incidents involving their personnel. However, some agencies reported increased concerns from Arabic, Middle Eastern and Jewish communities about the possibility of hate crimes on their temples, mosques and businesses. One agency reported a single hate-crime, which was perpetrated against a Muslim.

Fifth, terrorism related calls for service primarily involved suspected anthrax, suspicious packages and in some cases suspicious persons of Arabic or Middle Eastern descent. Such calls for service did increase immediately after 9/11 or shortly thereafter (October 2001) in two

communities to other circumstances; decreased 6 months later and police agencies are primarily dealing with the normal calls for service currently.

Lastly, although there were distinctions in certain policies of accredited and nonaccredited agencies, the researcher did not find any distinction between the practices of accredited and nonaccredited agencies, as it relates to 9/11.

### **Conclusions**

The research design in this study began with a traditional survey instrument used to extract information pertaining to 9/11 from local police agencies. I selected police executives from the respondents and collected data through: (1) in-depth, open-ended interviews; (2) direct observation; and (3) written documents. I was able to analyze and synthesize the data of the 8 respondents, developing important findings that were consistent with what others in the literature review had determined.

I conclude that 9/11 increased WMD/terrorism training for law enforcement agencies, but current law enforcement training was left intact. Authors that I reviewed supported the need for WMD/terrorism training and noted the subsequent shift following 9/11 (Cote', 2000; Lober, 2002; Moore, 2002; Police Standards, 2001). I experienced a mad

dash for WMD/terrorism training a few weeks after 9/11 and state mandates quickly changed the training requirements. Subsequently, police agencies had to rush their personnel through mandatory WMD/terrorism training, which has become standard for all law enforcement agencies in Florida. I participated in the regional terrorism task force, which assisted in augmenting training at my own agency.

However, the major impact of WMD/terrorism training was financial and funding was primarily absorbed by the law enforcement agencies. Although 17 of the survey respondents reported receiving some funding from federal or state government for terrorism training or WMD equipment, 11 did not receive any funding or assistance outside of their own budgets or nonterrorism grant funding sources (see Table 4.1). I did not receive any monetary assistance from the federal or state government for training or WMD equipment at my own agency, and it required the expenditure of regular budgeted funds and the Law Enforcement Trust Fund. During the final writing of this research, I received a few WMD suits via the regional task force from the federal equipment grant, which was promised to law enforcement agencies. Only 2 of the 8 executives interviewed received federal funding and they also said that it was limited.



Therefore, I conclude that funding from the federal government is promised, but the majority of the agencies executives interviewed are in a "wait and see" mode (Modzelewski, 2003). Chapters 2 and 3 identify federal funding sources, but note how federal funding is scarce and being reprioritized to meet WMD/terrorism needs (Weedon, 2002). Cote' (2000) found that funds were the biggest obstacle that local law enforcement agencies faced in developing counter terrorism training procedures and policies.

I conclude that vigilance in varying degrees increased significantly for all local law enforcement agencies. The 8 participants expressed how vigilance was increased at their agencies, out of necessity due to 9/11 and the literature supported their assertions (Wright, Ostrow and Cimon, 1995; Delattre, 2002; Horne, 2003). Supportive of this conclusion were the physical security changes at the law enforcement infrastructure itself, additional security measures put in place that I observed. Prior to 9/11, "Only the very large agencies have taken the necessary steps to respond to terrorist incidents" (Cote', 2000, p. 68). Of course, I conclude that the latter is no longer true.

Through interviews of the 8 participants, I conclude that the impact of 9/11 served to strengthen the resilience of law enforcement agencies to provide constitutionally based law enforcement practices. The researcher's conclusion about bias-based policing is supported and augmented by what was discovered during the compilation of the research material. Chapter 2 discussed the significance of the U.S. Constitution on law enforcement practices and the participants. Chapter 4 spoke of the importance of abiding by constitutional practices: (1) indirectly; by referencing policies, mission statements and department philosophy, or (2) directly; by referencing the U.S. Constitution.

The findings suggest that law enforcement executives are cognizant of the need to exercise nonbias-based policing, even in the face of a changing society and a limited number of people intent on disrupting a free society through terrorism. The 8 executives have gone to great lengths to ensure that their policies against bias-based policing are in place and adhered to within their various commands. The evidence can be found in the mission statements of 6 of the 7 law enforcement agencies, PD7 being the sole exception.

Additionally, two agencies, whose executives were participants, reported significant populations of Middle Eastern citizens (Arabic or Jewish communities) and how they (PD2 and PD3) were cementing their relationships with their Jewish or Arabic communities, rather than targeting them with bias-based policing. Previous work discussed in the literature review said the latter is the right thing to do (Delattre, 2002; Hooverman, 2002; Raterman, 2002). As suggested by previous research that local law enforcement had increased racial profiling against Middle Eastern individuals (Hoover, 2002; New Profilees, 2002), I conclude that the contrary is being observed and practiced.

It has been my experience, in my 33 years in law enforcement, that law enforcement agencies have been "browbeaten" by civil liberty organizations and federal legislature over the past decade to ensure that bias-based practices are eliminated. The result is the emergence of a new professional law enforcement executive to carry out modern day policing and safeguard the rights of all citizens. I share the same conclusions as the researcher and notable police expert, George Kelling (Nichols, 2003), who concludes that terrorism is just another hurdle in the field of law enforcement that must be dealt with. But it cannot be at the expense of trampling the civil rights of

Arabic, Muslim and Middle Eastern citizens, or law enforcement will return to the era of "Jim Crow" and the civil rights disturbances of the 60s.

I conclude that WMD/terrorism related calls for service did increase significantly during the first few weeks after 9/11, 6 months later were essentially back to normal levels and remain as such currently. Even in a community wherein the general populace was seasonal (Town C, PD4, Dir. CB), once the residents returned home in October 2001, they began calling law enforcement reporting suspicious packages, persons, etc. All of the calls proved to be false, with the lone exception of PD1, which had the only authentic anthrax call that exacerbated other false calls in October 2001. In the words of the participants, no department was left unscathed by the calls for service increases.

I conclude that there was no significant fluctuation in the changes in training, funding, vigilance and bias-based policing practices by law enforcement after 9/11. Six months after and currently, what law enforcement agencies did in these areas remains constant and are included in daily police practices, as a way of doing day-to-day business. There was an immediate spike in providing WMD/terrorism training and heightened awareness immediately

after 9/11, but calls for service is the only area that fluctuated significantly, with a peak and then a return to normal.

I conclude that accreditation played no significant role in how law enforcement agencies reacted to 9/11, and as such, did not find any difference between accredited and nonaccredited agencies. Three of the agencies were not accredited and demonstrated the same reaction to 9/11 as the other four accredited agencies. The value of accreditation to agencies participating in this study was found in its professionalism, accountability and policy development, which could provide some leverage against racial profiling or bias-based policing.

I used a diverse group of police executives who were of different racial backgrounds and also added a female police chief, to determine if there was a difference in their perspectives. The 8 executives interviewed were 4 White males, 3 Black males and 1 Black female. The findings were all consistent, regardless of race or gender. Therefore, I concluded that race and gender did not impact the responses of the participants.

This research broached a subject rarely studied, prior to 9/11 and the absence of previous academic studies bare out this conclusion. This research is contemporary,

indicative of current world trends and the involvement of the U.S., both at home and abroad, in the fight against terrorism.

### ***Implications***

The implications of this research for the practitioner suggest that law enforcement agencies must be prudent, creative and flexible in finding financial resources to provide additional training and equipment needed to face the new demands of terrorism. The latter is essential in the public sector that already operates amidst shrinking public dollars and a reprioritization of federal funding. The participants in this study used all of the means aforementioned, when faced with no or limited federal dollars to offset the cost of terrorism. Prudence is demonstrated in common-sense approaches, e.g., coordinating with other agencies to reduce expenditures and adopting a "train the trainer" approach, wherein once learned by one department member, other members of a department are trained. Creativity is demonstrated in using alternative training sources, e.g., obtaining pertinent terrorism training information from a state web site. Flexibility is demonstrated in redirecting regular funds, grants and forfeiture proceeds for terrorism purposes. The importance of collaborated training efforts among area law enforcement

agencies, as well as fire departments cannot be understated, because it has been proven beneficial to local police departments in this study.

A new sense of urgency is clearly upon the U.S. and that has been placed squarely on the shoulders of local law enforcement agencies to protect its citizens against once unimaginable acts of terrorism. As suggested by Moore and Duggan (2002), the federal government will exert local police departments to take a more active role in homeland security. As such, for the practitioner, the implications are that increased vigilance is here and is applicable to the smallest rural law enforcement agency, and also the largest metropolitan agency. However, the magnitude and scope of this increased vigilance will be determined by the resource capacity (funding and staffing) of the service provider and the dictates of its service community.

Training changes are nothing new in law enforcement and have consistently evolved over the years. For example, when I began my law enforcement career in 1970, training was primarily on the job, in the hands of a season veteran who taught you "the ropes." Then, the police academy was only six weeks, unlike the current police academy that is on the average 4 months. Today, police training in the U.S. is determined by the time period, trends and events,

and new legislation based on constitutional interpretations, dictated in part by society. Law enforcement executives must adapt to the training needs and in the case of terrorism, this adaptation is based on the need to have police officers familiar with WMD and terrorism.

The implications of this research suggest that local law enforcement must not have a "knee-jerk" reaction to events, such as terrorism that would undermine the efforts made in the past to maintain ethics and professionalism in law enforcement. The latter has important implications to legislators and other lawmakers. Constitutional principles must be maintained regardless of the actions of a few that have resorted to insane terrorism tactics. If law enforcement agencies engage in unconstitutional practices, it will undermine the democratic system and be tantamount to a move closer to becoming a police state. There must be a balance between the rights of citizens and right to live in a free and safe society. The question arises, "How does law enforcement find that balance?"

Just as many of the participant agencies have done, increased dialogue by law enforcement between members of the community, especially Middle Eastern, Jewish and Arabic communities are important in preventing bias-based



practices. The implications suggest that community-policing practices are still important, as the police must still bridge the gap between communities and law enforcement through reach-out efforts. Communities must note the latter and maintain open lines of communication with law enforcement as well. Policies, organizational philosophies and education of police officers against bias-based policing practices are equally important in preventing unethical practices. The agency head sets the standard and the overall tone of the police organization, so he/she is a crucial factor in finding a balance that ensures civil liberty, while yet maintaining the safety of the community.

Does a police executive say no when asked to violate the constitutional rights of citizens by another agency? The answer must be unequivocally no, and as learned in this study, the reaction of many local agencies have been a resounding "no" to requests to disregard rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution (Shank, 2001).

Calls for service are what drive the police agency and in time past, the police profession has assured the public that it can provide a swift response, which proved to be a dismal failure. Nevertheless, as the literature review and participants suggests, suspicious WMD/terrorism related

calls for services did increase significantly after 9/11 and will likely happen again when the next terrorism event occurs in the U.S. As in the aftermath of 9/11 and foreseeable in the future, the overwhelming majority of such calls will be false. Mitigating the plethora of false calls are a must and the implications suggest that to carry out the former, WMD/terrorism training in the communities and better communication between the police and the media in terrorism, as prescribed by Barnathan, (1987) and discussed by three of the participants are required.

This brings the researcher to a major implication, which is the independence of law enforcement agencies. U.S. local law enforcement agencies are primarily autonomous, and act independently and under the control of their respective government. However, as noted by Furay (1999) and Cote' (2000), law enforcement agencies must be interdependent on other law enforcement agencies in order to successfully address the issues of training, funding and vigilance. To a lesser degree, this interdependence contributes to reducing bias-based policing and handling increased call response. Interdependence is not only a resource saver, it also puts all parties on the same page, so to speak. Similar actions, done together, emerge as centralization and consolidation which, as the literature

review denotes, provides considerable benefits in handling terrorism events (Furay, 1999; Cote', 2000; FDLE, 2001; Beary, 2002; Lichtblau, 2002).

Implications of accreditation suggest that it is worthwhile if the law enforcement agency has the means to pursue it. Although all of the participants recognized the value and importance of accreditation, staffing and funding requirements to implement or revise policies to meet the accreditation standard was a drawback. The implications suggest that when an executive recognizes the importance of accreditation and exercises the values in practices used at his/her agency, actual accreditation is not a necessity. Accreditation had little significance in this study.

Finally, although the participants spoke of increased security measures in their service areas and their facilities, the implications suggest that security remains more in name than in actual practice at the police agencies. I was able to enter police facilities without major challenges and bypass the standard security protocol, simply by stating who I was at all 7 of the police facilities. I was wearing a badge only on one occasion (PD2) and was allowed to bypass the electronic screening device. I was never in uniform and did not have any personal knowledge of the staff responsible for screening.

Of course, the only exception would have been at PD5. Nevertheless, local police practitioners must exercise better security measures in their own back yards before seeking to strengthen security in other areas.

### ***Recommendations for Further Study and Future research***

Although this research found answers to the questions posed, it also opened doors in other areas associated with law enforcement and the aftermath of 9/11. The participants spoke of improved and increased cooperation between law enforcement agencies at the federal, state and local levels as the result of 9/11. In the words of the participants, cooperation among different levels of law enforcement has improved response to terrorism and conserved funding through consolidated training. Cote' (2000, p. 68) found, "In a business of limited funds and scarce resources. ...Most agencies have now turned to mutual aid agreements and coordinated response drills." Smaller agencies are able to rely on the larger agencies to fill in gaps that are left in the smaller agencies. Further research should delve into this new level of cooperation among law enforcement agencies to determine if it is consistent with the findings of this study and to determine its effectiveness in handling terrorist events.

The second area of cooperation was noted between fire departments and law enforcement agencies after 9/11. It has been my experience that fire departments are already advanced far beyond police departments in the application of incident command, which is needed in handling terrorism events and those in law enforcement can learn valuable lessons from fire departments. Subsequently, as noted in this study, fire department are included in Florida's regional terrorism task forces and work collaboratively with law enforcement. The research could be extended into these areas to determine the extent and benefit of such cooperation.

This research could be duplicated in other regions in the State of Florida, or expanded to include the entire state. It would be important to see if the findings in other sections of the state are consistent with the findings of this study. Lastly, there is a plethora of data collected from the 63 South Florida law enforcement agencies that would be valuable in quantitative research on the subject of this research.

This study examined the impact of 9/11 on law enforcement practices from September 11, 2001 to the current date, October 11, 2003. The time period has been slightly over 2 years. Future research should follow with

a longitudinal study, perhaps over the next 5 years, to see if the changes discussed are long lasting. It would be important to determine how local government, citizens and law enforcement adjusted.

Another area for future research is funding from the federal government to local law enforcement agencies. Currently, the U.S. has major financial commitments in Iraq, in an effort to rebuild that country, amidst terrorism, which has taken its human toll among the U.S. military and the populace. A future study should determine if federal funding, as suggested by the literature review, is still on the path for redirection to local law enforcement for terrorism. It would be important to determine if there was a change in funding and identify the possible cause as the current Iraqi crises.

This research may have a limitation based on its qualitative nature and difficulty in generalizing the results to a larger population, due to its small sample size (Patton, 1990). Extrapolation of the data of the participants was used in this research rather than generalization. Therefore, future research might look at a larger population or even a quantitative approach, so that hard data could provide a statistically precise finding, based on generalization.

## ***Final summary***

The purpose of this study was to determine the impact of 9/11 on the practices of local law enforcement agencies. The focus areas were training, funding, vigilance, bias-based policing, and call response (calls for service). The two types of agencies reviewed were accredited and nonaccredited. The findings were that local law enforcement agencies: (1) did not obtain sufficient funding from the federal government to cover the cost of terrorism; (2) increased their vigilance; (3) increased their training to include WMD and terrorism issues; (4) did not engage in bias-based policing; (5) experienced increased calls for service primarily involving suspicious packages, incidents, etc.; and (6) did not act differently due to their accreditation status. The findings revealed that calls for services returned to normal level 6 months after 9/11 and are currently at pre-9/11 levels. However, the other areas of interest remained constant, regardless of any change after 9/11.

Based on the findings, I have concluded that 9/11 impacted law enforcement financially, and increased cooperation and information sharing among all levels of law enforcement. Terrorism training for all agencies became the standard practice because it was mandated by Florida

Statutes to incorporate it as part of the law enforcement-training curriculum. I have concluded that although the federal government promised funding, it was received in insufficient amounts by relatively few agencies and was not enough to offset the budgetary impact on the agency. I concluded that vigilance was increased at all agencies, based on their fiscal ability to enhance security at their facilities and in their communities. The local law enforcement agency executives interviewed did not practice bias-based policing and therefore I have concluded that it did not occur as suspected by some in the literature review. I have concluded that there was an increased in calls for service by all agencies, however, currently calls for service are back to normal. I have concluded that accredited and nonaccredited agencies acted the same after 9/11. Finally, although the original questions did not factor in race or sex of the participants, I used a diverse group to determine if the responses would be different, based on race and sex. The findings were consistent and I have concluded that race and sex did not impact the findings of this study.

The data discovered in this study may not be sufficient to generalize to a larger population, but the findings and conclusion were extrapolated from the words of



the participants. The latter provides a rich narrative and descriptive account of the direction of local law enforcement. Although bias-based policing did not emerge as a problem and whether an agency was accredited or not accredited did not factor negatively into the findings, prevalent themes suggested that local law enforcement agencies were inadequately prepared or trained and sorely lacking in funding and communication immediately following 9/11. Remaining challenges suggest that local law enforcement in the U.S. may not have the requisite experience, funding and communication flow to sufficiently deal with terrorism.

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## **APPENDIX A**

### **U.S. Constitution, Bill of Rights**

#### **Amendment I**

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

#### **Amendment II**

A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.

#### **Amendment III**

No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

#### **Amendment IV**

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

#### **Amendment V**

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

#### **Amendment VI**

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and



cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

Amendment VII

In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

Amendment VIII

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

Amendment IX

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

Amendment X

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.

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## **APPENDIX B**

### **Law Enforcement Oath of Honor**

**Source: International Association of Chiefs of Police**

On my honor,

I will never betray my badge,

my integrity, my character,

or the public trust.

I will always have

the courage to hold myself

and others accountable for our actions.

I will always uphold the constitution,

my community and the agency I serve.

## **APPENDIX C**

### **Law Enforcement Code of Ethics**

**Source: International Association of Chiefs of Police**

As a law enforcement officer, my fundamental duty is to serve the community; to safeguard lives and property; to protect the innocent against deception, the weak against oppression or intimidation and the peaceful against violence or disorder; and to respect the constitutional rights of all to liberty, equality and justice.

I will keep my private life unsullied as an example to all and will behave in a manner that does not bring discredit to me or to my agency. I will maintain courageous calm in the face of danger, scorn or ridicule; develop self-restraint; and be constantly mindful of the welfare of others. Honest in thought and deed both in my personal and official life, I will be exemplary in obeying the law and the regulations of my department. Whatever I see or hear of a confidential nature or that is confided in me in my official capacity will be kept ever secret unless revelation is necessary in the performance of my duty.

I will never act officiously or permit personal feelings, prejudices, political beliefs, aspirations, animosities or friendships to influence me decisions. With no compromise for crime and with relentless prosecution of

criminals, I will enforce the law courteously and appropriately without fear or favor, malice or ill will, never employing unnecessary force or violence and never accepting gratuities.

I recognize the badge of my office as a symbol of public faith, and I accept it as a public trust to be held so long as I am true to the ethics of police service. I will never engage in acts of corruption or bribery, nor will I condone such acts by other police officers. I will cooperate with all legally authorized agencies and their representatives in the pursuit of justice.

I know that I alone am responsible for my own standard of professional performance and will take every reasonable opportunity to enhance and improve my level of knowledge and competence.

I will constantly strive to achieve these objectives and ideals, dedicating myself before God to my chosen profession . . . law enforcement.

## APPENDIX D

### Letter of Introduction for September 11<sup>th</sup> Survey

[Date]

I am Ph.D. student at Lynn University, Boca Raton, Florida preparing a study on the aftermath of the terrorist events of September 11, 2001 and their impact on law enforcement. My dissertation is entitled "Examining the Post September 11, 2001 Practices of Accredited and Nonaccredited Law Enforcement Agencies in the Aspects of Training, Legal and Service Delivery." I would ask that you kindly complete the attached survey and return it to me in the enclosed self-addressed stamped envelope by July 15, 2003. I will be selecting 6 police executives from the respondents for personal interviews.

Your assistance would contribute toward the completion of my dissertation. Your cooperation would be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely, I am

Chief of Police

P.S. If you cannot open the file, please notify me and I will forward the survey via U.S. Mail.

## APPENDIX E

### September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 Survey

The purpose of this research project is to study the aftermath of the terrorist events of September 11, 2001 and its impact on your agency in the areas of terrorism/WMD training, calls for service, legal issues and funding. The survey should take between 20 and 25 minutes of your time. Your responses to the questions are confidential and the information from the survey will only be assessable to the primary investigator. You have the right to stop responding to the survey at any time and discontinue your participation in this research.

Please complete the survey and e-mail to [REDACTED] or return via mail in the self-addressed prepaid envelope, or fax to [REDACTED] by July 15, 2003.

1. What is the size of your agency? Sworn \_\_\_\_\_  
nonsworn \_\_\_\_\_
2. Is your agency accredited?  
National \_\_\_\_\_  
State \_\_\_\_\_  
National & State \_\_\_\_\_  
No \_\_\_\_\_
3. Do you have a policy against racial profiling or bias-based policing? \_\_\_\_\_
4. If yes, does your policy address specific minority, ethnic or religious groups? \_\_\_\_\_  
(a) If yes, please list the group(s). \_\_\_\_\_
5. Has your department been approached to be more vigilant toward certain groups, e.g., Muslim, persons of Arabic descent or with Islamic belief?  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(a) If so, by whom? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(b) Did your agency comply with the request? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(c) Were there any ethical or legal concerns about bias-based policing? \_\_\_\_\_
6. Are there a significant number of Muslim, persons of Arabic descent or with Islamic beliefs in your service community? \_\_\_\_\_

7. Were there any departmental policies, plans, etc., to handle weapons of mass destruction (WMD) prior to September 11, 2001? \_\_\_\_\_
8. Were departmental policies or plans changed after September 11, 2001? \_\_\_\_\_
9. Were there any terrorism/WMD training requirements prior to September 11, 2001? \_\_\_\_\_ (a) After September 11, 2001? \_\_\_\_\_ (b) Do these training components continue today? \_\_\_\_\_
10. Was there an increase in the number of WMD calls from the public? \_\_\_\_\_
11. Are there a similar number of calls today? \_\_\_\_\_
12. Did your agency receive funding from federal or state governments (outside of your own fiscal entity) for terrorism/WMD training, related equipment or for increased vigilance? \_\_\_\_\_
13. Are there any other statements you might want to make regarding the impact of September 11, 2001 on law enforcement? \_\_\_\_\_

## APPENDIX F

### Alphabetical listing of Law Enforcement Agencies Surveyed

Agency	Jurisdiction	County
1. Bal Harbour Police Dept	city	Miami-Dade
2. Bay Harbor Island Police Dept	city	Miami-Dade
3. Belle Glade Police Dept	city	Palm Bch.
4. Boca Raton Police Dept	city	Palm Bch.
5. Boynton Beach Police Dept	city	Palm Bch.
6. Broward County Sheriff's Office	county	Broward
7. Coconut Creek Police Dept	city	Broward
8. Cooper City Police Dept	city	Broward
9. Coral Gables Police Dept	city	Miami-Dade
10. Coral Springs Police Dept	city	Broward
11. Davie Police Dept	city	Broward
12. Delray Beach Police Dept	city	Palm Bch.
13. Florida City Police Dept	city	Miami-Dade
14. Fort Lauderdale Police Dept	city	Broward
15. Fort Pierce Police Dept	city	St. Lucie
16. Hallandale Police Dept	city	Miami-Dade
17. Hialeah Police Dept	city	Miami-Dade
18. Hialeah Gardens Police Dept	city	Miami-Dade
19. Highland Beach Police Dept	city	Broward
20. Hollywood Police Dept	city	Broward
21. Homestead Police Dept	city	Miami-Dade
22. Juno Beach Police Dept	city	Palm Bch.
23. Jupiter Police Dept	city	Palm Bch.
24. Jupiter Island Public Safety Dept	city	Martin
25. Lake Worth Police Dept	city	Palm Bch.
26. Lantana Police Dept	city	Palm Bch.
27. Lauderhill Police Dept	city	Broward
28. Lighthouse Point Police Dept	city	Broward
29. Margate Police Dept	city	Broward
30. Martin County Sheriff's Office	county	Martin
31. Medley Police Dept	city	Miami-Dade
32. Miami Police Dept	city	Miami-Dade
33. Miami Beach Police Dept	city	Miami-Dade
34. Miami-Dade Police Dept	county	Miami-Dade
35. Miami Shores Police Dept	city	Miami-Dade
36. Miami Springs Police Dept	city	Miami-Dade
37. Miramar Police Dept	city	Broward
38. North Bay Village Police Dept	city	Miami-Dade
39. North Miami Police Dept	city	Miami-Dade
40. North Miami Beach Police Dept	city	Miami-Dade



41. North Palm Beach Police Dept	city	Miami-Dade
42. Opa Locka Police Dept	city	Miami-Dade
43. Pahokee Police Dept	city	Palm Bch.
44. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office	county	Palm Beach
45. Palm Beach Police Dept	city	Palm Bch.
46. Palm Beach Gardens Police Dept	city	Palm Bch.
47. Palm Beach Shores Police Dept	city	Palm Bch.
48. Parkland Police Dept	city	Broward
49. Pembroke Pines Police Dept	city	Broward
50. Plantation Police Dept	city	Broward
51. Port St. Lucie Police Dept	city	St. Lucie
52. Riviera Beach Police Dept	city	Palm Bch.
53. Royal Palm Beach Police Dept	city	Palm Bch.
54. South Bay Police Dept	city	Palm Bch.
55. South Miami Police Dept	city	Miami-Dade
56. St. Lucie County Sheriff's Office	county	St. Lucie
57. Stuart Police Dept	city	Martin
58. Sunrise Police Dept	city	Broward
59. Surfside Police Dept	city	Miami-Dade
60. Tequesta Police Dept	city	Palm Bch.
61. Vero Beach Police Dept	city	Indian River
62. West Palm Beach Police Dept	city	Palm Bch.
63. Wilton Manor Police Dept	city	Broward

## **APPENDIX G**

### **Alphabetical Listing of Survey Respondents**

1. Belle Glade Police Dept
2. Boca Raton Police Dept
3. Boynton Beach Police Dept
4. Coral Springs Police Dept
5. Davie Police Dept
6. Fort Pierce Police Dept
7. Hollywood Police Dept
8. Jupiter Police Dept
9. Jupiter Island Public Safety Dept
10. Lantana Police Dept
11. Lauderhill Police Dept
12. Margate Police Dept
13. Martin County Sheriff's Office
14. Miami-Dade Police Dept
15. Miami Springs Police Dept
16. North Miami Police Dept
17. Opa Locka Police Dept
18. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office
19. Palm Beach Police Dept
20. Palm Beach Gardens Police Dept
21. Palm Beach Shores Police Dept
22. Parkland Police Dept
23. Riviera Beach Police Dept
24. South Bay Police Dept
25. South Miami Police Dept
26. St. Lucie County Sheriff's Office
27. Stuart Police Dept
28. Vero Beach Police Dept
29. West Palm Beach Police Dept

## **APPENDIX H**

### **Personal Interview Questions**

1. Why is your agency [not] accredited through CALEA or the State of Florida?
2. How do you prevent bias-based policing or racial profiling in your agency?
3. How did you handle complaints about bias-based policing or racial profiling prior to September 11, 2001?
4. How were bias-based policing or racial profiling complaints handled after September 11, 2001?
5. What type of policies addressing terrorism or WMD did your agency have prior to September 11, 2001?
6. What type of policies have you implemented as a result of domestic terrorism and increased homeland security?
7. How has increased security measures and the ever-present threat of domestic terrorism changed any other operational policies or practices?
8. What training methodologies changed?
9. What was the fiscal impact of training?
10. What type of additional equipment for WMD or terrorism has your agency purchased?
11. Can you describe the funding shortfalls, as the results of equipment and other operational expenses?

12. What type of additional funding or assistance did you receive from the federal government?
13. If you did not receive funding, how did you handle the fiscal impact?
14. How would you describe the calls-for-service, especially WMD or terrorism related calls, immediately after September 11, 2001?
15. How many calls were determined to be bona fide?
16. How would you describe the current calls-for-service or policing practices?
17. What was the most significant impact to your department as a result of the terrorists' events of September 11, 2001?
18. What was your attitude about terrorism prior to September 11, 2001?
19. What is your attitude today?
20. Are there any important lessons that you have learned as a result of 9/11?
21. Are there any other statements that you might want to make regarding the impact of September 11, 2001 on law enforcement?

## APPENDIX I

{Date}

{Recipient's Address}

Dear

I am the Chief of Police for the City of Fort Pierce, Florida and also a doctoral candidate at Lynn University in Boca Raton, Florida. The purpose of this letter is to invite you to participate in a research project. My dissertation topic is "Examining the Post September 11, 2001 Practices of Accredited and Nonaccredited Law Enforcement Agencies in the Aspects of Training, Legal and Service Delivery." I would greatly appreciate your participation in this study, which will be beneficial to those of us in the field of Law Enforcement.

This study involves a one-on-one interview and a follow up interview. The one-on-one interview will consist of open-ended questions about your professional experience in the aftermath of the terrorist events of September 11, 2002 and the impact on your agency. The interview will be tape recorded for a later analysis. Once the analysis has been completed, you will be contacted again for a follow up interview to review the analysis for accuracy. The total time involved in your participation will be approximately two to three hours and the information you provide will be kept strictly confidential!

The goal of this study is to assess the operational impact of terrorism/WMD training and call response and convey that impact in the form of a description. The description can then be used to help others better understand that experience and aid in the planning & preparation process. You have been selected because your law enforcement agency meets the criteria needed to make a proper assessment.

You will find enclosed two copies of the following forms: (1) "Informed Consent" and (2) "Informed Consent to Audio-Record." Please review the forms carefully. I would request that you sign and date each of the forms, and provide a telephone number in the space provided so I may contact you to set up the interview. Please maintain one copy of each form for yourself and return one copy of each form in the provided return envelope. Once I receive the forms, I will contact you to set up a time convenient for you to conduct the interview. I look forward to meeting with you.

If you have any questions about this study, please do not hesitate to contact me at [REDACTED]. If you have concerns that you do not want to address with me, you may call Dr. Carole Warshaw of Lynn University, Dissertation Committee Chairperson, at [REDACTED].

Sincerely, I am

Eugene G. Savage

## APPENDIX J

### INFORMED CONSENT

You have been asked to participate in a research study conducted by Eugene G. Savage, a doctoral student in the College of Education program at Lynn University, Boca Raton, Florida. The research involves "Examining the Post September 11, 2001 Practices of Accredited and Non-Accredited Law Enforcement Agencies in Aspects of Training, Legal and Service Delivery." The goal of this study is to assess the operational impact of terrorism/WMD training and call response and convey that impact in the form of a description. The description can then be used to help other law enforcement agencies better understand the experience and aid in the planning and preparation process. You have been selected because your law enforcement agency meets the criteria needed to make a proper assessment.

The study involves a one-on-one interview and follow-up interview. The one-on-one interview will consist of open-ended questions about your agencies experience in the aftermath of September 11<sup>th</sup>. The interview will be tape recorded for a later analysis. Once the analysis has been completed, you will be contacted again for a follow-up interview to review the analysis for accuracy. The total time involved in your participation will be approximately two to three hours.

The information you provide will be kept strictly confidential. The transcription of the interview will be coded with a number and an alias to protect your identity. Reports of this research will not include any identifiable data. The overall results of the research will be published in a doctoral dissertation as well as other possible venues (e.g. professional journal). Lynn University's Institutional Review Board has authorized access to all materials related to this research.

It is hoped that this research will benefit other law enforcement agencies to better understand the experience of terrorist events and the strategies needed to properly plan and prepare for them. The risk to you is considered low on a scale of low, medium, and high. The researcher is available by telephone [REDACTED] for contact at any time during this research. In addition, you may withdraw from this study at any time without negative consequences, for any reason you deem necessary. Should you withdraw, your data will be eliminated from the study and destroyed. If you do participate, your data will be coded to protect your identity and confidentiality, and kept in a locked security box for a period of five years. After five years, the data will be destroyed. There is no financial remuneration for participating in this study. Although highly unlikely, as a requirement of the Lynn University Institutional Review Board, revelation of any unethical or illegal behavior is subject to reporting to the appropriate authorities.

Upon request, a copy of the final research analysis will be provided to you at the conclusion of the research. If you have any questions about any aspect of this study or your involvement, feel free to ask at any time. If you have concerns about this project that you do not want to address with Eugene G. Savage, you may call Dr. Carole Warshaw Dissertation Committee Chairperson, Lynn University, at [REDACTED].

Two copies of this informed consent have been provided. Please sign both indicating you have read, understood, and agree to participate in this research. Please return one copy to the researcher and keep the other for your files.

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Name of Participant (please print)

Telephone Number

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Signature of Participant

Date

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Eugene G. Savage, Researcher

Date

APPENDIX K

INFORMED CONSENT TO AUDIO-RECORD

I, \_\_\_\_\_, give permission to have this interview recorded by means of an audio recording device. I understand the interview will be taped for data collection purposes specific to this research project only. The recording will be transcribed and coded. The recording and transcription will be maintained for a period of five years. At that time the recording and transcription will be destroyed. I understand that these tapes, as well as all written materials, are completely confidential.

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Name of Participant (please print)

Date

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Signature of Participant

Date

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Eugene G. Savage, Researcher

Date

## **APPENDIX L**

### **Mission Statement of PD1**

**Source: PD1 2003 Annual Report**

The [PD1] will enhance the quality of life in the City of [City A] through progressive police service in partnership with the community.

Vision - The finest people providing the best police services for our community.

Values -

Fairness: Maintaining impartiality and objectivity

Integrity: Adhering to the highest level of ethics and honesty

Respect: Demonstrating understanding and sensitivity to all

Service: Always putting others before self

Trust: Belief in the community and each other for the common good



## **APPENDIX M**

### **Mission Statement of the PD2**

**Source: PD2 2000 - 2001 Annual Report**

The [PD2] will commit its resources in partnership with the community to:

- Promote a safe and secure environment, free from crime and the fear of crime,
- Maintain order and provide for the safe and expeditious flow of traffic,
- Practice our core values of integrity, respect service, and fairness.

#### **Integrity**

Integrity is the hallmark of the [PD2] and we are committed [sic] to the highest performance standards, ethical conduct, and truthfulness in all relationships. We hold ourselves accountable for our actions and take pride in a professional level of service and fairness to all.

#### **Respect**

We treat all people in a dignified and courteous manner, and exhibit understanding of ethnic and cultural diversity, both in our professional and personal endeavors. We guarantee to uphold the principles and values embodied in the constitutions of the United State and the State of Florida.

#### **Service**

We provide quality service in a courteous, efficient, and accessible manner. We foster community and employee involvement through problem-solving partnerships.

#### **Fairness**

We treat all people impartially, with consideration and compassion. We are equally responsive to our employees and the community we serve.

## **APPENDIX N**

### **Mission statement of PD4**

**Source: [PD4] 2002 Annual Report**

#### **Our Commitment**

The Mission of the [PD4] is to provide the highest level of professional Law Enforcement, Fire & Emergency Medical Services for the unique community of [JI].

Our elite department members will accomplish this by continuing to ensure trust as responsive members of the [JI] family through dedication, integrity, competence, and courage.

## **APPENDIX O**

### **Mission Statement, Vision, Values and Motto of PD5**

**Source: [PD5] 2002 Annual Report**

#### **Mission Statement**

The [PD5], in partnership with the community, is committed to providing professional, efficient, and courteous public service by creating a safe environment and improving the quality of life for those we serve in an atmosphere of respect, courtesy and integrity.

"We are indebted to our employees, especially the men and women who risk their lives for this cause. We respect their dignity and recognize their merit."

#### **Vision**

The [PD5] will maintain the highest standards of professional ethics and integrity. We are committed to the philosophy of police and community collaboration. We will maintain partnerships and coalitions with the business, corporate and residential communities with the goal of reducing crime and improving the quality of life. We will provide a well-trained workforce, "state-of-the-art" technology and other resources to better protect our community. It is our continued commitment and honor to provide professional service to all.

#### **Values**

Display honesty, integrity and sincerity in personal conduct and interactions. Accept full responsibility and accountability for your actions. Judge others by their actions, not their race, gender or personal characteristics. Do your best, no matter how trivial the task. Choose the difficult right over the easy wrong. Look out for the group before you look out for yourself. Respect the law and the dignity of all human beings. Have empathy and compassion for others. Always strive for excellence and continuous improvement in everything you do.

#### **Motto**

"Proudly serving and protecting"